PANELS OF THE
VIIth WORLD SANSKRIT CONFERENCE
GENERAL EDITOR: JOHANNES BRONKHORST

VOLUME II

EARLIEST BUDDHISM AND MADHYAMAKA

EDITED BY

DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG
AND
LAMBERT SCHMITHAUSEN

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Kern Institute, Leiden: August 23-29, 1987

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TUTA SUB AEGIDE PALLAS · EJB ·

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E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KØBENHAVN • KÖLN
1990

ISBN 90 04 09246 3

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Part I: Earliest Buddhism

Preface

L. Schmithausen
Hamburg

When asking my colleagues to participate in a workshop on "Earliest Buddhism"*, I expected them to present papers not so much on doctrinal issues of "Early Buddhism"[1] in the sense of the canonical period prior to the development of different schools with their different positions; I expected them to discuss rather the question whether the doctrines found in the four Nikāyas and the early verse collections can or cannot be stratified into layers of different antiquity or elements of different provenience, layers which may, perhaps, even include such as contain the doctrine, or stages of the development of the doctrine, of the Buddha himself.

I was, of course, aware of the fact that this matter is still highly controversial. To be sure, most of the above-mentioned canonical texts are transmitted as instructions or utterances of the Buddha himself. But in view of the discrepancies between the versions of the different Buddhist schools as well as for other reasons, modern scholars will hardly assert that *all* these materials are *literal* transmissions of the Buddha's sermons (cp. also R. Gombrich's paper). But there is no agreement at all with regard to the question whether and to what extent these texts can be regarded as faithfully preserving the doctrine of the Buddha himself at least *in essence*, ad sensum (and, in *some* cases - but which ones? - perhaps even verbatim).

(1). Some (especially, but by no means exclusively, British) Buddhologists[2] stress the fundamental *homogeneity* and substantial *authenticity* of at least a considerable part of the Nikāyic materials. Accordingly they tend to take divergencies within these materials, and even incoherences (provided they admit them at all), to be of little significance; and they tend to regard creative, innovative doctrinal developments during the oral period of transmission to have been minimal or to have been successfully prevented from being included into the canon. On this assumption, the canonical texts are taken to yield a fairly coherent picture of the authentic doctrine of the Buddha himself, and in cases of scholarly disagreement on doctrinal issues the presentation of one truly unambiguous passage is considered to be sufficient for settling the matter for the canon in this entirety.[3]

(2). As against this, other scholars are extremely sceptical with regard to the possibility of retrieving the doctrine of earliest Buddhism, not to speak of the Buddha's own doctrine, from the canonical texts as we now have them. They point, e.g., to the fact that none of these texts were codified before the 1st century B.C. and that we do not know to what extent they were revised even afterwards;[4] to methodological difficulties in reconstructing the common, "pre-sectarian" heritage through a comparative study of the versions of the different schools;[5] or to the heterogeneity of their contents and to the fact that they have so far not yet been successfully stratified in a comprehensive manner.[6] These scholars therefore try to gather reliable information on earliest (or at least earlier) Buddhism from other sources, especially from inscriptions.

(3). Others[7] (including myself)[8] still continue to apply, to smaller pieces or larger bodies of text, the methods of higher criticism, like comparison of parallel versions or somehow related texts, textual analysis, or Formgeschichte,[9] in order to isolate accretions, different strata or heterogeneous components. To them, divergencies may indicate development or difference of milieu, etc., and inconsistencies of content or structure may signalize heterogeneity of the materials and compilatory or redactional activity. Yet, these methods of higher criticism will, at best, yield a *relative* sequence (or sequences) of textual layers and/or sequence (or sequences) of stages of doctrinal development. And it may not be easy to safely ascribe any such layer or stage (or layers/stages) to a definite date or even to the Buddha himself without additional criteria (cp. the appendix of T. Vetter's paper).

All the papers contributed to the present workshop establish or presuppose, somehow or other, that it is possible to retrieve at least the essentials of the doctrine of the Buddha himself. But whereas R. Gombrich and K.R. Norman side with position 1, the approaches of T. Vetter and N. Aramaki are based on position 3. R. Gombrich's paper contains a detailed methodological criticism of position 3 in favour of position 1, and an essay on - partly humorous or satirical - anti-brahminical statements in the canon as a typical feature of the authentic doctrine of the Buddha. K.R. Norman's article may be characterized as an attempt to reintegrate the divergencies, which were pointed out by me[10] with regard to the canonical materials on bodhi and Liberating Insight and which were interpreted, by Bronkhorst[11] and Vetter[12] also, as indicating different currents and/or stages of development, into a largely synchronic coherent picture of the authentic doctrine of the Buddha as represented by the majority of the canonical sources. T. Vetter, stressing that significant differences or nuances of content and terminology should be taken seriously, discusses some old portions of the Suttanipāta and their

relation to what he had, in an earlier paper,[13] established to be the original spiritual practice of the Buddha and its earliest developments. He shows that some Suttas of the Aṭṭhakavagga may be understood as being, in substance, "inclusions" stemming from a different group that came to be incorporated into the Gotama-saṅgha. N. Aramaki's paper[14] was concerned with the Attadaṇḍasutta (of the Suttanipāta) which he is inclined to regard as one of the oldest Suttas, probably the Buddha's own words, and as (one of) the starting-point(s) of all subsequent textual and doctrinal developments, and he tried to show how the central issue of this Sutta, viz. the answer to the question as to the ultimate cause of Saṃsāra, had been prefigured by similar concepts in Vedic/Brahminical tradition and early Jainism.

The discussion in the workshop left little doubt that the different approaches documented in the papers themselves are hardly compatible, and that neither party was convinced by the arguments or achievements of the other to the extent of changing sides. Thus, there is - apart from declaring the whole matter to be hopeless or simply disregarding other positions - no choice but to continue methodological discussion as well as the discussion on concrete issues.[15] As long as the method of dealing with the canonical materials is controversial, it would seem reasonable to try different approaches side by side and to test the heuristic value of each of them. For each approach and its presuppositions will probably lead to specific observations but prevent or distort, at the same time, the perception of other aspects. Perhaps the future (if there is any to us, as things are in the world) will decide which of these approaches is the most fruitful one, and which theory about the formation of the canon is the one by which a maximum of facts can be satisfactorily explained without twisting or disregarding others.

Notes

Apart from the colleagues whose papers are published in this volume and Prof. Noritoshi Aramaki (see n.14), Prof. Dr. J. Bronkhorst and Prof. Dr. J.W. de Jong kindly participated as discussants.

1. Cp. M. Saigusa in: Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū 25.1/1986, 125ff, rejecting terms like "primitive Buddhism" or "Urbuddhismus". The latter, at least, would however correspond to "Ear*liest* Buddhism" as understood in the present workshop.

2. See next note. Cp. also books like St. Collins, Selfless persons, Cambridge 1982; J.T. Ergardt, Faith and knowledge in Early Buddhism, Leiden 1977; J. Pérez-Remón, Self and non-self in Early Buddhism, The Hague 1980.

3. Cp. K.R. Norman, A note on *attā* in the Alagaddūpama Sūtra, in: Studies in Indian Philosophy: Mem. vol. in honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi (Ahmedabad 1981), 28.

4. G. Schopen, Two problems in the history of Indian Buddhism: The layman/monk distinction and the doctrines of the transference of merit, in: Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 10/1984, 9ff.

5. Ibid., 14ff.

6. D. Schlingloff, König Asoka und das Wesen des ältesten Buddhismus, in: Saeculum 36.4/1985, 326ff.

7. Cp., e.g., the recent work by K. Meisig, Das Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra, Wiesbaden 1987; N. Aramaki, A text-strata-analytical interpretation of the concept of *pañcaskandhas*, in: Jinbun (College of Liberal Arts, Kyoto University) 26/1980, 1ff; id., Genshi-bukkyō-kyōten no seiritsu ni tsuite, in: Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū 23.1/1984, 53ff; id., On the formation of a short prose *Pratītyasamutpāda* Sūtra, in: Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions: Essays in honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi (Kyoto 1985), 87ff. Cp. also the works quoted in ns. 11 and 12.

8. See n. 10. Cp. also: Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigheit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien, in: Zur Schulzugehörigheit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur, hrsg. v. H. Bechert, 2. Teil (Göttingen 1987), 304ff, esp. 343ff (§§ 7 and 8).

9. Paul J. Griffiths, Indian Buddhist Meditation Theory: History, Development and Systematization. PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin 1983.

10. L. Schmithausen, On some aspects of descriptions or theories of "Liberating Insight" and "Enlightenment" in Early Buddhism, in: Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (Gedenkschrift f. L. Alsdorf), ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (Wiesbaden 1981), 199ff.

11. J. Bronkhorst, The two traditions of meditation in Ancient India, Stuttgart 1986.

12. T. Vetter, Recent research on the most ancient form of Buddhism, in: Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions: Essays in honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi (Kyoto 1985), 67ff.

13. Ibid.

14. This paper was, unfortunately, not yet available for publication.

15. Since my article of 1981 (see no. 10) is one of the main targets of Gombrich's and Norman's papers, I myself might be expected to respond, but my time and energy has been (and still is) entirely taken up by another work and other obligations.

Recovering the Buddha's Message

Richard Gombrich
Oxford University

When Professor Schmithausen was so kind as to invite me to participate in his panel on "the earliest Buddhism" and I accepted, I had to prepare a paper for discussion without being clear what my fellow-participants would assume that "earliest Buddhism" to be. In the nineteenth century, not all European scholars were even prepared to accept that such a historical person as Gotama the Buddha had ever existed; and though such an extremity of scepticism now seems absurd, many scholars since have been prepared to argue either that we no longer have the Buddha's authentic teachings or that we have only a very few, the rest of the purported teachings being garbled or distorted by the later tradition. Since I believe that in order to make sense to an audience one needs to begin from its assumptions - the crucial point in part II of my paper below - this uncertainty was a handicap. On reading the papers of my colleagues, I realized that, like me, they all (except Professor Aramaki?) assumed that the main body of soteriological teaching found in the Pāli Canon does go back to the Buddha himself. The main thrust of recent work by Professors Schmithausen, Vetter and Bronkhorst in this area, as I understand it, has been to argue that there are inconsistencies in the earliest textual material, and that from these inconsistencies we can deduce a chronological development in the teachings, but that this development may well have taken place within the Buddha's own lifetime and preaching career. On the other hand, the fact that the fundamental Buddhist teachings can be ascribed to the Buddha himself was more assumed than argued for by my colleagues, whereas I made some attempt to reconstruct how the scriptural texts came into being. It seems to me that if my reconstruction is anything like correct, it raises problems for the method of arguing from alleged inconsistencies, and also makes it unlikely that we can in fact ever discover what the Buddha preached first and what later. Accordingly, when I spoke on the panel I made little use of my prepared script and preferred to use my time to address the latter issues. It is obvious that the positions taken by some of us are incompatible; one can either politely ignore the fact (and leave the audience to make up its own mind) or try to address the issues and hope to progress by argument. Though the latter course is unusual in such intellectual backwaters as Indology and Buddhist studies, I ventured to take it at the conference. By the same token, I have for publication revised the first part of my paper along the lines on which I spoke, while omitting

criticisms of specific points. The second part of the paper is very little altered from the conference version.

I

We agree, then, that "the earliest Buddhism" is that of the Buddha himself. Unless a certain individual had propounded a doctrine that many found intellectually compelling and emotionally satisfying, and unless he had deliberately organized his following, there would now be no Dhamma and no Sangha. There could have been a Dhamma without a Sangha, but in that case Buddhism would have had no history.

The function of the Sangha as an institution was two-fold: to provide an institutional framework in which men and women could devote themselves to the quest for salvation (nirvana), and to preserve the Buddha's teaching. In an age without books, the latter function can have been no minor matter. World history can, I believe, offer hardly any parallels to the creation and preservation of so large a body of texts as the Buddhist Canon. I have argued elsewhere[1] that the Buddhists may have realized that it was possible because of the example before them of the brahmin preservation of Vedic literature, achieved by dint of a system of extraordinarily long and tedious compulsory education for brahmin boys.

None of the other religious leaders contemporary with the Buddha seem to have achieved such preservation of their teachings, and this may well reflect the fact that they did not organize settled religious communities like the Buddhist monasteries. I believe the Digambara Jaina tradition that their own canon was wholly lost, for I cannot see why such a story should arise if it were not true, whereas the temptation to claim the highest antiquity and authority for one's scriptures is obvious. In any case, all Jains agree that many of their canonical texts were lost at an early stage. The Buddhists were aware of the contrast between themselves and the Jains. The *Saṅgīti Suttanta* (*DN sutta* XXXIII) begins by recounting that at the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta his followers disagreed about what he had said. The same passage occurs at two other points in the Pāli Canon; but it makes good sense in this context, for it is the occasion of rehearsing a long summary of the Buddha's teaching in the form of mnemonic lists. The text says that the rehearsal was led by Sāriputta, in the Buddha's lifetime. Whether the text records a historical incident we shall probably never know. But that is not my point. I would argue that unless we posit that such episodes took place, not merely after the Buddha's death but as soon as the Sangha had reached a size and geographic spread which precluded frequent meetings

with the Buddha, it is not possible to conceive how the teachings were preserved or texts were composed. By similar reasoning, something like the first *saṅgāyanā* (communal recitation) must have taken place, otherwise there would simply be no corpus of scriptures. Details such as the precise time and place of the event are irrelevant to this consideration.

The Buddhists had to emulate the brahmins by preserving a large body of texts, but since membership of the Sangha was not ascribed at birth but achieved much later, usually in adulthood, they could not imitate the years of compulsory education. To preserve orally the basic Buddhist texts - by which I mean something like the *Vinaya* minus the *Parivāra*, the four *Nikāya* of prose sermons and the poetry in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* - must have required a vast amount of sustained and highly organized effort. Though there is evidence that extraordinary feats of memory are possible for individuals, whether or not they live in preliterate civilizations,[2] these Buddhist texts amount to hundreds of thousands of lines, so much that only a very few individuals of exceptional mnemonic gifts can ever have mastered the lot. We know that in Ceylon monks (and presumably nuns) specialized in a specific collection of texts, and the logic of the situation suggests that this must have been so from the outset.

This must have implications for textual criticism. Segments of texts (sometimes called pericopes) are preserved in different contexts, but it may not be possible to deduce from this that one passage is earlier than another, let alone which comes first. For instance, most of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* occurs elsewhere in the Pāli Canon, but that only shows that what the memorizers of the *Dīgha Nikāya* kept as a single text was preserved piecemeal by other groups. This is by no means to deny that one can occasionally show that a piece of text must have started in one context from which it was then transferred to another; but each such piece of evidence has to be teased out separately, and such demonstrations are still very few.[3]

No one was in a position to record or reproduce the Buddha's sermons as he uttered them. The texts preserved did not just drop from his lips; they must be products of deliberate composition - in fact, they were composed to be memorized. This inevitably introduces a certain formalization: such features as versification, numbered lists, repetition and stock formulae are all aids to memory. Vedic literature includes texts which display all these features. Early brahminical literature also includes prose texts, the *sūtra*, which were orally preserved and followed a different strategy: instead of redundancy, they aim for extreme brevity. There are however no early Buddhist texts in the *sūtra* style. A *sūtra* is so compos-

ed that it cannot be understood without exegesis. The Buddhist texts, by contrast, apparently aim to be self-explanatory.

Since there were religious texts being preserved in the Buddha's environment in both prose and verse, there seems to be no *a priori* ground for holding that Buddhist prose must be older than Buddhist verse or vice versa.[4] The ability to speak in verse *extempore* is not common and there is no reason to suppose that the Buddha had it; moreover, extended discourse in *extempore* verse in ancient India was generally in a rather free metre like the *anuṣṭubh*, not in the kind of lyric metres found in the *Sutta-nipāta*. A text which purports to reproduce an actual sermon by the Buddha is therefore likely to be in prose, and this implies no particular lapse of time after the event.

As we know, many texts do purport to reproduce the Buddha's sermons. If in doing so they employ various of the conventions of oral literature, schematizing the material by the use of formulae and stock passages, this is no argument against their essential authenticity.

I turn now to consider the style of argument that attempts to discern chronological layers in the texts by finding inconsistencies in them. Before criticizing this approach, I must make it clear that I am in no way committed to assuming *a priori* that the early texts do all date from the Buddha's lifetime or to denying that stratification is possible. My wish is merely to expose what I see as faulty argumentation. I also think it sound method to accept tradition until we are shown sufficient reason to reject it.

The method of analyzing Buddhist arguments with a view to establishing their coherence and development is I think largely inherited from the late Professor Frauwallner. I have the greatest admiration for his work and think that it has yielded many valid and interesting results. However, we must remember that most of that work was applied to philosophical texts which were undoubtedly written and read. I must begin my criticism by reiterating in the strongest terms that the kind of analysis which can dissect a *written* philosophical tradition is inappropriate for oral materials. As I have shown, the texts preserving "the Buddha's word" are not authored in the same sense as is a written text. While it is perfectly possible that some of the texts (perhaps some poetry?) were composed by the Buddha himself, we cannot know this with any certainty, and almost all the texts are, strictly speaking, anonymous compositions. The one important exception to this may be the *Thera-* and *Therī-gāthā*, which may be by the individual monks and nuns whom tradition holds to have been the authors.

There is however a principle that we may learn from the critical study of written texts, for its validity does not depend on the medium. This is

the principle known as *difficilior potior*, that it is the more difficult reading which is to be preferred. Colleagues have written on the assumption that the Buddha, since he was a great thinker, must have been consistent, so that inconsistencies must have been introduced later by the less intelligent men who followed him. But that is the reverse of how we should normally look at it. A tradition, whether scribal or oral, always tends to *iron out* inconsistencies; when in any doubt, it goes for the obvious. It is this tendency to which *difficilior potior* refers. If our texts preserve something awkward, it is most unlikely to have been introduced by later generations of Buddhists who had been taught to accept the generally neat and uniform doctrine expounded in the commentaries.

The Buddha preached for many years - tradition says, for 45. Teachers, unless they are exceptionally stupid, change both their opinions and their way of putting things. That the Buddha varied his way of putting things according to what audience he was addressing is indeed a commonplace of the Buddhist tradition, which attributes to him supreme "skill in means"; but that tradition would baulk at the idea that he ever changed his mind. However, I am not committed to the tradition; nor do the two kinds of change, in meaning and expression, necessarily show results which the observer can distinguish. It is mainly writing that freezes our past insights for us and so gives our *oeuvre* a certain consistency; even so, I suspect that there can be few university teachers today who have not had the experience of re-reading something they had written long ago and finding it unfamiliar. (Which is more depressing: to find that what we once wrote now seems all wrong, or to find that it contains facts we have forgotten and bright ideas we can no longer remember having thought of?) Thus, as hard-headed historians we cannot think that over 45 years the Buddha could have been entirely consistent - and especially when we take into account that he could not read over or play back what he had said. If the texts have any valid claim to be the record of so long a preaching career, they cannot be wholly consistent. Indeed, the boot is on the other foot: the texts are too consistent to be a wholly credible record. It is obvious that literary convention and human forgetfulness have contributed to the tendency recalled in my previous paragraph so as to iron out many of the inconsistencies of both message and expression which must have occurred.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let me add that naturally I am not suggesting that the Buddha's teaching was incoherent. Had that been so, there would have been few converts and no enduring tradition. There is considerable agreement in the canonical texts themselves and the commentaries on those texts about the central features of the Buddha's

message; and Mr. Norman seems to me to give an excellent account of them in his paper for this volume.

Despite this, some of my learned colleagues have called the texts as witnesses into the dock, and declared after cross-examination that their testimony leaves much to be desired. Do the texts claim that there are Four Noble Truths? But our logic tells us that the third is a corollary of the second, so there should only be three. Worse, it is alleged that the very accounts of the Buddha's Enlightenment are inconsistent. For example, he or his followers could apparently not make up their minds whether the crucial step is to get rid of all moral defilements or to know that one has done so. Many similar failings are alleged, each scholar selecting his own and accordingly devising a different line of development for early Buddhism.

But what are we discussing here? The description of religious experience is notoriously difficult. There is good reason for this difficulty. Since language is an instrument of social communication, all private experiences tend to elude linguistic expression, as we know from our visits to the doctor. For linguistic communication, we depend on shared experience: the doctor will with luck be able to deduce from our account of where and how it hurts what is wrong with us, because of similar previous attempts at description which he has read or encountered in his practice. But if our pain is unique in his experience, we are unlikely to be able to make him understand. To describe our emotions or aesthetic feelings we resort to the conventions offered by our culture but generally feel dissatisfied by their inadequacy: common words cannot convey our singularity.

Following an overwhelming experience, the Buddha tried to describe it, in order to recommend it to others. He felt that it was new, at least in his time, so that he had no past descriptions to help him out; indeed, tradition records that he was reluctant to preach because he doubted whether anyone would accept his account.[5] Surely one would expect a highly intelligent and articulate person not to be content with one kind of description of his experience but to approach it from many angles and points of view. In particular, since his experience was felt to be an awareness, he would be bound to speak of it both in subjective, experiential terms, and in more objective terms to convey the truth realized. (In general Sanskrit terminology, I am referring to *yoga*, the experience, and *jñāna*, the knowledge.) Followers, no doubt including some who had not had such an experience, standardized and classified the accounts of it. But they did preserve two kinds of account, experiential and gnostic, and since the Buddha evidently had a *gnostic experience* I find it odd to

argue that one kind of account must be earlier or more authentic than the other.

The dual nature of gnostic experience is less intractable than the sheer impossibility of describing the kinds of states of mind nowadays generally called "altered states of consciousness". The typical reaction to having such an experience has been to say that it is beyond words and to describe it, if at all, in highly figurative language. Nevertheless, in societies in which altered states of consciousness are regularly sought and/or attained, standardized descriptions of the experience are naturally current, and people develop expectations that certain practices will lead to specific experiences. Fieldwork in Sri Lanka has convinced me that even in such a society the labelling of altered states of consciousness performs a social function but may completely falsify the experiences. Sinhala Buddhist culture defines possession, loss of normal awareness and self-control, as the polar opposite of the states achieved by the Buddhist meditator; and yet I have recorded[6] several cases in which it seems clear from circumstantial evidence that a person is experiencing a state of consciousnes which is defined in completely different terms (for instance, as possession or *jhāna*) according to the institutional context and hence the cultural expectations. If the same state can be given contrasting labels, it is plausible that the same label may also be applied to very different states.

I am not claiming that the Buddha was so muddled that he could not distinguish between losing and enhancing normal awareness. But I am claiming that descriptions of meditative or spiritual experiences cannot profitably be submitted to the same kind of scrutiny as philosophical texts.

I would, however, go even further. Coherence in these matters is largely in the eye of the beholder. Few texts - taking that term in the widest sense - are up to the standards of the western lawyer or academic in their logical coherence or clarity of denotation, and by those standards most of the world's literary and religious classics are to be found wanting. The first verse of St. John's gospel informs us (in the King James version) that "the Word was with God, and the Word was God". Does this stand up to our examination? Must St. John go to the back of the class?

Surely what we do with such a passage is not decide that it is incoherent but try to learn what coherence the Christian tradition has found in it. Yet some of my colleagues are finding inconsistencies in the canonical texts which they assert to be such without telling us how the Buddhist tradition itself regards the texts as consistent - as if that were not important. My own view is not, I repeat, that we have to accept the

Buddhist tradition uncritically; but that if it interprets texts as coherent, that interpretation deserves the most serious consideration.

The above critical remarks do not mean that I think we can do no more than rehearse the Buddhist tradition. We have historical knowledge and awareness denied to the commentators, and can use them to throw light on the earliest texts. In the second half of my paper I hope to make a positive contribution by illustrating this point.

II

Meaning is embedded in a cultural context and any message, however new, must be couched in terms the audience can understand. The speaker cannot communicate with his audience unless he shares not merely their language, in the literal sense, but most of the presuppositions reflected in their use of that language - though of course he need accept the presuppositions only provisionally. The new acquires its meaning by standing in contrast to the old; fully to understand a speaker, we need to know what he is denying. We shall never know all the assumptions in the minds of the audiences to whom the Buddha preached, but we can know a good deal, and I find that not enough use has yet been made of that knowledge.

The Buddha's message is to be understood in opposition to the other articulated ideologies of his day. The most important of these was the brahminical. Jains maintain that Mahāvīra, the Buddha's contemporary, was no great innovator but carrying on an older tradition. That may be so, but of that older tradition we have no certain knowledge. Neither the other contemporary teachers mentioned in the Pāli texts nor, I believe, Mahāvīra, left any surviving record of their teachings; so we depend on what the Buddhist texts have to say about them. Even this, however, is quite helpful: the Buddha's view of moral causation was clearly meant to contrast with that of the other views described in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*[7] (whether those descriptions are historically accurate or not); and in the *Vinaya* the Buddha several times[8] defined what he meant by his middle way in contrast to the extreme asceticism of other sects. But clearly it is more illuminating to have independent evidence for a non-Buddhist teaching so that we can see what the Buddha made of it.

Before trying to apply this principle, I must offer an observation which is certainly subjective and yet seems to me important. Again and again we find that the Buddha's references to brahmins and brahminism are humorous and satirical. Are jokes ever composed by committees? The guru is venerated in India. His words are treasured. That is not to say

that later words which seem worth treasuring may not be attributed to the guru - certainly they may. But does one attribute to the guru a wide range of humorous observations, even remarks which border on flippancy? When the Buddha is recorded to have said[9] that brahmins claim to be born from the mouth of Brahmā, but don't their mothers menstruate and give birth? - then I wonder whether any monk would have dared to attribute such a remark to him unless he had actually said it.

* * *

According to the Canon, many of the Buddha's sermons were addressed to brahmins. Moreover, of those monks whose caste origins were recorded by the tradition (mainly the commentary to the *Thera-gāthā*), about 40% were brahmins.[10] The original Sangha did not contain a typical cross-section of the population. What religious institution does? In the early Sangha the high-caste, the wealthy and the educated - three overlapping groups then as still (in India) - were heavily over-represented. It is hardly surprising that the Buddha should have tended to speak to the educated. And the brahmins constituted the vast majority of ancient India's educated class. They were the professional educators - as to a large extent they have been ever since.

The word *veda* has been used to refer to certain texts, but its original meaning is simply "knowledge". Another term for the Veda, those texts which constituted *the* knowledge which really counted, is *brahman*. A "*brahman* person" is a *brāhmaṇa*. The Veda had appeared among men through the mouths of such people, and in the Buddha's day (and long after) access to it still only lay in the same quarter. The Veda, embodying true knowledge, was the source of all authority; but what the Veda said - and indeed what it meant - one could learn only from brahmins. To deny the authority of the Veda, therefore, was to deny the authority of brahmins, and vice versa. This is precisely what the Buddha did.

The fact that the Buddha gave new values to terms like *brāhmaṇa* is of course very well known. For him the true brahmin is the man who displays not the traditional, largely ascribed characteristics of the brahmin, such as pure birth, but the achieved qualities of the good Buddhist, ethical and psychological traits.[11] The brahmin by caste alone, the teacher of the Veda, is (jokingly) etymologized as the "non-meditator" (*ajjhāyaka*).[12] Brahmins who have memorized the three Vedas (*tevijja*) really know nothing:[13] it is the process of achieving Enlightenment - what the Buddha is said to have achieved in the three watches of that night - which constitutes the true "three knowledges".[14]

Some of the great modern scholars of Buddhism have said that the Buddha had no direct knowledge of Vedic texts,[15] but that is certainly wrong. The joke about how brahmins are born satirizes the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, the text in which brahmins are said to originate from the mouth of the cosmic Man.[16] There are similarly satirical allusions to the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. One example is the anecdote about Brahmā's delusion that he created other beings. It occurs in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*[17] of the *Dīgha Nikāya* to explain why some people think that the world and the soul are partly eternal and partly not; but, as Rhys Davids points out in the footnote to his translation,[18] it also occurs in the *Majjhima* and *Saṃyutta Nikāyas* and in the *Jātaka* - just what one would expect if my view of the preservation of the *Buddha-vacana* is anywhere near the truth. Brahmā is reborn (in Rhys Davids' words) "either because his span of years has passed or his merit is exhausted"; he then gets lonely and upset and longs for company. Then, "either because their span of years had passed or their merit was exhausted", other beings are reborn alongside him. *Post hoc, propter hoc*, thinks silly old Brahmā, and gets the idea that the other beings are his creation. I suppose that many who have read and even taught this passage (since it is in Warder's *Introduction to Pali)*[19] have noticed that this is just a satirical retelling of the creation myth in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[20] in which Brahmā is lonely and afraid and so begets for company; but I am not aware that anyone has pointed it out in print.

However, it was not just to joke on peripheral topics that the Buddha referred to brahmin doctrines, notably as expressed in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. For many years I have tried to show in my teaching and lecturing that the Buddha presented central parts of his message, concerning *kamma* and the *tilakkhaṇa*,[21] as a set of antitheses to brahminical doctrine.[22] I shall need much more time to read and think about the texts before I can hope to expound this interpretation at full length, but in this paper I can at least indicate with a couple of illustrations the general drift of my argument.

I am by no means the first to have pointed out the importance of the *Alagaddūpama Sutta*.[23] It was Mr. Norman, my teacher and fellow-contributor to the panel, who first demonstrated[24] that it contains a deliberate refutation of Yājñavalkya's teaching in the *Bṛhad-arāṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Since experience has shown me that this demonstration is still not widely known, I shall take the liberty of summarizing the argument in my own words.

The *sutta* has two relevant passages, which I translate[25] as follows:

A. "There are six wrong views: An unwise, untrained person may think of the body, 'This is mine, this is me, this is my self'; he may think that of feelings; of perceptions; of volitions; or of what has been seen, heard, thought, cognized, reached, sought or considered by the mind. The sixth is to identify the world and self, to believe: 'At death I shall become permanent, eternal, unchanging, and so remain forever the same; and that is mine, that is me, that is my self.' A wise and well-trained person sees that all these positions are wrong, and so he is not worried about something that does not exist."[26]

B. "So give up what is not yours, and you will find that that makes you happy. What is not yours? The body, feelings, perceptions, volitions and consciousness. What do you think of this, monks? If someone were to gather the grass, sticks, branches and foliage here in Jeta's wood or burn it or use it in some other way, would you think he was gathering, burning or using you?" "No, sir." "And why not? Because it is not your self and has nothing to do with your self."[27]

Mr. Norman has shown that passage B, in the light of passage A, must be understood as a satirical allusion to the identification of the world and the self - the identification which constitutes the most famous doctrine propounded in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads*. That identification was the culmination of a theory of the equivalence between macrocosm and microcosm; the need for multiple, partial equivalences was short-circuited by identifying the soul/essence of the individual and of the world. The Buddha in a sense kept the equivalence, or at least parallelism, for he argued against a single essence at either level and so made macrocosm and microcosm equally devoid of soul/essence.

There seem to be verbal echoes of Yājñavalkya. The sixth wrong view in passage A is that after death I shall be *nicco, dhuvo* etc.. Compare *BāU* 4,4,23: *eṣa nityo mahimā brāhmaṇasya* (*brāhmaṇa* here being one who has realized his identity with *brahman*); 4,4,20: *aja ātmā mahān dhruvaḥ*. The third point of the *tilakkhaṇa, dukkha*, is not mentioned here, but is of course opposed to *ānanda*, as at *BāU* 3,9,28: *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma* and 4,3,33: *athaiṣa eva parama ānandaḥ, eṣa brahmalokaḥ*. It remains only to remind readers of the most important and closest parallel of all. The fifth wrong view is to identify with what has been *diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mataṃ viññātaṃ*. What exactly is that? The answer is at *BāU* 4,5,6: *ātmani khalv are dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāte idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam*. So here is the form of the microcosm-macrocosm equivalence to which the Buddha is alluding;

and we can further see that his fifth wrong view is Yājñavalkya's realization of that identity in life, and his sixth the making real that identity at death. But, says the Buddha, this is something that does not exist (*asat*).

Note that none of these parallels are recorded by the commentary. How could one argue that these statements were not made by the Buddha but produced by the later monastic tradition when that tradition, which certainly did produce the commentaries, appears not fully to understand them?

The Buddha did not reject everything that Yājñavalkya said. At *BāU* 4,4,5 he says that by *puṇya karman* a person at death becomes *puṇya*, by *pāpa karman, pāpa*. Though the meaning of *puṇya karman* in brahminical literature had hitherto been "purifying ritual", the context here suggests a more general meaning. The passage is terse, so the meaning of *karman* is not spelt out; but it would be reasonable to suppose that what is meant is "act", ritual and ethical action not being fully differentiated. The Buddha went much further in his revalorization of the term: "By act", he said, "I mean intention".[28] Familiarity has dulled our perception of how bold a use of language that is. Action is completely internalized - in fact, transformed into its opposite. This goes just as far as saying that someone whom the world thinks a brahmin could really be an outcaste, and vice versa.

The change in the meaning of "action" lies at the heart of Buddhism and is fundamental to the coherence of the system. The Buddha revalorized not only brahminical soteriology, but ritual too. I conclude by offering an important instance of such revalorization.[29]

According to the Buddha, our six senses (including the mind) and their objects are ablaze with the three fires of passion, hate and delusion, and the goal is to extinguish those fires. According to Buddhist tradition, the doctrine of the three fires was first enunciated in the Buddha's third sermon, the *Āditta-pariyāya Sutta*. The *Vinaya* (I,23-35) presents this sermon as the culmination of a long story: the Buddha converts three brahmin ascetics (Uruvela Kassapa, Nadī Kassapa and Gayā Kassapa) by miracles he performs while staying in the building in which they keep their ritual fires; he persuades them to give up the *agnihotra* (Pali: *aggihutta*). Thus, just as the Enlightenment is represented by the allegory of the battle against Māra, the message of what T.S. Eliot[30] has made famous in our culture as "The Fire Sermon" is conveyed allegorically by the story of the three Kassapas. The link is made plain by the sermon's use of the fire metaphor.

The fires the Buddha sees burning are three because that number corresponds to the three permanently burning fires of the *āhitāgni*.[31]

There could after all have been some other number; were the reference less specific, the same message could have been conveyed by talking of one, generalized fire, or maybe two, e.g. *taṇhā* and *avijjā*. To reach three, *taṇhā* has to be split into *rāga* and *dosa*, positive and negative.

My claim seems to be corroborated by an interesting sermon in which the Buddha gives an allegorical interpretation of the three fires which is somewhat like the (much later) one in Manu, but depends on puns. I know of no modern discussion of this sermon: *Aṅguttara Nikāya, Sattaka Nipāta, Mahāyañña Vagga, sutta XLIV*, published by the Pali Text Society at *AN* IV, pp. 41-46. Since I find the P.T.S. translation (by E.M. Hare) unsatisfactory, I offer my own, with some comments. The Pali commentary on this *sutta* is short; it is published in the P.T.S. edition at *Manoratha-pūraṇī* IV, pp. 29-30.

Once the Blessed One was staying at Jetavana in Anāthapiṇḍika's park in Sāvatthī. At that time the brahmin[a] Uggata-sarīra[b] (Extended-Body, i.e., Fatty) had prepared a great sacrifice. Five hundred bulls and as many steers, heifers, goats and rams had been brought up to the sacrificial post for sacrifice. Then the brahmin went up to the Blessed One and greeted him, and after an exchange of courtesies he sat to one side. Then Uggata-sarīra said to the Blessed One, "Gotama, I have heard that it is very rewarding and advantageous to kindle[c] a fire and set up a sacrifical post." The Blessed One agreed that he had heard the same; this conversation was twice repeated. "Well then, Gotama, your ideas and ours, what you have heard and we have heard, agree perfectly[d]."

At this the Venerable Ānanda said, "Brahmin, you should not question the Tathāgata[e] by saying what you did, but by telling him that you want to kindle a fire and set up a sacrificial post, and asking him to advise and instruct you so that it may be for your long-term benefit and welfare." Then the brahmin asked the Blessed One so to advise him.

"Brahmin, when one kindles a fire and sets up a sacrificial post, even before the sacrifice takes place one is setting up three knives which are morally wrong[f] and lead to painful results. The three are the knives of body, speech and mind. Even before the sacrifice, one thinks, 'Let this many animals be slaughtered for sacrifice'. So while thinking one is doing something purifying[g] one is doing something not purifying; while thinking one is doing right one is doing wrong; while thinking one is finding the way to a good rebirth one is finding the way to a bad. So the knife of mind comes first. Then one says, 'Let this many animals be slaughtered for sacrifice', and so under the same misapprehensions one is setting up the knife of speech next. Then one oneself initiates[h] the slaughter, and so sets up the third knife of body.

"Brahmin, these are the three fires one should abandon, avoid, not serve: the fires of passion, hate and delusion. Why? Because a passionate person who is overcome and mentally controlled by passion does wrong in body, word and thought. So at the dissolution of the body, after death, he goes to a bad rebirth, to hell. The same goes for a hating and for a deluded person. So one should abandon these three fires."

"Brahmin, these are the three fires one should honour, respect, worship and look after properly and well[i]: the fire fit for oblations, the fire of the householder and the fire worthy of religious offerings[j]."

"Whoever the parents are[k], they, brahmin, are what is called the fire fit for oblations. Why? From that source, brahmin, was this person oblated, did he come into existence. So he should honour it and look after it. Whoever your children, wives, slaves, servants or workers are, they are what is called the householder's fire. So that fire too should be honoured and looked after. The ascetics and brahmins who keep from intoxication and negligence, who keep to patience and restraint, who control, pacify and cool themselves[l], they are the fire worthy of religious offerings. So that fire too should be honoured and tended."

"But, brahmin, this fire of wood should from time to time be kindled, from time to time be cared for, from time to time be put out[m], from time to time be stored[n]."

At these words Uggata-sarīra said to the Blessed One, "Excellent, Gotama! From today forth please accept me as your lifelong disciple; I put my faith in you. Herewith I release all the animals and grant them life. Let them eat green grass and drink cool water, and let cool breezes blow upon them."

<u>*Notes to the above translation*</u>

a *Contra* Hare, I construe as a genitive of agent with a past passive participle.

b I assume a joke. The commentary (C) says he was so known because of both his physique (*attabhāva*) and his wealth.

c *ādhānaṃ* (Hardy) must be the correct reading, not *ādānaṃ* (C).

d C: <u>*sabbena sabban*</u> *ti sabbena sutena sabbaṃ sutaṃ.* <u>*sameti*</u> *saṃsandati.* The word *suta* recalls *śruti*, "sacred text".

e *Tathāgatā* plural of respect?

f "morally wrong" translates *akusala*; "right" and "wrong" below *kusala* and *akusala*.

g "purifying" translates *puñña*; this is one of the fundamental puns or reinterpretations of Buddhism: for the Buddhist the term is virtually a synonym of *kusala*.

h C reads *samārambhati* with *v.l.* *samārabhati*, Hardy *samārabbhati*. Possibly connected with *ālabh* "to kill".

i Hare's translation is grammatically impossible: "these three fires, when esteemed, revered, venerated, respected, must bring best happiness". *Parihātabbā* must be passive; as C says, it = *pariharitabbā*. For the phonetic change *cf.* *kātabba* <Sanskrit *kartavya*. *Parihātabbā* answers *pahātabbā* in the previous paragraph. The real difficulty lies in *sukhaṃ*, which is not normally a synonym of *sammā*. I suspect a corruption and venture the suggestion that what was intended was another pun, on *sukkhaṃ*, "dry", which is what fires should be kept. Not all the Buddha's puns are phonetically perfect; one must bear in mind that these started as oral texts, so that small differences could be blurred, quite apart from the fact that in the Buddha's original dialect they may have been obliterated anyway. I know no parallel for *sukhaṃ/sukkhaṃ*, but occasional *dukha* for *dukkha* is guaranteed by metre.

j The punning names of the three fires are of course untranslatable. The first, *āhuneyya*, is however a precise Pali equivalent to *āhavanīya*, so the reference is changed but not the meaning. The second, *gahapataggi*, has turned "the fire of householdership" into "the fire of the householder"; losing the final *i* of *gahapati* by *sandhi* increases the phonetic similarity. The third name shows a greater gap between Sanskrit *dakṣiṇa* "south" and Pali *dakkhiṇeyya*; but the latter implies a punning interpretation of *dakṣiṇāgni* as "the fire of sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*)".

k Hare's "the man who honoureth his father and his mother" is impossible; it is they, not their son, who must be worthy of honour. *Yassa* is difficult; the text of this passage shows several variants. The parallel point in the text about the third fire has *ye te*, with no variants. I would restore *ye*, or better still *ye 'ssa*,[32] at this point for the first two fires at lines 3 and 9, interpreting both *ye* and *te* as nominative plural, and posit that the corruption occurred because *te* was interpreted as *tava*, which would make good sense, and the relative changed to agree with it. For the third fire, *te* = *tava* would make little sense, so there was no corruption.

l *parinibbāpenti*. In an article elsewhere[33] I have shown that this whole phrase is hard to translate appropriately because it has been clumsily lifted from quite a different context.

m *nibbāpetabbo*.

n C: nikkhipitabbo *ti yathā na vinassati evaṃ ṭhapetabbo:* "it is to be so placed that it does not go out". The flame could be transferred to some sheltered place or vessel.

It may not be fanciful to see in the Buddha's first allegorical fire an allusion to the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*; the idea that one is oblated from one's parents is the same, and there may even be a verbal echo. Our text says one is *āhuto saṃbhūto*. Compare *BāU* 6,2,13: "Gautama, woman is fire. Her lap is the firewood, her body-hair is smoke, her womb is the flame, what he does inside is the embers, enjoyments are the sparks. In this very fire the gods offer semen; from that oblation (*āhuteḥ*) man comes into existence (*saṃbhavati*)."

Dr. Chris Minkowski has kindly pointed out[34] that the last sentence of the *sutta* echoes a Vedic verse, *RV* X, 169, 1, which blesses cows, invoking for them pleasant breezes, good grass and refreshing water. The words are different but the sentiments the same. The verse, which begins with the word *mayobhūr*, is prescribed for use in several *śrauta* and *gṛhya* rites.[35] He writes: "It appears to be an all-purpose benedictory verse for cows used both in daily routine and in ritual celebration. I think it is therefore quite possible that specifically this verse is echoed in the Buddhist text. As the Fatty Brahmin let the cows go he recited the verse he would recite in letting them out to graze."

* * * * *

Let me sum up. I have argued that we (unlike the commentators) can see the Buddha's message in systematic opposition to beliefs and practices of his day, especially those of the educated class who inevitably constituted most of his audience and following. Texts, which by and large do not represent his precise words (or if they do, we can never know it), must have been composed during his lifetime. Unfortunately I have not made a close study of the *Aṭṭhaka* and *Pārāyaṇa Vagga*, but I would certainly see no *a priori* problem in allowing them to date from the Buddha's lifetime, because I believe that a lot of the texts must do so. To go further, and try to sort out which of the texts contemporary with the Buddha date from his early years I would think a hopeless enterprise.

Many years ago my aunt, a violinist, was employed to play in the orchestra attached to the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre in Stratford-on-Avon. She lodged with a working class family. She was astonished to discover one day that they did not believe that a man called Shakespeare had ever existed. "So who do you think wrote the plays?" she asked. "The

Festival Committee, of course", came the pitying reply. I am content to be a loyal nephew. On the other hand we must remember that if the plays had never been published the role of the Committee might indeed be crucial.

Notes

1. "How the Mahāyāna began", *Journal of Pali and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 29-46, Nagoya, March 1888.

2. See Ulric Neisser (ed), *Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts*, San Francisco 1982, especially parts V and VII. On the topic "Literacy and Memory" Neisser writes (p. 241): "Illiteracy cannot improve memory any more than my lack of wings improves my speed afoot. And while it would be logically possible to argue that literacy and schooling make memory worse, the fact of the matter is that they don't. On the contrary: cross-cultural studies have generally found a positive relation between schooling and memory." On the other hand, he goes on, "particular abilities can be nourished by particular cultural institutions." Bards performing oral poetry are one such institution; the Sangha memorizing Buddhist texts could well be another.

3. Some notable efforts in this direction were made by Jean Przyluski in his huge four-part article "Le Parinirvāṇa et les funerailles du Buddha". Many of his arguments now seem far-fetched and some of his statements have even been shown to be factually inaccurate; but I remain impressed by his analysis of the third chapter (*bhāṇavāra*) of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* in the second part of the article (*Journal Asiatique, XIème série*, XII, 1918, pp. 401-456). For a case study on a far more modest scale, see my "Three souls, one or none: the vagaries of a Pāli pericope", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* XI, 1987, pp. 73-78.

4. Similarly, while versifiers differ in their ability, I can see no *a priori* ground for supposing that a poem which is metrically strict must be older or younger than one which employs metrical license. Naturally this is not to deny that some metres were invented earlier than others.

5. *Vin.* I, 5.

6. Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, *Buddhism Transformed*, Princeton, forthcoming 1988.

7. *DN* I, 52-59.

8. E.g. *Vin* I, 305; Vin III, 212.

9. *MN* II, 148 = *DN* III, 81-82.

10. B.G. Gokhale, "Early Buddhism and the brahmins" in A.K. Narain (ed.), *Studies in the History of Buddhism*, Delhi, pp. 68-80.

11. *Snip* verse 142 (= *Vasala Sutta* verse 27).

12. *DN* III, 94.

13. *Tevijja Sutta*, *DN sutta* XIII.

14. *AN* I, 163.

15. E.g. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *La morale bouddhique*, Paris 1927, p. 12.

16. *RV* X, 90, 12.

17. *DN* I, 17-18.

18. T.W. Rhys Davids (trans.), *Dialogues of the Buddha* part I (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists* II), London 1899, p. 31.

19. A.K. Warder, *Introduction to Pali*, London 1963, pp. 198-199.

20. *BāU* 1, 4, 1-3.

21. The three hallmarks of phenomenal existence (i.e. of life in this world as we unenlightened beings experience it): impermanence, suffering, non-self.

22. Since no one in my many audiences or elsewhere has presented any reasoned objections to my interpretation, I have ventured to present the essentials of the Buddha's doctrine in these terms in my contribution to the article "Buddhism" for the next edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; I hope there to have shown in practice that this approach offers opportunity for a coherent understanding of the doctrine within few words. For a more leisurely exposition of this approach see my *Theravada Buddhism: a social history from ancient Benares to modern Colombo*, London 1988. The relevant part of this book was written in 1980. It deals only with those aspects of the doctrine relevant to social history, mainly *kamma*; on that topic see further my "Notes on the brahminical background to Buddhist ethics", pp. 91-101 in Gatare Dhammapala et al. (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhātissa*, Nugegoda (Sri Lanka) 1984.

23. *MN sutta* 22. See especially Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "*Diṭṭhaṃ, Sutaṃ, Mataṃ, Viññātaṃ*" in Somaratna Balasooriya et al (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, London and Sri Lanka 1980, pp. 10-15, and references there cited. Bhattacharya's article deals with my passage A. He does not translate it, but he glosses it: "All these theories are false because they make of the

Ātman an 'object', while the Ātman, the Absolute, the Being in itself, can never be an object" (p. 11). I can see no support in the text for this interpretation.

24. K.R. Norman, "A note on *Attā* in the Alagaddūpama Sutta", *Studies in Indian Philosophy: a memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi, LD series 84*, Ahmedabad 1981, pp. 19-29.

25. In both extracts my translation eliminates repetitions.

26. *MN* I, 135-6.

27. *MN* I, 140-1.

28. *Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi. AN* III, 415.

29. Most of the rest of this paper represents a revised version of part of my paper "Why there are three fires to put out", delivered at the conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Bologna, July 1985. Though originally I revised it for publication in the proceedings of that conference, the convenor and editor, Prof. Pezzali, has kindly let me know that that publication is still (in November 1987) not assured.

30. *The Waste Land* (1922), Part III, especially the note on line 308.

31. The *āhitāgni* is the brahmin who has followed the ritual prescription of the Vedic (*śrauta*) tradition and keeps the fires burning for the purposes of his obligatory daily rites.

32. I am grateful to Prof. Schmithausen for pointing out that *ye 'ssa* would be the neatest emendation.

33. Cited in note 3 above.

34. In a letter to me after I had lectured at Brown University.

35. The verse is used in the *aśvamedha*, for instance; but its use in *gṛhya* rites may better account for its being known to Buddhists. Minkowski writes: "As [householders] let their cows out to graze they should recite *mayobhūḥ* etc. (*Āśvalayana Gṛhya Sūtra* 2, 10, 5). Or when they come back from grazing and are back in the pen (*Śāṃkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra* 3, 9, 5). There is also a *gṛhya* festival performed on the full moon of Kārttikī when the cows are honored and the *mayobhūr* verse is recited (*Śāṃkhāyana G.S.* 3, 11, 15)."

Aspects of early Buddhism

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As is well known, the *attā* is specifically denied as a permanent entity in Theravāda Buddhism, although the word is of course widely used in Pāli[1] in the everyday sense of "oneself". The question then arises: If there is no permanent *attā*, then what is it that transmigrates in the course of rebirths in *saṃsāra*? In the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta of the Majjhima-nikāya[2] we read of the bhikkhu Sati, who so misunderstood the Buddha's teaching that he thought it was *viññāṇa* "consciousness" which continued in *saṃsāra (tad ev' idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsārati, anaññaṃ)*.[3] This would appear to be a recollection by Sati of some such statements as those found in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad that *vijñāna* continues: *idam mahad bhūtam anantam apāraṃ vijñāna-ghana eva*[4] "This great being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but intelligence": *sa vijñāno bhavati, sa vijñānam evānvavakrāmati*[5] "He becomes one with intelligence; what has intelligence departs with him"; *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu*[6] "Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses". Radhakrishnan's note on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.1 states that "the principle of intelligence (*vijñāna*), after having absorbed all the functions of consciousness, proceeds to continue in a new life".[7]

When Sati's view was made known to the Buddha, he refuted it by pointing out that he had frequently taught that *aññatra paccayā n' atthi viññāṇassa sambhavo*[8] "Apart from condition there is no origination of consciousness". He rejected the idea of a permanent *viññāṇa* which could transmigrate, by stressing the place of *viññāṇa* in the twelve-fold chain of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* "dependent origination", where *viññāṇa* is caused by the *saṅkhāras* "compounded formations" or "conditioned things", and is itself the cause of *nāmarūpa* "name and form". According to the account of the Buddha's *bodhi* in the Vinaya-piṭaka, the Buddha examined the twelve-fold *paṭicca-samuppāda* backwards and forwards immediately after *bodhi*,[9] but elsewhere we read of the Buddha rehearsing a shorter form with only ten links, before his *bodhi*,[10] and the longer chain is probably only a later extension of an earlier idea. The Pāli commentators analyse the twelve-fold version as being spread over three existences,[11] but it seems more likely that it was in its original formulation a simple empirical assertion, with no reference to more than one birth. There are, in fact, many other examples of chains of cause and effect mentioned in

the Pāli canon,[12] and it is probable that the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, of however many links, was simply a development of earlier, less elaborate, statements of conditionality. There is no reason to suppose that the Buddha was the first to think of a cause and its effect.[13]

We may deduce that the *paṭicca-samuppāda* chain was first reasoned out by the Buddha in what we may describe as reverse order, in the way in which the ten-fold chain mentioned above is given, starting from the end, i.e. the position in which the Buddha found himself. He was alive and destined to suffer old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) like other people who were alive. He was so destined because he had experienced birth (*jāti*); birth is caused[14] by existence (*bhava*); existence is caused by clinging (*upādāna*); clinging is caused by craving (*taṇhā*); craving is caused by feeling (*vedanā*); feeling is caused by contact (*phassa*); contact is caused by the six senses (*saḷāyatana*); the six senses are caused by name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*); name-and-form are caused by consciousness (*viññāṇa*). This is the starting point of the ten-fold chain. In the twelve-fold chain consciousness is caused by the compounded formations (*saṅkhāra*); the compounded formations are caused by ignorance (*avijjā*). The destruction of any link in the chain would lead to the destruction of any links dependent upon it. The destruction of craving would lead to the destruction of clinging, existence, birth, and old age and death. The destruction of *avijjā* would lead to the destruction of the whole chain of conditional origination, and therefore to the end of continued existence in *saṃsāra*. The destruction of *avijjā* by *vijjā* would therefore lead to *nibbāna*, which was release (*mokkha*) from *saṃsāra*.[15]

The various accounts of the Buddha's *bodhi*, which led to his *nibbāna*, are not easy to reconcile together, since they appear in different forms in different parts of the Pāli canon, with quite large omissions and changes of emphasis in some versions. The shortest account is that found in the Ariyapariyesanasutta of the Majjhimanikāya,[16] and for this reason some scholars believe that this is the earliest account available to us.[17] It concentrates upon the gaining of *nibbāna*, but does not give any information about how it was attained. We read that after the Buddha had attained *nibbāna*, knowledge (*ñāṇa*) and insight (*dassana*) arose in him that his release was unshakable,[18] that this was his last birth, and that there would be no renewed existence (*punabbhava*) for him.[19]

We may assume that in the shortest account of his *bodhi* the Buddha would deal with the most important part of the experience, and we can therefore see that this was the gaining of *nibbāna*. This view is supported by the fact that when he visited other teachers, before his *bodhi*, he found their teachings inadequate because they did not lead to *nibbāna* (*nāyam dhammo nibbidāya na virāgāya na nirodhāya na upasamāya na*

abhiññāya na sambodhāya na nibbānāya saṃvattati).[20] We may deduce from this that the concept of the attainment of *nibbāna* existed, even though the Buddha (while a Bodhisatta), and his teachers, were unable to achieve it. We may also deduce that the words in the Buddha's statement are in the order in which the various states mentioned in it are to be realised, starting with disgust with the world, and going on to *sambodhi* and *nibbāna*. This bears out the belief that the Buddha's aim was to free himself from *saṃsāra*, and all aspects of his teaching were concerned with the acquisition of means to do this, either in this life or a later one, and with finding how best to dwell in *saṃsāra* until release was obtained.

The account of the Buddha's *bodhi* given in the Mahāsaccakasutta of the Majjhima-nikāya,[21] however, gives more information. We read there that the Buddha realised that the various efforts he had made so far were not productive, and he wondered if there was another way to *bodhi* (*siyā nu kno añño maggo bodhāya*).[22] He recalled an experience in his boyhood, when he had by chance entered into the first *jhāna*. He therefore entered into the first *jhāna* again, and from there moved into the second, third and fourth *jhānas*.[23] At that point he gained, in order, three knowledges (*ñāṇas*). The first was the knowledge of his previous existences; the second the knowledge of the arising and passing away of others, and their fates which depended upon their actions (*kamma*); the third was the knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas*. He understood the existence, arising, stopping and path to the stopping of misery (*dukkha*), and then the existence, arising, stopping and path to the stopping of the *āsavas*. With his knowledge his mind was freed from the *āsavas*. He knew that he was released, and that birth was ended. There is no indication of how exactly release was obtained, and it may simply be that gaining knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas* was the destruction itself, i.e. the knowledge was efficacious, and the *bodhi* was the *nibbāna*. It is perhaps belief in such a view that has led Collins to translate *nibbāna* as both "enlightenment" and "liberation".[24]

The translation "enlightenment" is normally reserved for *bodhi* or *sambodhi*, but it is somewhat misleading in that the root *budh-* which underlies these words has no direct connection with "light". The root means literally "to wake up", or metaphorically "to wake up (to a fact), to know it", and "awakening" would be a more literal translation of *bodhi*. The past participle *buddha* is used actively to mean "one who has awakened, one who has gained knowledge". In the Ariyapariyesanasutta account the Buddha refers to his *dhamma* as being *duranubodha*[25] and *na ... susambudha*,[26] and this implies that his *bodhi* consisted of gaining that *dhamma*, i.e. the knowledge of how to gain release. This accords with

Buddhaghosa's statement: *uparimagga-ttayasaṅkhātā sambodhi*[27] "*sambodhi* is synonymous with the three higher paths (leading to *arahat*-ship)".

In the account in the Vinaya-piṭaka, the Buddha specifically states that he gained *bodhi* (*anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddho*)[28] when knowledge and insight (*ñāṇadassana*) arose in him in respect of the four noble truths about misery, but in the account of his *bodhi* in the Mahāsaccakasutta the four statements about misery are not referred to as noble truths,[29] and since they appear to be subordinate to the four statements about the *āsavas*, it is possible that the statements about misery are a later addition, which led to a parallel, but inappropriate, set of four statements being evolved about the *āsavas*, to provide symmetry.[30] If this is so, then something similar is probably true of the Buddha's statement about the point at which he became Buddha. It should rather have been the point when he gained knowledge about the destruction of the *āsavas*.

In the Sāmaññaphalasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya,[31] the Buddha sets out the advantages of life for a *samaṇa*. These culminate in the practice of the four *jhānas*, leading to the three *ñāṇas*. In the account of the third *ñāṇa*, that of the destruction of the *āsavas*, we find the same insertion of the four statements about misery, once again not called noble truths. There then follow the four statements about the *āsavas* which lead on to the destruction of the *āsavas* and the attainment of *arahat*-ship.[32] This is therefore a repetition of the Buddha's own experience as related in the Mahāsaccakasutta, and again we may suspect the presence of the statements about misery.

It is noteworthy that when the Buddha begins to teach, he preaches the news about the four noble truths about misery, not about the *āsavas*. As part of the fourth noble truth he teaches the eight-fold path leading to the destruction of misery (*dukkha-nirodha*). The stages of the path are: *sammā-diṭṭhi, -saṃkappo, -vācā, -kammanto, -ājīvo, -sati, -samādhi*.[33] This path is said to have been learned by the Buddha, and to lead to *nibbāna* (*cakkhu-karaṇī ñāṇa-karaṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati*).[34] We are therefore presumably to regard *dukkhanirodha* and *nibbāna* as synonymous.[35] The path does not include any reference to the four *jhānas*, although it is possible that the final element, *sammā-samādhi* "right concentration", could be interpreted as including them.[36] If it does not, then the way to *nibbāna* along the eight-fold path is a means which differs somewhat from the way in which the Buddha himself gained *nibbāna*.[37]

Elsewhere in the Pāli canon, however, there is a list of the stages of an *asekha*, i.e. an *arahat*, who has finished his training and is now an adept. This path adds two further stages, *sammā-ñāṇa* and *sammā-vimutti*,

to the usual eight.[38] This is an extension, rather than a contradiction, of any other teaching. The Buddha states that the eight-fold path leads to *nibbāna*. *Nibbāna* (= *vimutti*) must therefore be a further stage upon the path, and the knowledge required to gain *nibbāna* must be the preceding stage. When one is an *asekha*, then one has practised the eight-fold path, gained *sammā-ñāṇa*, and then *sammā-vimutti*.

As just noted, the Buddha states that the eight-fold path leads to *nibbāna*. He uses *dukkha-nirodha* as a synonym of this, but does not speak of the destruction of the *āsavas*, which, as we have seen, is also a synonym of *nibbāna*. Schmithausen suggests that the question of *dukkha* is prior to the question of the *āsavas*,[39] but this is not necessarily so. It is clear that in early Buddhism the concept of the *āsavas* and their destruction was of great importance. The most common epithet of an *arahat* is *khīṇāsava* "one whose *āsavas* are destroyed", not "one whose craving, or ignorance, is destroyed". The list of the *āsavas* which we find in the Pāli canon is: *kāmāsava* "lust", *bhavāsava* "becoming", and *avijjā-sava* "ignorance".[40] To these *diṭṭhāsava* "wrong view" is sometimes added.[41] It is clear that if this list is correct, then the *āsavas* as a whole are not part of the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, although *avijjā* and *bhava* are there as separate items, and it might be possible to take *kāma* as equal to *taṇhā*.

It is to be noted that the etymological meaning of the word *āsava* "influx", the use of the terms *āsava* and *aṇhaya* by the Jains, and the use of the related word *āsinava* by Aśoka, suggest, as was proposed by Alsdorf,[42] that the usual use of the word by the Buddhists is probably not the original usage. This view is also supported by the fact that the four *āsavas* in this list are identical with the four *oghas*,[43] suggesting that substitution has taken place at some time. Schmithausen points out[44] that the *āsavas* are glossed in Pāli as *vighāta-pariḷāha*, which would give a meaning something like "afflictions". In the Sammādiṭṭhisutta of the Majjhima-nikāya[45] the eight-fold path is said, unusually, to lead to the destruction of the *āsavas*.[46] This might be a relic of an earlier theory, but it is said in such a way that *āsava* might almost be taken as the equivalent of *dukkha*, which perhaps further explains the parallelism between the *āsavas* and *dukkha* in the account of the Buddha's *bodhi*.

It is possible that, whatever the original meaning of the word *āsava*, it was noted that the destruction of the *āsavas* led to the destruction of *kāma*, *bhava* and *avijjā*, which might have suggested the identification of the *āsavas* with the things which were destroyed at the same time. If, however, we believe that the *āsavas* are to be identified with any one link of the twelve-fold *paṭicca-samuppāda*, then the most likely candidate for identification would be the *saṅkhāras*. It is not impossible that there

was some earlier meaning of *āsava* which was approximately synonymous with that of *saṅkhāra*. It is to be noted that the cause of the *āsavas* is *avijjā*,[47] which is also the cause of the *saṅkhāras*. We read that the stopping of *avijjā* leads to the stopping of the *āsavas*. This does not prove that the *āsavas* and the *saṅkhāras* are the same, but it does show that the *āsavas* cannot be *avijjā*, for they can scarcely be their own cause, as is pointed out by Schmithausen.[48] It may be that *avijjā* and the *saṅkhāras* were originally a separate cause-and-effect, which were prefixed to the chain of causation beginning with *viññāṇa*.

It seems possible that at some early stage of Buddhist thought there was a view that the *āsavas* were very similar in effect to the *saṅkhāras*, the active "formulating factors", or "formative influences" or "karmic formulations", as Nyanatiloka translates.[49] In the individual there was the passive version of the *saṅkhāras*, the "formed factors", as one of the group of *khandhas*. This idea of the active *saṅkhāras* as the karmic formations, and then the passive formed *saṅkhāras* as part of the individual, would not be inconsistent with the idea of *āsava* in Jainism as the process by which *kamma* flowed into the soul.

If this was so, then it is probable that the older meaning of *āsava* was forgotten in Buddhism[50] when the emphasis in the Buddha's teaching was placed upon the idea that the world was *dukkha*. This may have been the result of the change of emphasis from what has been called the *jhānic* side of Buddhism, where the stress was on *jhāna* "meditation" as a means of gaining *nibbāna*, i.e. the destruction of the *āsavas*, to the kammic side of Buddhism, whereby the emphasis was on the entry into the stream, whereby the entrant could hope, by successfully following the teaching, to rise higher and higher in successive rebirths towards the goal of *arahat*-ship. In these circumstances, the main need was to convince followers that the world was *dukkha*, but that there was a way of release from it which did not demand special ability in meditation. The fact that *nibbāna* or *mokkha* could be attained in various ways led to a situation where there was different terminology employed to denote what was basically the same concept. So one who had gained *arahat*-ship could be described as *khīṇāsava*, *nibbuta*, or *dukkhassa antakara* "one who has put an end to misery". We also find references in the Pāli canon[51] to those who have put an end to misery by breaking the seven fetters (*saṃyojanāni*). Since these fetters include ignorance (*avijjā*) and lust for existence (*bhavarāga*, which is perhaps a synonym for *taṇhā*), it may be that there is no inherent contradiction between this teaching and the idea of breaking the chain of dependent origination by destroying one of the links.

There is an interesting point which arises in connection with the four *jhānas* which the Buddha practised at the time of his *bodhi*. As noted above, one version of the occurrence relates that the Buddha recalled a boyhood experience, in which he had entered upon the first *jhāna*. Repeating his boyhood experience, he entered the second, third and fourth *jhānas*. We have, however, an account of the Buddha's pre-*bodhi* visits to two teachers, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. With these teachers he practised meditation and reached with them the states of *ākiñcaññāyatana*[52] "the state of nothingness" and *nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana*[53] "the state of neither perception nor non-perception", respectively. As already stated, he rejected both of these as not leading to *nibbāna*, but in his own teaching after his *bodhi* he included them as stages on the way to *nibbāna*. If, as taught by the Buddha, they are the third and fourth of the *arūpa-jhānas*, which are the seventh and eighth of the *samāpattis* "attainments", since they come after the four *rūpa-jhānas*, then the Buddha had already attained the first four *samāpattis* with those teachers before he gained the seventh and eighth. We have the statement of the commentator Buddhaghosa to this effect.[54] This would make the story of his boyhood memory seem very strange, and we should perhaps follow the view that the four *rūpa-jhānas* and the four *arūpa-jhānas* were originally two quite separate sets of states of meditation.[55]

In the Buddha's accounts of the eight *samāpattis*, however, we read of a ninth state, that of *saññāvedayitanirodha*[56] "cessation of feelings and perceptions" or "cessation of the feeling[57] of perceptions". In this state, for one seeing with perceptive knowledge, the *āsavas* are destroyed (*paññāya c' assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti*).[58] This would seem to imply that, if we equate *āsavakkhaya* with *nibbāna*, this was another way of attaining *nibbāna*, and Schmithausen quotes Nagasaki[59] as believing that *saññāvedayitanirodha* and *nibbāna* were originally identical. It is not entirely clear, however, how one could see by knowledge when in such a state, and it is possible that the seeing with *paññā* refers to something which happens after attaining this ninth state, not while one is in it. Without further information about the nature of *paññā* it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions about this, but if we equate *paññā* with *ñāṇa*, then this could be another reference to *bodhi* leading to *nibbāna*.

We must, however, note that there is no reference to the four *arūpa-jhānas* in the accounts of the Buddha's own attainment of *nibbāna* at the time of his *bodhi*. In the story of his death, in the Mahāparinibbānasuttanta of the Dīgha-nikāya,[60] we read that the Buddha went through all the stages of the *rūpa-jhānas* and the *arūpa-jhānas*, and then entered *saññāvedayitanirodha*. He was then thought by Ānanda to have attained *nibbāna*.[61] Anuruddha, however, pointed out that he had only attained

saññāvedayitanirodha.[62] From there the Buddha went back, in due order, to the first *jhāna*, and then up to the fourth *jhāna*, from which he died, and presumably attained *nibbāna*. It is therefore noteworthy that it was also from the fourth *jhāna* that the Buddha gained *bodhi* and *nibbāna* on the earlier occasion, and it may be relevant that in the Saṃyutta-nikāya[63] we read of a bhikkhu going from the fourth *jhāna* to *saññāvedayitanirodha*,[64] passing beyond *nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana*, without any mention of the other *arūpa-jhānas*.

It would seem from the account of the Buddha's death that *saññāvedayitanirodha* was probably some sort of death-like trance, and we may wonder how Anuruddha, seeing the Buddha in this condition, nevertheless knew that he was not in *nibbāna*. It is clear that as far as Anuruddha was concerned the state was not identical with *nibbāna*, but it does not reveal how anyone in this death-like trance could make use of *paññā* to attain *nibbāna*. It may well be that the statement that the Buddha was in *saññāvedayitanirodha* was merely the result of later theorising. This perhaps supports the suggestion that it was after gaining *saññāvedayitanirodha*, not while one was in the state, that one was able to use *paññā* and gain the destruction of the *āsavas*.

The object of the Buddha's teaching was to gain release from the beginningless and endless *saṃsāra*. There is a reference in the Pāli canon to two varieties of release in *nibbāna*.[65] One is attained in life and is called the element of *nibbāna* with a remnant of clinging (*sa-upādisesā nibbānadhātu*). In this the defilements (*kilesas*) are destroyed, and lust, hatred and delusion (*rāga, dosa* and *moha*) are annihilated. The remainder of physical life is perfect bliss and peace. The second form of *nibbāna* is that without a remnant of clinging (*anupādisesā nibbānadhātu*). It coincides with death, and is not followed by rebirth, for the elements of existence (*khandhas*) have been destroyed.

The descriptions of *nibbāna* in the Pāli canon are set out in very general terms, and it is often defined in terms of negatives or opposites. It is "blissful" (*siva*) or "happy" (*sukha*) as opposed to the *dukkha* of existence. It is "unmoving" (*acala*) as opposed to the endless movement of *saṃsāra*. It is "undying"[66] (*amata*) as opposed to the repeated deaths of *saṃsāra*. It is "unborn" (*ajāta*), "unoriginated" (*abhūta*), "uncreated" (*akata*), and "unformed" (*asaṅkhata*) as opposed to the world, which is born, originated, created and formed. The last named epithet of *nibbāna* is the most important, for in Theravāda Buddhism *nibbāna* is the only *asaṅkhata* thing.[67]

Buddhism denied the existence both of a permanent soul and a permanent individuality. An individual is merely a group of five "elements of existence" (*khandha*),[68] "form" (*rūpa*), "feeling" (*vedanā*), "perception"

(*saññā*), "mental-formations" (*saṅkhāra*) and "consciousness" (*viññāṇa*). If the "compounded formations" (*saṅkhāra*), the second link in the chain of dependent origination, are destroyed because their cause "ignorance" (*avijjā*), is destroyed by *vijjā*, then all compounded formations, including the passive "mental formations" (*saṅkhāra*) and all the other *khandhas* which go to make up the individual are destroyed and we are left only with the "uncompounded" (*asaṅkhata*), i.e. *nibbāna*, which is outside *saṃsāra*.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the condition of being *nibbuta* or in *nibbāna* cannot be defined. The word *nibbuta* is also used of a fire which has gone out. Schrader long ago pointed out the Indian belief that an expiring flame does not really go out: *vahner yathā yoni-gatasya mūrtir na dṛśyate naiva ca liṅganāśaḥ*[69] "As the form of a fire ... is not seen nor its seed destroyed". So it is with an individual who has gained *nibbāna*. His state cannot be described any more than the state of a fire which has gone out can be described. The only thing that is certain is that, because *nibbāna* is "not-self" (*anattā*), it cannot be reconciled with the views of those who think that the object of religious exertion is to re-unite the individual soul with Brahman or Ātman.

Notes

1. Abbreviations of title of Pāli texts are as in the Epilegomena to the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Vol. I, Copenhagen, 1924-48. References are to the editions of the Pali Text Society.
2. M I 256-71.
3. M I 256, 19-20.
4. II.4.12.
5. IV.4.2.
6. IV.4.22.
7. S. Radhakrishan, *The principal Upaniṣads*, London 1953, p. 270.
8. M I 258, 20.
9. Vin I 1.
10. S II 104.
11. See S. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge 1982, p. 108.
12. The *paṭicca-samuppāda* is described in the Pāli Canon with varying lengths and starting from various points. This probably represents its use in different contexts of teaching or instruction, i.e. in his sermons the Buddha would sometimes start from a specific cause or arrive at a specific effect in the chain, for various doctrinal reasons.
13. If the Sn does really contain pre-Buddhist material, then it is possible that some of the statements of cause-and-effect which occur there are older than the Buddha. Despite Aramaki (N. Aramaki, "On the formation of a short prose *Pratītyasamutpāda* sūtra", in *Buddhism and its relation to other religions (Festschrift for Dr. Shozen Kumoi)*, Kyoto 1985, 87-121), there is no reason for thinking that the earliest presentation of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* was in verse, although it may be that the oldest literary version we have is in a verse text.
14. Or "because of" (*-paccayā*). The meaning is that one link in the chain is a pre-requisite for the next, e.g. birth is a pre-requisite for death: a person cannot die unless he has been born.
15. These are simply different analyses of the same problem, i.e. suffering, old age, death, etc., which involves tracing them back to a cause. The Buddha then seeks a way to destroy that cause. Since the method of destruction depends upon knowing how to do it, the starting point for destruction must be knowledge (*vijjā*). It therefore follows that the starting point of *saṃsāra* must be *avijjā*.
16. M I 160-75.
17. See L. Schmithausen. "Liberating Insight and Enlightenment in Early Buddhism", in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf)*, Hamburg 1981, p. 207, quoting A. Bareau.
18. *akuppā me vimutti*. In other versions we find the phrase *vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti* (for references see Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 219 n. 69). In some contexts this can be taken as referring to the word *cittaṃ*, which precedes it, and the phrase can be translated, "In (it) released there is the knowledge '(I am) released'". In some contexts, however, it is not *cittaṃ* but *ariyasāvako* which precedes *vimuttaṃ*. Various explanations of this are possible: it is perhaps a pericope, with the standard phrase being used in a context where it is not appropriate; since there is no verb to indicate who or what is released, it is possible to take *vimuttaṃ* impersonally, meaning "(it is) released" (see T. Vetter, "The most ancient form of Buddhism", in the *Festschrift for Dr. Shozen Kumoi* (see n. 13), pp. 67-85, (p. 70)). In such a context, however, it might seem preferable to take *vimuttaṃ* as an example of a past participle being used as the equivalent of an action noun: "(there is) release". Another explanation would be to assume that in an earlier form of this phrase in an Eastern dialect the reading was *vimutte*, which could be either masculine or neuter. When this was converted into a Western dialect form the redactors had a choice between *vimutto* and *vimuttaṃ*, and having decided in the majority of occurrences to have *vimuttaṃ*, to agree with *cittaṃ*, this was then extended to all occurrences, even though it was not appropriate with *ariyasāvako*. There is an extended version of the phrase including a verb: *vimuttasmiṃ vimutt' amhī ti ñāṇaṃ hoti*, and the fact that this is not merely a scribal error in the Pāli tradition is proved by the (Mūla-?)Sarvāstivādin reading *vimukto 'smīti*. This form of the past participle with the case ending elided, was applicable to both a masculine and a neuter subject. Schmithausen (ibid.) thinks that the form with *amhī* is a later reading, but the sandhi formation whereby *-e* or *-o* is elided before *a-*, rather than *a-* being elided after *-e* or *-o*, is not common in Pāli and seems to be early. I would suggest that this is, in fact, the

earlier form of the phrase. I suspect that in some branches of the scribal tradition *vimutt' amhī ti* was misunderstood as *vimuttam hī ti*, from which *hi* was dropped as an unnecessary particle, leaving a neuter form *vimuttam iti* even when the context demanded a masculine.

19. M I 167, 27-29.
20. M I 165, 10-12 = 166, 29-31.
21. M I 237-51.
22. M I 246, 35.
23. It is debatable whether the Buddha actually went through four states of meditation as set out in the texts. It seems more likely that there was a single developing state of meditation, which (when he came to describe it to his followers) could conveniently be broken down into four states. The problem which Vetter raises (Vetter, op. cit. (in n. 18), p. 80), is best explained by saying that the Buddha was trying to put into words something ineffable which had happened to him, and his words are really a later rationalisation (perhaps by his followers) of the irrational. All his views are simply ways of describing different aspects of the same experience, and are complementary, not contradictory. These various rationalisations are not necessarily of different dates, since they may be products of different environments and (preaching) needs.
24. Collins, op. cit. (in n. 11), Index, p. 319, s.v. *nibbāna*.
25. M I 167, 31.
26. M I 168, 6.
27. Sv 313, 4.
28. Vin I 11, 28.
29. For a discussion of the formulation of the four noble truths see K.R. Norman, "The four noble truths: a problem of Pāli syntax", in *Indological and Buddhist Studies (Festschrift for J.W. de Jong)*, Canberra 1982, pp. 377-91.
30. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 205.
31. D I 47-86.
32. D I 85.
33. Vin I 10, 20-23.
34. Vin I 10, 24-25.
35. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 214.
36. We have to assume that at the very beginning of Buddhism, i.e. at the level of the Buddha's own personal experiences, the meaning of technical terms was not rigorously fixed, and so *samādhi* could be used in the sense of *jhāna*, etc.
37. In the exposition of the four noble truths, it does not seem to make sense to say, as Vetter does (op. cit. (in no. 18), p. 77), that the Buddha had actually practised the fourth noble truth. Surely the Buddha had gained *nibbāna* by means of *jhāna*, but was holding out to others the possibility of following a different path leading to the destruction of *dukkha*?
38. See D III 271, 5-9.
39. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 205.
40. See M I 249, 14-15.
41. See The Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*, s.v. *āsava*.
42. See L. Alsdorf, *Les études jaina: état présent et tâches futures,* Paris 1965, p. 4.
43. See *Pali-English Dictionary*, s.v. *ogha*.
44. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 248 n. ad 23.
45. M I 46-55.
46. M I 55.
47. M I 55.
48. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 205.
49. See Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, s.v. *saṅkhāra*.
50. The way in which the Buddha retained the use of the word *āsava* with a changed meaning was quite in keeping with his practice of taking over technical terms from other religions, but giving them a new meaning, e.g. the term *tevijja* was explained as referring to three (special) types of Buddhist knowledge, not the brahmanical *vedas*. Having taken over the idea of the *āsavas* from the Jains, or some other source, he kept the term, with a changed meaning, even when it was not longer a matter of great doctrinal importance.
51. A IV 7-8.
52. M I 164, 15.

53. M I 165, 35.

54. *ākiñcaññāyatanapariyosānā satta samāpattiyo maṃ jānāpesi*, Ps III 171, 22-23.

55. The four *arūpa-jhānas* were not originally Buddhist, and that is why they were included in the non-Buddhist teachers' views. If Bareau is correct in stating that the story of the Buddha being taught by these teachers has no historical basis, we must conclude that the inclusion of a mention of the *arūpa-jhānas* in the Buddha's life history was intended to show that they were inadequate when compared with the Buddha's method. They do, however, lead to a state which seems to be equal to *nibbāna*, which presumably means that some, at least, of these non-Buddhist teachers had also succeeded in finding a way out of *saṃsāra*. It was presumably because the *arūpa-jhānas* were successful in gaining the desired end that they were incorporated into the Buddhist scheme of *jhānas*, not as simultaneous means (which would have been better, because they are really an alternative) but as consecutive.

56. M I 165, 35.

57. Although *saññāvedayita* is usually translated as a dvandva compound, this is not necessarily correct. Grammatically, it could as well be taken as a tatpuruṣa compound, with the past participle *vedayita* being used as an action noun. This interpretation would depend upon the occurrence of *saññā* with the verb *vedayati*. This combination seems not to occur in the Pāli canon as we have it now, but it is possible that it existed at an earlier date, when the precise signification of technical terms had not yet been fixed.

58. M I 175, 3-4.

59. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 259 ch. H.

60. D II 72-168.

61. D II 156, 17.

62. D II 156, 18-19.

63. S V 215.

64. See Schmithausen, op. cit. (in n. 17), p. 215 n. 54.

65. See Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, s.v. *nibbāna*.

66. Vetter (op. cit. (in n. 18), p. 74) may not be correct in translating *amata* as "immortality". This translation perhaps gives the wrong impression, since the Buddha was presumably trying to gain release from *saṃsāra*, i.e. he was trying to find a state where there was no rebirth, and therefore no dying leading to rebirth. For this reasons *nibbāna* is described as being without birth, without death, without *gati*, etc.

67. The reference in the Milinda-pañha (268,14; 271,11) to *ākāsa* being *akammaja* is taken to be due to Sarvāstivādin influence. See I.B. Horner, Milinda's Questions, Vol. I, London, 1963, p. xviii.

68. Cf. *evaṃ khandhesu santesu, hoti satto ti sammuti*, S I 135, 21.

69. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad I.13, quoted by F. Otto Schrader, "On the problem of nirvāṇa", in *JPTS* 1904-1905, p. 167 n. 2.

Some remarks on older parts of the Suttanipāta

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In "Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi" (Hairakuji Shoten, Kyoto 1985, 67-85) I presented an approach to the most ancient form of Buddhism. This approach could, simplifying somewhat, be described as a reduction of the Buddha's biography. The main criteria for this reduction were coherence and intelligibility as defended by Lambert Schmithausen in "Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf" (ed. K. Bruhn und A. Wezler, Wiesbaden/Franz Steiner Verlag/1981, 200).

Here I should like to discuss older parts of the Suttanipāta which are not connected with the Buddha's biography. Many scholars think that these parts belong to the oldest layer of Buddhist literature. I do not contradict this opinion. But what about the ideas expressed in them? Are they necessarily older than all ideas expressed in texts that received their definite shape in a later stage? And should we have such an impression in regard to some of these ideas, can this be taken to mean that they represent a more ancient form of Buddhism than can be gathered from texts connected with the Buddha's biography?

Without excluding the possibility of other parts of the Suttanipāta being also very old I shall focus on three texts (all written in verse):
1) The Khaggavisāṇasutta (the third sutta of part I)
2) The Pārāyana(-vagga) (= part V)
3) The Aṭṭhaka(-vagga) (= part IV).
Their relative antiquity is guaranteed by the fact that they are commented on by the Cullaniddesa and the Mahāniddesa, texts which themselves are included in the Pali canon.

1. The Khaggavisānasutta

The main topic of the Khaggavisāṇasutta (verses 35-75 of the PTS edition of the Suttanipāta) is the advice to live alone (*eko care*) as a rhinoceros lives alone (or: the horn of some kind of rhinoceros stands alone).

This advice is reiterated in all but one (v.45) of its verses. It means leaving behind not only one's family, but also bad friends in religious life and even good friends. One may join a good and wise religious friend as long as one can learn from him, but then one again must wander alone.

"Living alone" also means keeping aloof from objects of sensual pleasure (50-51).

Besides this continually repeated theme of living alone we find a description of the fourth Dhyāna (67, cp. *jhāna* in 69) and references to prerequisites of Dhyāna-meditation: avoiding the violation of any creature (35), watching over the sense organs (63), being mindful (45, 70) and overcoming the five hindrances (*pañcāvaraṇāni* 66) of the mind. One is also invited to perform the emancipation (*vimutti*) consisting of love (*mettā*), equanimity (*upekkhā*), compassion (*karuṇā*) and kindliness (*muditā*) (73).

A path (*magga*) is mentioned in 55. It is obtained (*paṭiladdha-*), when one has passed beyond the restless motion of views (*diṭṭhi-visūkāni*). If, as is very likely, the noble eightfold path (starting with right views) is meant here, one must have gone beyond the restless motion of *wrong* views.

In 70 one is councelled to strive for the extinction of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*) and in 74 to give up passion (*rāga*), ill-will (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*).

These are the main ideas of the sutta. They point to an early stage of development of Buddhism where the four noble truths were the theoretical frame of the practical goal of reaching the fourth Dhyāna. No analysis of a person into five Skandhas being mentioned, nor their predicates of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non-self, the contents do not point to the method (and, in my opinion, further stage) of discriminating insight (*paññā*).[1]

Nor do these ideas point to a stage before Dhyāna-meditation and its frame of the four noble truths which I would call the discovery of Gotama, who on account of this could rightly claim to be *buddha*. There is nothing in this sutta that cannot be connected with the first teaching of the Buddha. Only the stress on living alone could, but need not, be seen as puzzling. It was obviously puzzling to later Buddhist monks who only knew of living in communities. This seems to be the reason why in the Cullaniddesa (beginning with the commentary on v. 35 of the sutta) "living alone" is already considered a prescription for Paccekasambuddhas. That this is far from convincing has been shown by Johannes Bronkhorst in "The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India" (Stuttgart/Franz Steiner Verlag/1986, 120-121).

2. The Pārāyana(-vagga)

The title of this fifth and last part of the Suttanipāta (verses 976-1149) and some of its verses are quoted in other canonical texts probably older than the Cullaniddesa (see Lord Chalmers, Buddha's Teachings ... Cambridge Mass. 1932, XV-XVI, and Nyanaponika, Suttanipāta, Konstanz 1955, 18). This demonstrates the popularity of the text, which is a kind of breviary, rather than its antiquity, which is thereby ensured only to some degree.

Moreover, the "Pārāyana" mentioned there can hardly mean the whole of the text as it has come down to us. The 56 introductory verses are not commented upon in the Cullaniddesa and very likely did not belong to the old Pārāyana. The second epilogue (1131-1149) is, it is true, discussed in the Cullaniddesa, but it begins by speaking about the Pārāyana as a completed work (1131) and is probably an earlier addition.

There is also internal evidence that the introductory verses originally were not part of the Pārāyana. The persons named in 1124-25 (some of them also in the nucleus of the text), including the great Ṛṣi Piṅgiya, are evidently not disciples of the Brahman Bāvari as suggested in the introductory verses. And we need not be amazed that the question about a great man (*mahāpurisa*) in 1040-1042 is not answered with the 32 characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*) Bāvari expects in 1000.

When we take the verses 1032-1130 as the Pārāyana proper mentioned in other canonical sources, we still do not have the same uniformity of contents as in the Khaggavisāṇasutta. These verses are, however, a unity insofar as sixteen persons put short questions to the Buddha[2] who gives short answers often using the same words.

Moreover, most of the sixteen sections have at least one verse dealing with the topic of overcoming birth and old age[3] or old age and death[4] or death[5] or suffering[6] or sorrow and lamentation[7] or 'perception'.[8]

Other sections not covered by these items refer to thirst[9] which may be assumed to be the cause of birth, etc., as is the case in suttas mentioning birth, etc.[10]

The clause *bhavābhavāya mākāsi taṇhaṁ* at the end of the Dhotaka-section (1068) reminds us of sentences in the nucleus of the Aṭṭhakavagga and might indicate a more immediate aim, i.e. a mystical aim (see below), than overcoming rebirth. A similar statement, however, at the end of the preceding section (1060) clearly appears to be integrated into the advice to overcome birth and old age.[11]

In order to overcome (the cause of) birth and old age etc. eleven of the sixteen sections recommend, among other methods, the practice of mindfulness (*sati*, adj. *sata* 1035-36, 1039, 1041, 1053-54, 1056, 1062, 1066-67, 1070, 1085, 1095, 1104, 1110-11, 1119), a practice which seems to be (in my opinion: seems to have again become, if it was an independent

practice in Jainism or other groups) independent from Dhyāna-meditation except in one case (1107); in two (perhaps three) cases (see below) it is combined with the method of discriminating insight (*paññā*).

With these last remarks we come to the diversity of contents in the Pārāyana. To begin with I want to consider a single occurrence of Dhyāna meditation (in the Udaya-section). In 1107 we find mindfulness (*sati*) in combination with equanimity (*upekkhā*) in a compound ending with 'purified' (*saṁsuddha*). Adducing 1106 (*pahānaṁ kāmacchandānaṁ domanassāna cūbhayaṁ*) we can be fairly sure that here the fourth Dhyāna is meant (cf. *jhāyin* in 1105). This state of mind is here called 'emancipation by liberating insight' (*aññāvimokkha* 1105, 1107) and is said to destroy nescience (*avijjā* 1105, 1107); this points, as I have argued at another place (The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism, Leiden, E.J. Brill 1988, chapter 8) to a later stage in the development of the Dhyāna stream. If we adduce the following verses of this section, we may derive that destroying nescience helps to destroy thirst (*taṇhā* 1109) and thereby helps to reach *nibbāna* (1109), or, more negatively formulated, to reach the destruction of 'perception' (*viññāṇa* 1110-11). Here we find the same structure as in the Ajita-section

(1033: *avijjā* - *vevicchа* and *jappa* → *dukkha*,
and 1036-37: *viññāṇa* + *nāmarūpa* = *dukkha*,
end of *viññāṇa* → end of *nāmarūpa*)

and in the Mettagū-section

(1051-52: *avidvā* → *upadhi* → *dukkha*,
and 1055: *viññāṇa* should no longer remain in 'becoming'),

a structure which is also found in the first three, respectively four, members of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination. But this structure seems to be superseded in the closing verses (1110-11) of the section under discussion (and also in the Mettagū-section, 1054-56) by an attempt to overcome *viññāṇa* more directly by the practice of mindfulness alone, not connected with Dhyāna and *aññā*, and not directed against *avijjā*, but against *taṇhā* (1109; cf. 1055: *etesu nandiṁ ca nivesanaṁ panujja* ...).

Mindfulness might now, it is true, be connected with *paññā* (in the sense of discriminating insight) instead of *aññā*. Although this is not the case here, in the Mogharāja-section in verse 1119 we find a clear example of the combination of mindfulness and the advice to give up the seeing of a self (*attānudiṭṭhi*) (we may suppose: in the constituents of a person). The giving up of this seeing was very likely done by judging the constituents of a person as nonpermanent and therefore unsatisfactory and therefore non-self, a method often indicated by the term (*sammā-*) *paññā* at other places in the Pali canon.

Because we have this passage in the Mogharāja-section, we may also be allowed to interpret the combination of the terms *sati* and *paññā* in the Ajita-section (1035-36) in this sense, not following Nyanaponika (op. cit. p. 350) who explains *paññā* in these two verses as *sampajañña*, which is quite understandable in regard to the vague meaning *paññā* has at other places in the Suttanipāta and in regard to the traditional and, in my opinion, much older combination of *sati* and *sampajañña*, but not in regard to verse 1119. Our interpretation implies that in the Ajita-section the aforementioned structure, corresponding with the beginning of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination, remains preserved until the end of the section.

There may be one further example of a recommendation of discriminating insight in the Pārāyana, even though the term *paññā* is not used. In the Posāla-section (1113) a mental state is mentioned in which apperceptions (*saññā*) of form (*rūpa*) are overcome, all physical elements (*kāya*) are left behind and one sees that nothing exists. This state, which reminds us of states without apperception which are in some passages of the Aṭṭhakavagga (see below) an aim in themselves (cf. AN V p. 324-326) is, however, not fully accepted here. In 1113 Sakka (the Buddha) is requested to give the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) regarding how a person possessing such a state is to be guided further. This is, whatever the somewhat obscure lines that follow may mean, remarkable, because in another section of the Pārāyana, in the Upasīva-section, the state without apperceptions is acknowledged as the final state. As to the following lines in the Posāla-section, we can see that they speak about knowing (*abhijānaṁ*) all *viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo* and of knowing (*jānāti*) *tiṭṭhantam*. This could mean that one has to know the *viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo* and the *viññāṇa*, and this knowledge might have consisted of the insight that *viññāṇa* and the four other constituents are nonpermanent, unsatisfactory and non-self (note the word *vipassati* in 1115, only once occurring in the Pārāyana, never in the Aṭṭhaka, the variant reading in 1070 not being convincing). For this interpretation one could refer to SN 22.54 (described by Noritoshi Aramaki, On the Formation of a Short prose Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, in "Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi", Heirakuji Shoten, Kyoto 1985, 95), but on the other hand it is not precisely the same method, because in SN 22.54 one gets rid of the five constituents by simply relinquishing the greed for them, here by knowing them.

The word *paññā*, but obviously not a recommendation of the method of discriminating insight, occurs at two more places in the Pārāyana. In 1090-91 the distinction between "having *paññāṇa*" and "producing *paññā*" could, viewed from the whole section, even imply a criticism of the method of discriminating insight. At the second place (1097) we have a

distinction between a person who has little *paññā* and a person who has abundant *paññā*. The latter term occurs at other places in the Suttanipāta (346, 376, 538, 792, 1143, cf. *bhūripaññāṇa* in 1136, 1138, 1140), but never in a context where it clearly can be determined as meaning "having much discriminating insight", no more than the vague meaning "very wise" appearing to be intended, especially in the passage 792 of the Aṭṭhaka-vagga.

To conclude our survey of the diversity of contents in the Pārāyana we must have a look at the Upasīva- and at the Nanda-section. In the Upasīva-section (1069-1076) we hear nothing about some kind of knowledge as was the case in other sections discussed above. The reason is not that it speaks of other things, but that for "crossing the great flood" (1069) a state without apperception (*saññā*) is recommended; and apperception must be considered the basis of every knowledge using notions and words.[12] In 1071-72 the highest emancipation from apperception and the being released in this state (*saññāvimokkhe parame vimutto*) is proclaimed. It is said, moreover, that nothing more is needed (this is against the aforementioned Posāla-section). In the Aṭṭhakavagga we shall find a similar teaching in some passages. Here, however, this practice of overcoming apperception is combined with the practice of mindfulness (*sati* 1070), which is never the case in the Aṭṭhaka passages. This, in my view, clearly shows the hand of the author-compiler of the Pārāyana. His hand also seems to be shown, when at the end of the Upasīva-section, the question is put whether the (central constituent?) *viññāṇa* of a person who possesses this emancipation will come to an end; for those passages (or any other passage) of the Aṭṭhaka never mention *viññāṇa*. The author-compiler seems to have been aware of the advantage of discussing this problem here, a problem so difficult to answer in the context of discriminating insight, where the disappearance of *viññāṇa* strongly suggest pure annihilation. Here, however, no theories are at stake and one can maintain that nothing can be said about the consequences of the disappearance of *viññāṇa*: "When all things (*dhamma*) are abolished, then all ways of thinking, too, are abolished" (1076).

The Nanda-section (1077-83) is, at the beginning, even more explicit in defying knowledge (*ñāṇa*). What makes a Muni is his manner of living (*jīvita*, in 1078 explained with *visenikatvā anīghā nirāsā*),[13] not knowledge, nor views (*diṭṭhi*, against 1117 in the Mogharāja-section where Gotama is expected to have a view), nor learning (*suta*). This is in conflict with other teachings in the Pali canon and perhaps reflects a very old, even prebuddhist instruction, being also represented in the Aṭṭhakavagga (see below). But in the Nanda-section of the Pārāyana this teaching is combined with the aim of overcoming birth and old age (1079-

82), whereas in the corresponding passages in the Aṭṭhaka this is not so. As to the question regarding how to achieve this aim, the answer is that not only has one to give up all views, learning and also ascetic morality and vows, but one has also to know thoroughly (*pariññāya* 1082) thirst (*taṇhā*). One thereby becomes free from the Cankers (*āsava*, a term that need not, but can already include "nescience") and "crosses the flood". In this "thoroughly knowing" in order to be released from rebirth I also see the hand of the author-compiler.

Having discussed the diversity of contents in the Pārāyana and also having noticed some uniformity we may be justified to call the Pārāyana a "text" which was "composed" by a person who wanted to mention as many tenets or methods as he knew and as many as were necessary to complete the solemn number of sixteen questions. All is related to the Buddha and, very likely, to the aim of overcoming rebirth. It may have been composed at a relatively early date, but to call it the oldest text of the Pali canon, as some scholars do, fails to convince me. Some of its contents are presented at other places in small units (e.g. suttas of the Aṭṭhaka or parts of larger suttas) in a more convincing form and, probably, of an earlier date.

3. The Atthaka(-vagga)

This is the only part of the Suttanipāta which as such can be found in the Chinese Tripiṭaka (Taisho No. 198, accompanied by a prose commentary). The translation is, however, of a doubtful quality; e.g. the words *sātam* and *asātam* in 867, 869 and 870 are rendered with 有 and 無. Therefore, although I have referred to it, I make no use of it in my argument.

The name Aṭṭhaka for the fourth part of the Suttanipāta (verses 766-975) probably derives, as is long since known, from the fact that four of its sixteen suttas (no. 2 up to no. 5) consist of "eight" (*tuṭṭhubha-*)verses. This would point to a very superficial criterium at the start of collecting these suttas.

On the other hand, the sixteen suttas we now have before us have in common some peculiar traits, e.g. scarcely a trace of the method of discriminating insight (for a possible exception see below p. 45), and some of them, which I want to call the nucleus of the text, lack approval of any issue proclaimed at other places as being essential for Buddhism.

Obviously, material has not been taken from everywhere to reach the solemn number of sixteen suttas. The Aṭṭhaka contains, as I shall try to demonstrate, texts of a group that existed before or alongside the first

Buddhist community. After some time this circle was integrated into the Buddhist saṅgha. It then produced more texts. In these it tried to combine the old teaching with the teaching of the Buddha, taking from the latter what seemed suitable and often, but not always, losing its original radicalness.

Persons who want to defend the original unity of the Aṭṭhaka will point to Udāna V 6 where it is said to be recited as having sixteen parts. The same sentence occurs, however, in Vinaya I (p. 196) without the word 'sixteen'. I won't deny that the Aṭṭhaka was known as a breviary consisting of sixteen parts in a relatively early stage of the formation of the Pali canon. But the sentence in the Udāna could, if there are sufficient grounds against an original unity of the sixteenfold Aṭṭhaka, rather be used to prove the late composition of Udāna V.[14]

As to formal arguments against an original unity we can cite A.K. Warder (Pali Metre, London 1967, 130) who says that the Jarāsutta (no. 6) appears to be of later composition than other poems analysed by him, tending towards the style of the later period, Therīgāthā etc. Warder, however, does not use this observation to dissect the Aṭṭhaka. On p. 224 of 'Pali Metre' he mentions another example of a later metre, viz. *gīti*, in the Tuvaṭakasutta (no. 14 of the Aṭṭhaka), and suggests that the Aṭṭhaka is, therefore, later than the Pārāyana. He puts forward a second reason for this suggestion: "Whilst the Aṭṭhaka is almost entirely in *tuṭṭhubha*, the Pārāyana contains a good many *vattas*, although these are mainly in the frame story".

As for this second reason, we may recall the fact that the 56 introductory verses of the Pārāyana, all but two written in *vatta*, are not commented upon in the Cullaniddesa and are very likely of later origin. So an increased number of *vatta* would rather point to a later period. But let us compare the Aṭṭhaka with the nucleus of the Pārāyana, the sixteen questions. These have about 52 *vatta* (taking into account third lines) and 49 *tuṭṭhubha* (including fifth etc. lines). The Aṭṭhaka consists of 58 *vatta* and 121 *tuṭṭhubha*, besides 10 *vetālīya* and 20 *gīti*. In any case Warder gives a wrong impression of the Aṭṭhaka, when he says that it is "almost entirely in *tuṭṭhubha*". And, regarding the real distribution of *vatta* and *tuṭṭhubha* in these two texts, one may ask whether the proportion in either text is in any way significant, *if* one follows this line of reasoning.

When we speak of *vatta* and *tuṭṭhubha*, it would be more convincing to look at metrical license, a higher quantity of which perhaps indicates greater antiquity. I shall not go into details here, but mention only two suttas of the Aṭṭhaka that struck me, having got used to various kinds of metrical license in the Pārāyana and the Aṭṭhaka, as coming very near to classical standards. The first is the Kāmasutta (no. 1 of the Aṭṭhaka)

consisting of eight *vatta*-verses, all of which fulfil the classical norm of the Śloka, viz. pādas a and c being of the *pathyā*-form with the exception of 771a (having a cadence of b- and d-pādas, a common fact in other sections of the Aṭṭhaka and the Pārāyana). The second is the Guhaṭṭhakasutta (no. 2 of the Aṭṭhaka) consisting of eight *tuṭṭhubha* verses which are, reckoned as a whole, much more regular than in other suttas of the Aṭṭhaka consisting of *tuṭṭhubha* or *tuṭṭhubha* + *vatta* verses.

The observations about kind and state of metre in the Jarāsutta, Tuvaṭakasutta, Kāmasutta and Guhaṭṭhakasutta, strengthened by an analysis of their contents (see below) cause me to single out these suttas as being of later origin than the remaining suttas of the Aṭṭhaka; the fact that the Guhaṭṭhaka was very likely part of the first collection of suttas called Aṭṭhaka has no influence on this decision. The remaining suttas are not yet a real unity, but they can no longer be said to be later than the Pārāyana by the first reason stated by Warder, i.e. the *vetālīya* metre in the Jarāsutta and the *gīti* metre in the Tuvaṭakasutta; this does not affect the rest of the suttas.

Now I want to focus on the contents of the suttas of the Aṭṭhaka. In order to determine uniformity and diversity I start with the main contention of the article "Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon" by Louis O. Gómez (Philosophy East and West 26, 1976, 137-165; as I heard it a question mark should have been put at the end of the title). According to Gómez in the Aṭṭhaka, and also in the Pārāyana, we find passages implying a mystic state[15] and a way to it that cannot be reduced to other, more common teachings of the Pali canon, and are comparable only to later developments such as in Mādhyamika and in Zen. I agree with this interpretation, but want to add some historical refinement to it. We can use this interpretation for determining the contents of the suttas of the Aṭṭhaka, because not all of them have this goal or recommend the way to it, and of those that contain these issues some have them in a form mixed with other less compatible tenets. I shall, therefore, not ascribe this mysticism to *the* Aṭṭhaka (or *the* Pārāyana)[16] as Gómez does and may be allowed to do with regard to his aim of comparing a very old teaching with developments thought to belong to the Mahāyāna.

This mysticism has in common with these later developments an extreme apophatic tendency which "could be characterized in the theoretical realm as the doctrine of no-views, and in the practical realm as the practice of practicing no dharmas. In its extreme manifestations this tendency is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of right-views and the practice of gradually and systematically cultivating the true or pure dharmas" (Gómez p. 140).

To support this contention Gómez mainly cites passages that advise overcoming or denying apperception (*saññā*), knowledge (*ñāṇa*), views (*diṭṭhi*), learning (*suta*), thoughts (*muta*), ascetic morality (*sīla*) and vows (*vata*). I shall critically discuss some of these passages. But even if we suppose, for the moment, that all these passages can be accepted as proof without reservation, even then there remain six out of the sixteen suttas of the Aṭṭhaka that are not used by Gómez for his argument, and could not be used, simply because they do not have instances required for this case. These suttas are (no. 1 of the Aṭṭhaka) Kāma-, (no. 2) Guhaṭṭhaka, (no. 3) Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka-, (no. 6) Jarā-, (no. 7) Tissametteya-, (no. 16) Sāriputta-sutta.

Of these only the Guhaṭṭhaka contains a hint of overcoming apperception (*saññā*). It says that one must thoroughly know it (*pariññā* 779, compare *phassaṁ pariññāya* in 778); this does not accord with a denunciation of all knowledge and obviously represents a stage of advanced assimilation of this mysticism. I recall that the Kāma-, Guhaṭṭhaka- and Jarā-sutta have previously been singled out on metrical grounds.

I shall now discuss some problematic passages cited by Gómez. Let us first examine some passages from the Tuvaṭakasutta. The quotations on p. 148 do not refer to his specific claim; they contain advice that can also be found in connection with preparing Dhyāna meditation (see *jhāyī* in 925). On pp. 142 and 147, however, Gómez quotes the verses 916-919 which are relevant. Especially notable is the compound *papañca-saṅkhā* (916), which is translated by Gómez as "conception and dispersion".[17] In 874 (in the Kalahavivādasutta) *papañca-saṅkhā* is said to be caused by apperception (*saññā*), the implication being that it will vanish, when apperception has been stopped. Here (in 916), however, 'I am' (*asmīti*) appears as the root of *papañca-saṅkhā*, and this might be a restriction of the general term *saññā* under the influence of the well-known Buddhist idea that one cannot be freed from desire and rebirth as long as one sees the constituents as one's self.[18] In the same verse (916) one is not only asked to destroy the thought 'I am', but also the thirst (*taṇhā*); to do this latter one has to train ever mindful (*sadā sato sikkhe*, cf. 933). Mindfulness is a well-known practice of early Buddhism as can be derived from teachings connected with the Buddha's biography. Familiar to these teachings are also the terms *paṭipadā*, *samādhi* and *jhāyī* occurring in the verses 921 and 925 of the Tuvaṭakasutta. In 921 we find the term Pātimokkha as well. Moreover, in 933 we read that one has to have insight (*aññāya*) into "this *dhamma*", which is in conflict with the contention of Gómez. In the same verse (933) "the teaching (*sāsana*) of Gotama" is mentioned, and in the first verse of this sutta (915) a question is put to Ādiccabandhu (cf. 1128 = Buddha); such a clear

reference to the Buddha never occurs in the suttas most relevant for Gómez' contention.

Concluding we may say that the Tuvaṭakasutta bears some traces of the topic under discussion, but has adapted this teaching and is only an adulterated authority in this matter. I may also recall the suggestion that this sutta is of later origin because of its metre.

Another sutta cited by Gómez (p. 148), the Attadaṇḍa- (no. 15 of the Aṭṭhaka), can also be dismissed from the group of relevant suttas. Only in 954 we find a remark ("he does not grasp at anything nor does he reject anything") that is slightly reminiscent of our subject matter. Moreover, in verse 947 (*ñatvā dhammaṁ*) knowledge of the Dhamma is, contrary to our expectations, recommended.

The Purābhedasutta (no. 10 of the Aṭṭhaka) is cited by Gómez (p. 146) only in passing as having an instance (in 856) of a kind of a middle path: "A man of wisdom seeks to abandon the thirst for nonexistence as much as the thirst for becoming". This is a convincing argument, but in the verse itself we do not find "a man of wisdom", but "having known the Dhamma" (*ñatvā dhammaṁ*), which complicates the matter. Thus sutta is, furthermore, introduced (in 848) as a Gotama-sutta and recommends equanimity and mindfulness (in 855), which can be interpreted as an instigation to reach the fourth Dhyāna. There may be found, however, as in the "Buddhist" Tuvaṭakasutta some other traces of our subject in 851 (*diṭṭhīsu ca na nīyati*), 853 (*na saddho na virajjati*) and in 861 (*dhammesu ca na gacchati*).

After this investigation, there remain seven suttas of the Aṭṭhaka which, though in no way contradicting the basic Buddhist intention of disentanglement, lack any approval of tenets known to essentially belong to the Buddha's teaching from other parts of the canon. These are: the Suddhaṭṭhaka- (no. 4), the Paramaṭṭhaka (no. 5), the Pasūra- (no. 8), the Māgaṇḍiya (no. 9), the Kalahavivāda- (no. 11), the Cūḷabyūha (no. 12) and the Mahābyūha- (no. 13).

Some of these suttas (Suddhaṭṭhaka in 790 and 795, Paramaṭṭhaka in 802-3, Māgaṇḍiya in 843 and Mahābyūha in 907 and 911) mention the Brāhmaṇa as the person who accomplishes the way they speak of. Māgaṇḍiya mentions the Muni (838, 844, 847) and Paramaṭṭhaka the Bhikkhu (798) as well, but Kalahavivāda only the Muni (877). Pasūra (in 828) and Cūḷabyūha (in 883-4, 890) denounce the quarrelsome ascetics (*samaṇa*) and (only Cūḷabyūha 891-2) the sectarians (?*titthyā*). Here we get the impression that the Brāhmaṇa as the person accomplishing the mystical way is opposed to the Samaṇa and not to the Brāhmaṇa by birth, the latter opposition being a common theme in other parts of the canon, but not in any way alluded to here (the Pārāyana, on the other hand,

mentions Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas together in 1079-82 or the Brāhmaṇa alone in 1059, 1063 and 1115, but not in opposition to Samaṇas). There is, however, one of these suttas that does not mention the Brāhmaṇa (only the Muni) and is not against the Samaṇas (plural), but speaks of *a* or *the* Samaṇa (singular, 866 and 868); it is the Kalahavivādasutta, a sutta concerned with overcoming quarrel which is considered the domain of Samaṇas in other suttas. Maybe we can take this as an indication that in this circle one now had accepted the fact that there was one Samaṇa who was not a "sophist" and not quarrelsome and could be adhered to also by followers of this "Brahmanical" mystical way (I shall return to this question below). But if with this "Samaṇa" the Buddha is meant,[19] it is remarkable that he is referred to by such a term which is never used in the references to his authority that we find in the Pārāyana (see above note 2) and in some suttas of the Aṭṭhaka eliminated above from the nucleus, such as the Purābheda- (Gotama 848), the Tuvaṭaka- (Ādiccabandhu 915, Gotama 933) and the Sāriputta- (Buddha, Tādin etc. 957).

Let us now take a brief look at the contents of these remaining suttas, making use of what Gómez has said about this matter. A special problem seems to be offered by the Pasūrasutta. It mainly advocates abstention from disputes and does not mention anything that can be interpreted as a mystical state. Therefore, it appears only to express a peace of noninvolvement (cp. Gómez 139). We know from e.g. DN I p. 24-28 that before or/and during early Buddhism there existed a group of Samaṇas who tried to avoid all affirmations and negations. This group is often connected with the name of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta (e.g. DN I p. 58). Maybe the thoughts about abstention from disputes registered in the Pasūrasutta originally had no other aim than such a peace of noninvolvement. But the two concluding verses (833-834) are capable of being interpreted as integrating these thoughts into a way to a higher peace (cp. Gómez 146) - it is surely an advantage on such a way to abstain from disputes. And the sutta has got a place amidst other suttas proclaiming this higher peace. I would, therefore, like to follow Gómez's interpretation of this sutta.

How can we become more sure about such a higher goal? There are two fairly plausible arguments. Some of these suttas, while (with the exception of the Suddhaṭṭhaka-) also recommending abstention from disputes, criticize clinging to apperception (*saññā*), and some of these suttas describe the method to reach the goal by a special middle path (not the same middle path we know from the Buddha's first preaching).

First the passages about apperception. Verse 792 in the Suddhaṭṭhaka is critical of a person who is attached to apperception (*saññasatta*); this person, however, is opposed here to a person who knows the Dhamma and

has much *paññā*. Whatever *paññā* may be here, probably only wisdom in a general sense, knowing the Dhamma is in each case in discord with the standards of mysticism Gómez has distilled from other passages. We may, therefore, call this a contaminated passage.

A much better instance is to be found in the Paramaṭṭhakasutta (in 802) translated by Gómez (p. 141) with "He has not formed (or fancied) even the least apperception in what is here seen, heard or thought" (*tassīdha diṭṭhe va sute va mute vā / pakappitā natthi aṇū pi saññā*). This sutta is in no way, neither in this verse nor in other verses contaminated with opposite teaching.

The Māgaṇḍiya (in 841) has a verse line similar to the passage just quoted from the Paramaṭṭhaka: *ito ca naddakkhi aṇuṁ pi saññaṁ*. But because this seems to be critically said in regard to the person having asked a question and seems to imply that this person must get an apperception and thereby a clear notion of something, it is not so useful a passage. Very clear and illustrative, however, is the last verse of this sutta (847). Gómez translates (p. 145): "For him who is detached from apperceptions (*saññāviratta*) there are no knots, released by insight (*paññāvimutta*) he has no delusions. Those who hold on to apperceptions and views go around in the world in constant conflict". If we may take *paññā* as here only meaning wisdom and not discriminating insight (material traces of which I have not found in the suttas under discussion), we would have a convincing and uncontaminated instance of our subject matter.

I postpone a verse (874) of the Kalahavivādasutta, because it is also a good instance of the middle path I announced.

A last example of denouncing *saññā* is found in the Cūḷabyūhasutta (886). But I am not so convinced that this points to a mystical way or state.

A better manner to show that we sometimes have to do with a kind of mysticism is to find instances of a middle path in this sense that not only all dogmas are denied and all theories and knowledge - which could be interpreted as aiming at a peace of noninvolvement - and all apperceptions - which is a stronger argument -, but that this denying, too, is denied. With such a double denying one can avoid the impression that the mental state aimed at is similar to the state of a stone or plant, which seem to have no apperceptions. One can imagine some criticism to this point; such a middle path would, then, be a development in the teaching.

The best instance is verse 874 in the Kalahavivādasutta. In the translation of Gómez (p. 144) it reads: "When he has not an apperception of apperceptions (*na saññasaññī*), when he has not an apperception of non-apperception (*na visaññasaññī*), when he does not not apperceive (*no*

pi asaññī), when he does not have apperceptions without an object (*na vibhūtasaññī*, cf. 1113), for him who has attained to this, form ceases, for apperception is the cause of dispersion and conception (*papañcasaṅkhā*). "We may add that according to the question in 873 for such a person not only form (*rūpa*) ceases, but also pleasure and pain. Looking at 872 we may also say that "name and form" (*nāmarūpa*) ceases. Contrary to the being conditioned of *nāmarūpa* by *viññaṇa* and the causes of *viññāṇa* in the twelvefold chain of dependent origination, here *nāmarūpa* appears to be dependent on *saññā*[20] and ceases in this very life (we may interpret: does not appear for a while), and not only (and definitively) after death. That these verses, and the whole sutta, are directed against the structure at the beginning of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination cannot be excluded merely because they contain thoughts one is not used to, which induces most scholars to consider this sutta the origin of all attempts to construe chains of dependence. As to my idea that this sutta represents a later stage in the development of the teaching of this mysticism see below (p. 50-51), where I shall point to a hardly dubitable example of criticism of an advanced Buddhist term.

Another example of such a middle path can be found in verse 839 of the Māgaṇḍiyasutta. Gómez (p. 146) translates this verse: "Cleansing is not attained by things seen or heard (... *diṭṭhiyā* ... *sutiyā*, better: by views or learning), nor by knowledge, nor by the vows of morality (*sīlabbatena*, better: by morals and vows, see line 4), nor is it attained by not seeing or not hearing, nor by not knowing, nor by absence of morals and vows. Abandoning all these, not grasping at them he is at peace (*santo*, cf. *ajjhattasanti* in 837), not relying, he would not hanker for becoming". Whatever may be the precise connection of the latter part of this verse with the first part, the beginning lines imply that the goal is not reached by persons who never think and have learned nothing and are immoral, though it cannot be attained by views, doctrines learned from others, knowing, morals and vows. Perhaps we may also conclude that this goal, if it is reached by overcoming all apperceptions, as the last verse (847, quoted above) of this sutta strongly suggests, is not below, but above all apperceptions. Maybe this is expressed in verse 847 itself, if *paññā* in *paññāvimutta* does not have the meaning of discriminating insight, but of wisdom or "real insight", here used by someone who knew that this term was held in high esteem by others, but himself did not practice the method meant by it (there is no indication for this).

I now want to leave the theme of mysticism and to look at these seven suttas of the Aṭṭhaka from the angle of release from rebirth, so conspicuous a theme in the Pārāyana. Only with difficulty can one find some passages that perhaps recommend this goal. A good one seems to be

verse 902 (of the Mahābyūha-) where is said: why should he tremble and what should he long for, for whom there is no passing away and re-appearing (*cutūpapāto*)? This might, however, also be said, because such a person is not at all interested in this matter. It is possible to come to such an interpretation, when one looks at verse 836 (of the Māgaṇḍiya-). Here we find the question: What kind of rebirth (*bhavūpapatti*) do you proclaim? The answer in 837 (condensed) is: I do not proclaim anything, I have seen the inner peace. In 839 (already quoted as an instance of a middle path description) we see that this inner peace is considered to have its base in "cleansing" or purity (*suddhi*). Here we observe a positive use (cf. 830 in the Pasūra) of the term *suddhi*, which is for the most part criticized in these suttas. Why it is criticized is not so clear. But it is probable that in the environment where (the ideas of) these texts originated there were groups striving for purity as a means for a better rebirth. But it is "real purity" not to strive for anything, surely not for this or that existence (*bhava* 839, *bhavābhava* 801, 877, 901).

One might expect that also striving for non-becoming would be criticized. With one exception (at the end of the Kalahavivāda, see below) this cannot be found in the seven suttas under discussion. Gómez' translation (p. 141) of the compound *bhavābhava* in 801 (cf. 786 and Gómez p. 145) by "being or not being" is not possible, when we consider *idha vā huraṁ vā* in 801 b. We find, however, a clear rejection of striving for both becoming (*bhava*) and non-becoming (*vibhava*) in the Purābhedasutta (856), which shows some "Buddhist" influence (see above p. 46) but has much in common with the suttas under discussion.

We can perhaps explain this observation. In the oldest days this mystical movement faced only groups of persons who strove for a better existence after this life, not groups of persons who strove for release from rebirth. At some moment this latter goal, not being too far from renouncing the strife for better existences, was recognized by these mystics, but nevertheless they rejected striving for it. With this explanation we can perhaps understand the third part of that strange tripartition of the thirst into thirst for *kāma*, thirst for *bhava* and thirst for *vibhava* found in the Pali tradition of the four noble truths. This may be an addition to the four noble truths, coming from the now Buddhist circle where the Purābhedasutta was composed.

If we use a Buddhist term not occurring in the Aṭṭhaka except in the Tissametteya- (822) and the Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka (783), we could say: in this circle the *nibbāna* is conceived as complete extinction of all desires, even of the desire for the extinction of rebirth. Extinction of rebirth, a second meaning of *nibbāna*, could, by the way, also be rejected, because it presupposes some theory about rebirth.

An instance of openly rejecting this second *nibbāna* seems to be extant at the end of the Kalahavivāda- (876-877), where "expert (persons) who proclaim *anupādisesa*" are criticized. I see no other manner to understand this *anupādisesa* than to interpret it in the traditional way as release where no psycho-material substratum remains.[21]

If I am right in this interpretation, we have to admit that such a critical remark about a widely accepted Buddhist goal could only be made some time after the first events and teachings we gather from the Buddha's biography. But because the Kalahavivāda (having a middle path formulation) is one of the most advanced of the seven "non-buddhist" suttas of the Aṭṭhaka, we are not forbidden to assume an origin of this movement lying before the preaching of the Buddha.

The goal of overcoming all apperceptions is not in conflict with the genuine Dhyāna meditation, the latter, however, not being accomplished without concern for the welfare of all living beings (cf. Khaggavisāṇasutta 35) and culminating in a state of pure equanimity and mindfulness can be better connected with the "right view" that there are rebirths and with the goal of overcoming rebirth.

So we can understand that this group of mystics was integrated into the Gotama-saṅgha and tried to adapt specific Buddhist methods and aims as is the case in other suttas of the Aṭṭhaka. On the other hand, the Gotama-saṅgha attempted to include (mainly in the sense of Paul Hacker's term 'inclusivism') the main subject of this movement or to make use of it (e.g. to reject all theories, when, in the development of the *Paññā* stream, questions as the (non-)annihilation of a released person presented too many difficulties, cf. MN 72).

As to attempts to "include" this theme, the first ones may be found in the Pārāyana. In the Upasīva- and Nanda-section this comes near to acceptance, but in the Upasīva-section overcoming apperception is supported by mindfulness and at the end the whole issue is employed to get rid of the problem of the (non-)annihilation of the released person, and in the Nanda-section the method of overcoming all views and knowledge is employed for the aim of release from birth and old age and combined with "knowing" thirst (see description above). In the Posāla-section, however, we meet an example of blank "inclusivism". What is called in the Upasīva-section 'emancipation from apperception' is here only a state of nothingness, which could be a fetter (1115), and has to be overcome by knowledge.

This reminds us of the state of nothingness as one of the four (or five) *samāpattis* and the appreciation, common in Buddhism, of this state and of the other *samāpattis* as not leading to release from rebirth. Gómez (note 45) may be right, when he says that we must not reduce the state

described in 874, which reminds us of the samāpatti, which is neither apperception nor non-apperception, to a meditational state of the *arūpa*-sphere. But even in early times Buddhists thought they could do this, the starting point perhaps being (registered by) the Posāla-section of the Pārāyana. And from their angle they were right; this state of mind or these states (where 'nothingness' and 'neither-apperception-nor-nonapperception' and 'cessation of apperception and feeling' were considered gradations and were perhaps preceded by exercises to give up all apperceptions of visible form) originally was/were not intended to overcome rebirth. They were, however, not right in supposing that this state of mind was intended for less than their goal; for these mystics considered themselves standing above this question of rebirth or no rebirth. And when they became integrated into the Gotama-saṅgha, they could, with a good conscience, maintain that they, too, were released from rebirth. But to convince the other side it was necessary to show that by such a state of mind the faults causing, according to its view, rebirth were destroyed. What the opponents expected as a means, however, was not implied. It may be that this problem led to the strange formulation "staying in the cessation of apperceptions and feelings, his cankers have completely vanished after he has seen by *paññā*" (see Schmithausen op. cit., 216). As Schmithausen has observed (op. cit. note 55) this passage is missing in DN and SN, which shows that the monks specializing in these Nikāyas had a good sense of dogmatics, though not of mysticism.[22]

Appendix

Introduction at the Conference (slightly adjusted).

There are persons who seem to have such an experience of uniformity and fascination when reading Buddhist suttas that they feel allowed to compare them to the plays of Shakespeare; and in this case we know, or assume, that one person must have written them.

Other persons, however, have difficulties in combining contents of two or more suttas and in seeing larger suttas as a whole, though they may be fascinated by details. Insofar as they work as philologists they cannot see that all reports point to the same experience and that the difference in words is only due to a difference in a more subjective and a more objective way of speaking. The words in the texts point to different methods (sometimes to a combination of methods), though the aim of no longer being reborn may be the same. Where different methods are used, one may also expect (slightly) different experiences. Moreover, not all

methods are associated with the Buddha's enlightenment. The texts themselves sometimes mention that there are different kinds of released persons.

Those philologists can try to register that there are different descriptions of ways and that within some descriptions there are elements which in their eyes are not wholly compatible.

In case they are impressed by details they can also try to explain lack of coherence by assuming that a compiler has worked carelessly or with an external intention. In this connection one can hardly avoid the question as to which of several ways or descriptions of ways is the older one and whether they all must be ascribed to the Buddha himself. Insofar as one assumes that a prose passage or verses can be connected with the Buddha's own teaching one now is seemingly engaging, as a contribution to this panel puts it, in a hopeless enterprise. When one looks at the variety of results in this field one would nearly believe it. Though everybody accepts that one has to use all main canonical sources, the practice of analysing carefully, needed in this connection, leads to reducing the material and to focusing on a small group of texts. This, not unexpectedly, leads to different results and gives the impression that every scholar in this field states what he himself likes best.

I have some hope that we can overcome this deadlock, namely by concentrating on those passages Buddhist tradition itself calls the first sermons of the Buddha. We can try to make a hypothesis on the basis of these sermons and then to look whether it holds good when compared with the contents of other texts. If this procedure brings some clarity to the complex contents of the canonical scriptures, we may assume that we have some ground to stand on. In the Festschrift for Shozen Kumoi (1985) I have presented a hypothesis on the first teaching of the Buddha. My strongest point is the following observation. The Pali Vinaya tradition on the establishment of the Buddhist order, a compilation of material with an external intention, relates that the first disciples of the Buddha were released from all *āsavas* while listening to the second sermon, the discourse on non-self. Listening to the first sermon, which demands the cultivation of the noble eightfold path, had, according to this tradition, only the effect that the listeners obtained the so-called Dharma-eye and wanted to enter the order, issues that do not occur in the sermon itself. Though the practice of the noble eightfold path contained in the first sermon is, according to this tradition, not the cause of the release of the first disciples, this sermon nevertheless is kept in the first position of all sermons of the Buddha. Therefore I feel justified in assuming that the cultivation of the eightfold path is an older method of release than insight while listening to a discourse on non-self.

I spoke about comparing such a hypothesis with the contents of other texts. Here I want to look at older parts of the Suttanipāta with this intention.

Notes

1. The word *paññā* appears at one place, in verse 75, but only in the meaning of 'sagacity' with regard to one's profit, said of impure persons.

2. The questions are put to the Buddha according to the first epilogue in 1126 and 1128 (Buddha Ādiccabandhu). This is confirmed by most of the "questions" themselves being addressed to Gotama (1057, 1083, 1117, cf. Gotamasāsana in 1084), the Bhagavat (14 times, two of them, in 1058 and 1079, disturbing the metre), Sakka (1063, 1069, 1090, 1113) and other epithets which are not exclusively of the Buddha, but in this context very likely are employed to point to him, such as *muni* (1052, 1058, 1075, 1081, 1085) or *mahesi* (1054, 1067, 1083) or *devīsi* (1116) or *nāga* (1058, 1101).

3. *jātijaraṁ* 1045-48, 1052, 1056, 1060, 1079-82, 1097, 1120, 1122.

4. *jarāmaccu* 1092-94.

5. *maccu* 1100, 1104, 1118.

6. *dukkha* 1033, 1049-51, 1056-58.

7. *sokapariddava* 1052, 1056.

8. *viññāṇa* 1037, 1055, 1110-11, cp. 1114.

9. *tanhā* 1041, 1068, 1070. 1085, 1088.

10. For *taṇhā* see 1082-83, 1103, 1109. Cp. the (quasi) synonyms *ādāna* 1094, 1103-4 (here also *upādiyati*); *iñjita* 1040-41, 1048; *upadhi* 1050-51, 1057, 1083; *chandarāga* 1086; *nandi* 1055, 1115; *nivesana* 1055; *bhavarāga* 1046; *mamāyita* 1056; *rāga* 1046; *visattikā* 1053-54; *veviccha+jappa* 1033; *saṅga* 1060, 1068.

11. 1060: ... *bhavābhave saṅgam imaṁ visajja ... vītataṇho ... atāri so jātijaraṁ ...*

12. Cp. 874 discussed below p. 45.

13. "not taking sides, free from resentment, desireless", cp. 794, 833, 1048 and 1060. An interesting discussion of the word *visenikatvā* can be found in S. Collins, Selfless Persons, Cambridge University Press 1982, 140.

14. Cp. L. Schmithausen's handling of the fact that the Pārāyana is mentioned in AN IV p. 63, in: Karma and Rebirth ed. R.W. Neufeldt, State University of New York Press 1986, p. 210 and p. 224 note 54.

15. What Gómez wants to express with the term 'mystic(al)' can be gathered from the introduction of his article (reference to St. John of the Cross).

16. Only two of the sixteen sections refer to this state, one in a very restricted form; see above pp. 40-41 the remarks on the Upasīva- and the Posāla-section.

17. Gómez seems to take it as a copulative compound; cf. his translation of this difficult compound in 874 (p. 144): "dispersion and conception". More likely it is a determinative compound. But Gómez' translations may convey much of the original intention.

18. Maybe the term *paññā* in 931cd "*atha jīvitena paññāya sīlabbatena nāññam atimaññe*" has something to do with this idea.

19. This is fairly sure in 866, where besides the question about *chanda* which is to be expected ofter 865, there is also asked, where *vinicchaya* comes from and *kodha* and *mosavajja* and *kathaṅkathā* and the Dhammas the Samaṇa has spoken of. This is not in conflict with the rest of the sutta. What is problematic is the second passage in 868, because it advises the person who doubts that he should train on the path of knowledge (*ñāṇapatha*). Then the text says: by the Samaṇa the Dhammas are spoken of after having known (*ñatva*). There also it is very likely that the Buddha is meant. This advocating of a way of knowledge of Dhammas would be the only inconsistency in this radical sutta. I may, however, remark that on the whole the Kalahavivāda- is strictly organized by only one verse question and only one verse answer etc. except in 867-868 (two verses for the answer). It is not to be excluded that the answer consisted of six lines (cf. 875: 5 lines) and that the lines 5 and 6, being necessary in regard to the question in 866, were filled up with two more lines (making another verse) which were not necessary and even against the original intention, domesticating as it were the contents.

20. In the Dvayatānupassanāsutta of the Suttanipāta, which in my eyes rightly is characterized by Chalmers (op. cit. p. XVII) as having an ancient nucleus only in 728, *saññā* is mixed up with the term *saṅkhāra* (in 732) and thus has got a place in its chain of dependent origination. The sutta wants to tackle each link of its chain as such (not only the first link, which very likely was the original intention of such chains). Its incorporation of the term *saññā* could be inter-

preted as an attempt to incorporate the function of *saññā* in the Kalahavivāda into a more traditional chain of conditions and at the same time to preserve the idea of trying to overcome *saññā* directly.

21. Here (in 877d *bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro*) one may be allowed, on account of the context and the supposed development, to translate *bhavābhava-* with "being and/or not being".

22. The author thanks Ms. Joy Manné for looking over the English in this article.

Part II: Madhyamaka

Editor's Note

The following section includes papers contributed to the Mahāyāna/Madhyamaka section of the World Sanskrit Conference held in August 1987. Not all the scholars due to take part were able to attend the conference, unfortunately, and contributions have not been received from all those who participated. The full text of J.W. de Jong's paper, a summary of which is included here, is appearing in the J. Asmussen Felicitation Volume.

January 1988 D.S.R.

Buddhism and the equality of the four castes

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In early Buddhist texts the claims of the brahmans to superiority are often discussed. The Buddha explains that differences among men are due to their occupations. The theory of the four *varṇas* is also discussed in canonical Jain texts and in the *Mahābhārata*. In the Vanaparvan (216, 14-15) it is even said that a *śūdra* can become a *brahman*.

In later times only very few Buddhist texts pay attention to the problem of caste, as, for instance, the *Vajrasūcī*, the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* and the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*. In the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* one finds almost the same arguments used as in the Vāseṭṭha-sutta of the *Suttanipāta*.

The Buddhist texts which deal with the caste system can be divided into two groups. First the canonical Pāli texts in which no reference is made to Hindu texts at all, and secondly the *Vajrasūcī*, the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* and the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, the authors of which seem to have been well versed in the Hindu scriptures. In all these texts the opposition to the caste system is absolute.

It is a surprise to see that in another Buddhist text the *Manusmṛti* is quoted not with a polemical intention as in the *Vajrasūcī* but with approval. In the first chapter of Bhāvaviveka's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is said that in preaching the doctrine one must take into account the birth, age, caste (*rigs*, Skt. *varṇa*), place and time of the hearer. In his commentary Avalokitavrata explains that the doctrine must not be taught to a *vaiśya* or a *śūdra*. In this connection he quotes a verse from a work of the heretics:

phyi-rol-pa rnams-kyi gźuṅ-las /
dmaṅs-rigs la ni blo-gros daṅ // lhag-ma bsreg-bya sbyin mi-bya //
de-la chos-bstan mi-bya-źiṅ // de-la brtul-źugs bstan mi-bya //

This verse is a literal translation of *Manusmṛti* IV.80:
na śūdrāya matiṃ dadyān nocchiṣṭaṃ na haviṣkṛtam /
na cāsyopadiśed dharmaṃ na cāsya vratam ādiśet //

It would be too hazardous to build a theory on the strength of a single quotation, but one wonders whether we do not have here an indication of a tendency among Buddhist scholars, authors of learned philosophical śāstras, to assimilate tenets found in brahmanical learning.

On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya

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Indologists have repeatedly been confronted by the difficult problem of the correct assignment of literary works to their authors. In the history of the Vedānta the attribution of works to Śaṃkara has been frequently debated, whilst in the Alaṃkāraśāstra there is the thorny question whether Ānandavardhana was the author of the *Dhvanikārikā*s as well as of the commentary on them, the *Dhvanyāloka*. Another well-known discussion has centred on the question whether one and the same Vasubandhu was the author of the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā* on the one side and of texts such as the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* and of other commentaries on Mahāyānist Sūtras and Śāstras on the other side. Similarly, in the early history of the Madhyamaka, we are faced with the question whether one and the same Nāgārjuna was the author not only of the *Madhyamakakārikā*s, and of other closely related works considered to form part of a 'Scholastic Corpus', but also of the *Ratnāvalī* and, above all, of a 'Hymnic Corpus'.

A more recent arrival on the scene as a subject of discussion is the authorship of the *Tarkajvālā*, the commentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*, of the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* and of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, all texts ascribed by some writers to the same Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya who lived in the sixth century CE.[1]

In the case of authors like Śaṃkara and Ānandavardhana, and even to a large extent of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, the fact that their relevant works have survived in the original Sanskrit makes it possible to apply to them both stylometric and terminological criteria with a view to establishing authorship. But the case of Bhāvaviveka is different because of the fact that with the sole exception of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* - a photograph of which text was taken at Źa lu in Tibet by Giuseppe Tucci after a hand-copy had earlier been made there by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana - none of the works ascribed to him is now accessible in the original. This circumstance of course makes impossible the use of stylometric analysis. As for the application of terminological criteria, it is fraught with difficulty. For even though Paul Hacker and his followers have for example developed fine terminological and related doctrinal criteria for the study of Śaṃkara, it is well known how difficult it can be to extract conclusive arguments from such distinctions. For one thing, our frequently imperfect knowledge of the history of Indian philosophical

ideas, arguments and terms may not place us in a position safely and confidently to affirm that a given doctrine, reasoning or expression could not, in any circumstance, have been accepted by the author to whom a text is traditionally ascribed. With regard to Nāgārjuna for example, the predominantly positive ideas and the cataphatic language found in the Hymns ascribed to him stand in marked contrast to the largely negative theory and apophatic approach of Nāgārjuna's scholastic works such as the *Madhyamakakārikās*; and we can say that there indeed exists a clear and significant difference in philosophical ideas and methods between the 'Scholastic Corpus' and the 'Hymnic Corpus' and that the works in question can be divided into two distinct categories (as has in fact been done by the Indo-Tibetan doxographical traditions as well as by modern scholars). But from this it by no means follows necessarily that the same Nāgārjuna could in no circumstances have been the author of both these sets of works. For the difference could be one of genre; or it could be the reflection of parallel traditions drawn on by the same author; or again it could be the result of a development in his thinking.

This kind of difficulty is compounded when the texts in question are available only in translation, as is the case for almost all the works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka. Even in the case of Vasubandhu, although it might have been hoped that the problem of authorship would be less difficult to resolve because so many of the works ascribed to him that have been under scrutiny are extant in Sanskrit and thus lend themselves to stylometric and terminological analysis, this expectation has not actually been fulfilled. And the availability of such means of analysis has not hitherto been of decisive help in arriving at clear conclusions as to authorship, or indeed even in reaching a working consensus among all scholars. This is due in part to the very nature of the materials scrutinized: they reveal few conclusive and unassailable arguments for or against identity of authorship that are accepted by all scholars in the present state of knowledge.

For deciding identity of authorship between a basic text (*mūla*) and its commentary, the often cited exegetical principle of avoiding *utsūtravyākhyāna*, according to which a commentator should not go beyond the master's intent as found in the *Mūla* being commented on, would if strictly observed make difficult, or even precarious, any conclusion as to authorship based on doctrinal content. But it is of course necessary to determine whether this principle has been observed, and indeed the extent to which a good commentator is in a position to observe it. Conversely, if an author were to feel free to go beyond his own *Mūla* in his explanation of it in a *Svopajñavṛtti*, etc., the frontier between an auto-com-

mentary and a commentary by another author who did not observe the principle of avoiding *utsūtravyākhyāna* would be an uncertain one with respect to doctrinal content. P.V. Kane once observed: '[An author of an autocommentary] can very well say "my sūtra is brief and I am expanding its meaning for the sake of clear grasp of the subject". Or he may say in the vṛtti that what he has stated in the sūtra is due only to his following old writers and that his own real opinion is different.'[2] This last alternative in fact represents what Vasubandhu has done in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where he has given the Sautrāntika doctrine as his own, whereas in the *Kārikā*s he has stated the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika view (see *Kośa* viii. 40). In such a case the principle of avoiding *utsūtravyākhyāna* is clearly not operative.

In this connection there moreover arises the often awkward question as to when *adhyāhāra* - that is, the frequently necessary, and quite legitimate, supplying by a commentator of words missing in the *Mūla* for reasons of brevity, etc. - may turn into *utsūtravyākhyāna*.

References in a text to Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna ideas, or to Tantric works, have sometimes been cited as a further criterion for differentiating between compositions ascribed to an author. Here an important distinction requires, however, to be made explicit. Given the fact that Mantrayāna is after all fairly old in India, and that Tantric texts were no doubt in existence well before what might be called the main Vajrayāna efflorescence beginning in, approximately, the seventh century CE, an allusion to such ideas or texts cannot by itself be a sufficient ground for establishing that a text is not by a given author if he is posterior to, say, the fourth century at the latest. Only a traceable quotation from a homogeneous work of a known later date could serve this purpose. It is, then, the *kind* of Mantrayāna material mentioned, and the *way* it has been used in a text, that can be revealing; for it may contribute at least to a balance of probability one way or the other in respect to the authorship and date of a work.

In the specific case of Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, therefore, the mere mention of *dhāraṇī*s (*gzuṅs sṅags*), *mantra*s (*gsaṅ sṅags*) and *vidyā*s (*rig sṅags*) in the *Tarkajvālā*[3] is very clearly not conclusive in assigning authorship to a Deutero-Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya. On the contrary, the quotation of a 'prophecy' (*vyākaraṇa*) concerning Nāgārjuna from the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra* in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*[4] is quite another matter. This is because our text of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* in its Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta - which in fact contains a 'prophecy' concerning Nāgārjuna, though not in the precise words quoted in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* - mentions King Gopāla, the founder of the Pāla dynasty and the

predecessor of Dharmapāla (*rg. c.* 770-810 or 775-812) in whose time Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra also flourished.[5] The citation of the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra* in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* thus possesses greater weight than the simple allusion to *dhāraṇīs*, etc., in the *Tarkajvālā* (especially in view of the uncertainty as to whether this Tantra was extant, as the constituted work we now know, as early as the sixth century).[6]

In regard to the authorship and date of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, it is moreover to be noted that when quoting (P, f. 354a3-4) a verse to be found in Saraha's Apabhraṃśa *Dohākośa*[7] Bhavya has referred to the author of this verse as 'teacher's teacher' (*bla ma'i bla ma: guru-guru*).[8] This description can be interpreted as indicating that Bhavya, the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, was the grandpupil of Saraha. Now this Saraha may be identical with Rāhulabhadra, the master of Ārya-Nāgārjuna, i.e. of the Deutero-Māgārjuna who would seem to have lived in the seventh century. This would be consonant with the references in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* to Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, who are also usually placed in the seventh century (see below).

Now, if we may suppose that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was actually referring to this Apabhraṃśa verse by Saraha, and that the latter was its author's teacher's teacher - a supposition which appears not to be historically implausible and is in accord with the Vinaya-lineage Rāhula → Nāgārjuna → Bhāvaviveka → Śrīgupta → Jñānagarbha → Śāntarakṣita found in some sources[9] - the question arises as to the date of the Apabhraṃśa composition by Saraha known as the *Dohākośa*. By its first editor, M. Shahidullah, this collection was dated to *c.* 1000 CE;[10] and the tenth century has been maintained by several subsequent writers on Apabhraṃśa and the history of Middle Indo-aryan.[11] A *terminus ante quem* is provided by the *Dohākoṣa* commentary by Advayavajra (Maitrīpāda), probably the author of that name who lived in the early eleventh century. But the tenth century, although perhaps within the bounds of possibility, would seem to be a rather late date for Saraha; for as already mentioned he may well be identical with Saraha/Rāhulabhadra, the master of Ārya-Nāgārjuna who may have lived in the seventh century.[12]

As for Apabhraṃśa, it is known as a literary language from the seventh century by references to it in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* (i.16, 28) and Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* (i.32, 36), as well as in an inscription of Dharasena II of Valabhī (*c.* 600). But texts composed in Apabhraṃśa have mostly been dated by historians of Middle Indo-aryan no earlier than the tenth century, although the language is attested earlier, for example in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* (a seventh-century text from Valabhī) and in Uddyotana's *Kuvalayamālā* (eighth century). Moreover, according to Śākyaprabha's

autocommentary on his *Ārya[mūla]sarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikas*, Apabhraṃśa was the language of the canon of an (unspecified) Buddhist school (*nikāya*); this Śākyaprabha lived at the latest in the eighth century.[13] (Later sources have connected the Apabhraṃśa canon in question with specific Nikāyas.)[14] Although the evidence bearing on the use of Apabhraṃśa as a literary language is accordingly hardly sufficient in the present state of knowledge to date Saraha's *Dohās* on the basis of linguistic criteria, a date later than that of Bhāvaviveka I - the sixth century - seems very likely. As already noted above, Saraha could have lived in the seventh (or at the very earliest perhaps in the late sixth) century if the above-mentiond Ārya-Nāgārjuna lived in the seventh century.

Hence, although again not conclusive by itself, the evidence provided by the quotation in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* of a verse identical with one found in Saraha's Apabhraṃśa *Dohākoṣa* points to a time later (and perhaps even much later) than that of Bhāvaviveka I, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*.[15]

It is to be noted further that a quotation from Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* (iii.259) has been introduced by the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* by saying: 'In order to set out the Middle Way by eliminating the two extremes, I therefore negate also this *abhāva* [with the verse iii.259]'.[16] In other words, to judge by the only available version of this text in Tibetan, it appears that the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* claimed that he was also the author of *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.259. The *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* contains other quotations from the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* too.

In another passage of the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* the author has stated that he composed the *Tarkajvālā*.[17]

Before pursuing this matter further, it will be of interest to enquire whether, apart from literary-historical criteria, data of a formal kind are available that will assist us in deciding the question of the authorship of works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka.

In the *Tarkajvālā* there is found a curious feature that is of importance in this respect. On several occasions this work has referred to the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* being commented on not only in the third person but also as 'Ācārya' (*slob dpon*).[18] That the author of a *Mūla* should in his autocommentary refer to himself in the third person is of course very usual.[19] But that an author of an autocommentary should refer to himself as 'Ācārya' is, if not unprecedented, at least rare.

It is true that in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*avatāraṇikā* on i.3) Vasubandhu has put in the mouth of a questioner a sentence in which the author of the *Abhidharmakośakārikās* is referred to as 'Ācārya'. But the decisive point in this case is the fact that another person is here supposed to be speaking and using the appellation 'Ācārya' for Vasubandhu, so that this example can scarcely be regarded as a precedent for the usage found in the *Tarkajvālā*. An example where a Sanskrit writer has in an autocommentary referred to the author of the *Mūla* - in other words to himself - as 'Ācārya' is nevertheless to be found in the Jaina Haribhadrasūri's (eighth century?) *Anekāntajayapatākā*.[20] How frequent this convention is has not to my knowledge been established, but it would appear to be quite rare.[21] The question for us is then whether Bhāvaviveka has actually employed this convention.

Because of his recognition of its rarity V.V. Gokhale has suggested that Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, Atiśa's Tibetan collaborator in the translation of the *Tarkajvālā*, may have inserted explanations given by Atiśa, introducing them by the appellation *ācārya*.[22] This is of course not in itself impossible, but it must be considered an unusual procedure. It would moreover seem that the word *ācārya* in the *Tarkajvālā* refers in such cases not to Atiśa but to the author of the *Mūla*.

Here, then, it is a formal feature rather than either a literary-historical or a doctrinal one that could lead to the conclusion that the author of the *Tarkajvālā* was not identical with the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* in question.[23]

If this is the case, nothing stands in the way of supposing that the name of the author of the *Tarkajvālā* - and of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* too - was Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya also. And the problem would be one not of authenticity as against forgery, but of identifying to which of two or more Bhāvavivekas/Bhavyas these works are to be ascribed.

What is then to be made of the disparate, and sometimes apparently conflicting, evidence gathered above?

In several Indo-Tibetan sources the three works in question - the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*, the *Tarkajvālā* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* - have evidently been ascribed, implicitly if not explicitly, to one and the same author.

Y. Ejima has however distinguished between an 'Ur-*Tarkajvālā*' and a revised *Tarkajvālā*, which is the text included in the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur. In Ejima's opinion, while the 'Ur-*Tarkajvālā*' was by the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*, the revised version is by the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, who has referred favourably to Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti, both of whom are usually placed in the seventh century, as

well as to a number of Tantric texts generally dated to after the sixth century. Ejima has supposed that this Bhavya lived no earlier than Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (eighth century).[24]

C. Lindtner has taken the opposite course of ascribing all three works in question, as well as the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* to be considered below, to one and the same sixth-century author, placing both Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti accordingly in the sixth rather than in the seventh century and also giving the sixth century as the lower limit for all the Tantric sources cited in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.[25]

Now, on the basis of any of the above-mentioned data taken separately, it may indeed not be possible conclusively to demonstrate either that, negatively, the *Tarkajvālā* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* can *not* be by the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* or that, positively, these two works *are* by an author different from the Bhāvaviveka who composed the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*. Nevertheless, it still has to be said, I think, that the cumulative weight of the various data constituting our body of evidence must lead one very carefully to consider the possibility that these texts are in fact not by the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* and the *Prajñāpradīpa*. The balance of evidence seems to incline in favour of this conclusion, even if it cannot be held to prove it conclusively: what is possible in logical deduction will indeed seldom be possible in such difficult cases of historical and philological induction.

At the same time, following an old philosopher's maxim which the historian has also to bear in mind, *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem* 'entities are not to be multiplied beyond need'. The question here is then what is need, and what corresponds to parsimony - to *lāghava* as opposed to *gaurava*.

The problems posed by assuming identity of authorship for these three works seem to outweigh any that result from assuming different authorship. That is, to suppose that all three are by one and the same sixth-century author appears to involve making more difficult assumptions - e.g. putting back the dates not only of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti but also of Kumārila,[26] making Dharmakīrti virtually a younger contemporary (or an immediate successor) of Dignāga, and placing the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra/kalpa* as a constituted text bearing this title no later than *c.* 500 CE together with all the Tantric and other sources cited in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* including the Apabhraṃśa *dohā* discussed above - than to suppose, on the balance of the evidence, a difference of authorship. A point of no little importance is also the fact that the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* regarded (a) Candrakīrti favourably and quoted

him as an authority; whereas the author of the *Prasannapadā* was perhaps the chief opponent of Bhāvaviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa*.

Beside the two opposed views advocated by Ejima and Lindtner, there exists a third, theoretical, possibility of resolving at least the literary-historical problems raised by the authorship of the three texts. This would consist in supposing that Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya had an extremely - and unusually - long life-span beginning in the sixth century, before Sthiramati, when he composed the *Prajñāpradīpa*, and extending to a very advanced age in the seventh century, the time of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti and of masters such as Saraha/Rāhulabhadra and Ārya-Nāgārjunapāda, when he might have composed the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

Such a solution does not, however, account for the author of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s being evidently referred to in the *Tarkajvālā* with the title *ācārya*. Nor does it explain how the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* came to refer to Candrakīrti as an authority to be followed, especially when there is evidence that Candrakīrti lived in the seventh century.[27]

Could it be, then, that the author of the *Madhyamahṛdayakārikā*s and the *Prajñāpradīpa* was indeed different from the Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya who composed the *Tarkajvālā* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, but that the author of the latter work considered himself to belong to the same mental and spiritual continuum (*cittasaṃtāna*) as his earlier namesake(s) so that he could evidently claim the authorship of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s and explicitly state that he composed the *Tarkajvālā*?

If so, our problem would be as much one of religious ideas as of literary history and the development of philosophical doctrine. This relationship could apply even if it turns out that the *Tarkajvālā* has a different author from both the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, that is, if we have to do with three rather than with two authors sharing the name Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya and all belonging to the same spiritual lineage.

How does the hypothesis that the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was not Bhāvaviveka I square with the historical and doxographical traditions of Buddhism? For, as already mentioned, certain Indo-Tibetan traditions have proceeded, at least tacitly, as if all three texts in question were composed by the same author. And the *Tarkajvālā* has in any case been regularly regarded as Bhāvaviveka's *raṅ 'grel* or autocommentary on the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s.

The traditions are not, however, all agreed that the *Madhyamakaratna-*

pradīpa was composed by Bhāvaviveka I, as has sometimes been supposed on the basis of the bsTan 'gyur catalogues, etc.

Thus, while lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786) regards the *Tarkajvālā* as an autocommentary on the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s, he explicitly states that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was not composed by the same author but by a master known as the Junior Bhavya (Legs ldan chuṅ ba).[28] And in an important historical and doxographical work completed in 1801/1802 by Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma (1737-1802) mention is also made of a later, or younger, Bhāvaviveka who lived after Candrakīrti and belonged very significantly to the lineage of the *zab mo lta ba'i brgyud pa* or *klu sgrub ñe brgyud*.[29] A related tradition is attested earlier in the *rGya nag chos 'byuṅ* by mGon po skyabs (eighteenth century).[30]

Turning now to the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* ascribed also to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, it can be observed that starting with its introductory verse of salutation this text is quite closely related to the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* by Jñānagarbha (eighth century), the master mentioned above who belonged to a lineage in which he linked Bhāvaviveka and Śrīgupta with Śāntarakṣita.

The theory of the two levels - *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* - and of the two *satya*s in the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* appears at least as advanced as Jñānagarbha's, and as rather more elaborate than that of Chapter iii of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s and the *Tarkajvālā*. On the level of the *paramārthasatya*, it operates with a division between the 'non-modal' (i.e. non-conceptualizable and non-verbalizable) Absolute (*rnam graṅs ma yin don dam: *aparyāya/niṣparyāya-paramārtha*) and a 'modal' Absolute (*rnam graṅs kyi don dam: *saparyāya-paramārtha*), the latter being in its turn subdivided into the **saparyāya-paramārtha* of reasoning (*rigs pa: nyāya* or *yukti*?) and that of the negation of real origination (*skye ba bkag pa'i don dam*). This developed terminology is not to be found in the *Tarkajvālā*, Chap. iii (which does however, like the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*, distinguish between a *paramārtha* without *prapañca* and one with);[31] nor indeed is it found even in Jñānagarbha's text (see however *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* 4ab on *rigs pa* as *don dam*). As for the *saṃvṛti* level, the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* mentions the division between true *saṃvṛti* (*yaṅ dag pa'i kun rdzob: tathyasaṃvṛti*) and false *saṃvṛti* (*log pa'i kun rdzob: mithyāsaṃvṛti*), a distinction seemingly implied in the *Tarkajvālā* (iii.7, which however mentions only the *tathyasaṃvṛti*) and explicitly mentioned by Jñānagarbha (8d, where the latter is referred to as the *yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob* etc.). The *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*'s very important, indeed criterial, definition of true *saṃvṛti* in terms of a thing (*dṅos po* =

vastu) that is causally efficient (*don byed nus pa* = *arthakriyāsamartha*) - an idea presumably taken from Dharmakīrti[32] - is to be found also in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (8 and 12). According to the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*, false *saṃvṛti* may be either conceptually constructed (*rtog bcas: savikalpa*, as in the case of a rope misapprehended as a snake) or not so constructed (*rtog med*, e.g. when somebody suffering from eye-disease sees the moon as double without any conceptual construction entering into this apprehension).

The *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* would accordingly seem to fit very well into the philosophical thought of the eight century (if not later).[33] And it can perhaps be dated to about the same period as the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. This very short text does not cite any sources or authorities, and it does not therefore allow any literary-historical inferences to be drawn.

Further research is required to determine how far back the Tibetan tradition on two Bhāvavivekas goes and what its ultimate sources were. In any case, the existence of this tradition demonstrates very clearly that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* has not been unanimously attributed in Buddhist sources to the Bhāvaviveka who lived in the sixth century. Further investigation of the relation between the *Tarkajvālā*, the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* will also be necessary.

For many purposes it would in the final analysis seem to be more interesting to seek to understand and explain texts and religious and philosophical ideas, and to study the traditions to which they belong, rather than to concentrate one-sidedly on trying to determine authorship, especially when the very nature of the evidence makes the latter enterprise so uncertain. Although clarifying authorship is of very considerable help in understanding and interpreting a text, this latter goal can still be effectively pursued even when authorship is uncertain or unknown, as is often the case in the history of Indian literature.

Notes

1. See Y. Kajiyama, *WZKSO* 12-13 (1968-69), p. 193 ff.; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 61-62.

Whether the fact that the names Bhāvaviveka, Bhāviveka and Bhavya are all either retrievable or reconstructable from the Indian, Chinese and Tibetan sources, and that they are sometimes used in alternation, has anything to do with the existence of more than a single Mādhyamika master bearing one (or more) of these names is quite uncertain because of the loss of most of the relevant Indian-language documents in the original. The distribution in the Tibetan sources of the Tibetan equivalents of these names - Legs ldan 'byed (pa), Legs ldan, sNaṅ bral, sKal ldan, Bha bya - does not appear definitely to establish such a supposition. In Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, the Mādhyamika master who commented on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s is referred to as Bhāvaviveka; and in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti* (11) we find the name Bhāvin. (Bhāvivikta - a formation comparable to Bhāviveka - was the name of a Naiyāyika who lived probably in the sixth or seventh century.)

2. P.V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit poetics*[3] (Delhi, 1961), p. 174.

3. *Tarkajvālā* iii.12-13, P, f. 60a6; iv, P, f. 199b2. On *dhāraṇī* according to the Madhyamaka and other traditions, see E. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, i (Louvain, 1944), pp. 316-21, 328; iv (Louvain, 1976), pp. 1854-69. And on Bhāvaviveka and *dhāraṇī*s according to Hsüan-tsang, see T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's travels in India*, ii (London, 1905), pp. 215, 223-4.

4. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, P, f. 361b4-5.

5. See *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, Chap. liii. 449-51 (ed. T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, Trivandrum, 1925) = 491-3 (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, in: K.P. Jayaswal, *An imperial history of India*, Lahore, 1934) for Nāgārjuna; Chap. liii.628 and 816 = 683 and 883 for Gopāla. (In the Tibetan translation these *vyākaraṇa*s are to be found in Chap. xxxvi/6).

6. The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* was translated into Chinese by T'ien-hsi-tsai at the end of the tenth century (Taishō 1192), and into Tibetan by Kumārakalaśa and Śākya Blo gros at the command of Byaṅ chub 'od in the eleventh century. On earlier versions in Chinese, see recently Y. Matsunaga, in: M. Strickmann (ed.), *Tantrik and Taoist studies in honour of R.A. Stein*, vol. iii (= *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 22 [1985]), pp. 882-94. (It is however conceivable that the version of this Tantra cited in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* did not contain the *vyākaraṇa* concerning King Gopāla; but it is of course impossible to prove this.)

7. Ed. P.Ch. Bagchi, *Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University* 28 (Calcutta, 1935), p. 82; ed. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, *Dohākoś* (Patna, 1957), p. 6; Tibetan translation, P, f. 77a2. This quotation has already been noted by C. Lindtner, *WZKS* 26 (1982), p. 175.

8. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, P, f. 354a3-4: *bla ma'i bla mas kyaṅ don dam par rigs pa'i glu las/raṅ gi sems ñid kun gyi sa bon te / / gaṅ la srid daṅ myaṅ 'das 'phro ba / / 'dod pa'i 'bras bu ster bar byed pa yi / / yid bźin 'dra ba'i sems la phyag 'tshal lo / / źes gsuṅs pas ...*
The version in the Tibetan translation of Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* reads: *sems ñid gcig pu kun gyi sa bon te / / ... yid bźin nor 'dra'i sems la phyag 'tshal lo //*

9. See Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 127a6. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school*, p. 89; 'Über die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas', in: H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur* (AAWG, Göttingen, 1985), p. 123-4.

10. M. Shahidullah, *Les chants mystiques de Kāṇha et de Saraha* (Paris, 1928), p. 31.

11. See G.V. Tagare, *Historical grammar of Apabhraṃśa* (Poona, 1948), p. 20; R.A. Singh, *Syntax of Apabhraṃśa* (Calcutta, 1980), p. 3. Cf. J. Bloch, *Indo-aryan* (Paris, 1965), p. 21; L. Renou, J. Filliozat and P. Meile, *L'Inde classique*, i (Paris, 1947), §§ 116, 940; ii (Paris, 1953) § 2030; S.K. Chatterji, *Origin and development of the Bengali language*[2] (London, 1970), i, pp. 110 f., 123; iii pp. 26-27; P. Kvaerne, *An anthology of Buddhist Tantric songs* (Oslo, 1977), pp. 5-7. - On the question of 'Eastern Apabhraṃśa' as the designation of the language in which Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* is written, see S.N. Ghosal, *JAS* (Bengal), 22 (1956). S.R. Banerjee, *Eastern school of Prakrit Grammarians* (Calcutta, 1977), p. 86, would date Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* by the tenth or at the latest the twelfth century, but adds that it is better to take 700-1200 as the period of the Apabhraṃśa texts he is considering.

12. Saraha has been placed in the eighth century by A. Wayman, *The Buddhist Tantras* (New York, 1973), pp. 13-14. J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age* (Paris 1968), p. 82, and P. Kvaerne, *Anthology*, p. 7, speak of a ninth century date. Such datings are however

perhaps too late in view of the mention by I-ching (635-713) of a Nāgārjuna who had studied the Vidyādharapiṭaka (see E. Chavannes, *Mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la Loi dans les pays d'Occident* [Paris, 1894], p. 102), and of the time of Vajrabodhi (c.671-741) - a disciple of Nāgabodhi - and of Amoghavajra (*c.* 705-774). On this complicated question, which has still to be wholly clarified, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school*, p. 104-05 and 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school' in: L.A. Hercus *et al.* (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (Festschrift J.W. de Jong, Canberra, 1982), p. 511, where the seventh century has been suggested for Ārya-Nāgārjunapāda, the disciple of Rāhulabhadra = Saraha.

13. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, in: H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-literatur*, p. 114.

14. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *loc. cit.*, pp. 116-7. This tradition, found in Tibetan sources, is not to be found in either Śākyaprabha or Padmākaraghoṣa. (And the indication on the subject in O. von Hinüber, *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick* [Vienna, 1986], § 102, citing A. Yuyama, *Die Sprache der älteren buddhistischen Überlieferung* [AAWG, Göttingen, 1980], pp. 175-81, evidently needs to be modified accordingly.)

15. In the appendix on Yogācāra to Chap. xxv of his *Prajñāpradīpa*, Bhāvaviveka in fact refers to his *Madhyamakahṛdaya-tattvāvatāra* (D, f. 248a6).

16. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, P, f. 345a3-4: *gaṅ gi phyir kho bo mtha' gñis spaṅs pas / dbu ma'i lam ston pa'i phyir med pa ñid kyaṅ 'gog par byed de: "dṅos mams med ces bya ba'i blo / / don bźin yin par mi 'dod de / / rtog pa'i sgo nas grub pa'i phyir / / mtho yor la ni mi blo bźin //"*. The Sanskrit text of *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.259 in the edition of Y. Ejima (*Chūgan shisō no tenkai - Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*, Tōkyō, 1981) reads: *na santi bhāvā iti vā yathārthā na matir matā / kalpanādvāranirvṛtteḥ sthāṇoḥ puruṣabuddhivat //*.

17. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, P, f. 335b3: *bdag gis bkod pa rtog ge 'bar ba*.

18. *e.g. Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti-Tarkajvālā*, i.21 (P, f. 50a5); iii.58 (f. 75al), 97 (f. 86a2), 176 (f. 107a2), 196 (f. 112b6), etc.

19. As has been observed by P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, i^2 (Poona, 1968), p. 195, 'in order to avoid looking egoistic, ancient authors generally put their own views in the third person as said by early writers like Medhātithi [ad Manu i.4] and Viśvarūpa [ad Yājñavalkya i.2].' In his *History of Sanskrit poetics*[3], p. 270, Kane has remarked that 'ancient writers regarded it as too dogmatic to express their opinions in the first person', observing on p. 171 that 'it is clear that there is no prohibition against an author saying that he himself composed the sūtra and the vṛtti, even when he speaks of himself in the third person in the vṛtti'.

20. Ed. H.R. Kāpadīā, Gaekwad's Oriental Series (Baroda, 1940), vol. i, p. 2.12.

21. The author of the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayavyākhyāna* has also referred to the author of the Mūla - the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikās* - as *slob dpon* = *ācārya*. Both these works have been ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the bsTan 'gyur. C. Lindtner has expressed doubt as to Nāgārjuna's authorship of the *Vyākyāna*; see *WZKS* 26 (1982), p. 172. On these two works see recently C. Dragonetti, *WZKS* 30 (1986), p. 110 f.

22. V.V. Gokhale in: C. Lindtner (ed.), *Miscellanea buddhica* (Copenhagen, 1985), pp. 77 and 99 note 44.

23. See Y. Ejima, *Chūgan shisō no tenkai - Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*. See also Ejima's views reported in C. Lindtner, *WZKS* 26 (1982), pp. 182-3.

The opposite situation is to be found for example in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* whose author as it were incorporates certain Sūtras into his Bhāṣya by introducing them as if he had composed them himself (saying *e.g. vakṣyāma* in ii.40 and 46).

24. See Y. Ejima, *op. cit.*, and *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 28/2 (1980), pp. (37)-(43). See also Ejima's views reported in C. Lindtner, *WZKS* 26 (1982), pp. 182-3.

25. See C. Lindtner *AO* 40 (1979), p. 90, and 41 (1980), pp. 27-37; *WZKS* 26 (1982), pp. 167-84; *Indologica Taurinensia* 12 (1984), pp. 163-84; and most recently in E. Kahrs (ed.), *Kalyāṇamitrārāgaṇam, Essays in honour of Nils Simonsson* (Oslo, 1986), pp. 179-202, and in B.K. Matilal (ed.), *Buddhist logic and epistemology* (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 239-63.

26. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school' in: L.A. Hercus *et al.* (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist studies*, p. 530 (where in the words 'It must of course be supposed...' *must* is a misprint for *might*).

27. If, however, the reference in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* were not to Candrakīrti, the author of the *Prasannapadā* and the chief critic of Bhāvaviveka I, but to the Deutero-Candrakīrti, a disciple presumably of the Tāntrika Ārya-Nāgārjunapāda, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* could not be ascribed to the sixth-century Bhāvaviveka I; and it could hardly be placed before the seventh or eighth century.

28. lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bźag pa gsal bar bśad pa*, kha, fol. 6a (~ p. 283): *legs ldan chuṅ bar grags pas mdzad pa yin gyi slob dpon 'dis mdzad pa min no.*

29. Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' śel gyi me loṅ*, rGya nag Chapter, f. 9b3: *legs ldan 'byed phyi ma'am legs ldan 'byed chuṅ ma.*

30. mGon po skyabs, *rGya nag chos 'byuṅ* (Sichuan ed., 1983), p. 123.

31. The present writer's observation in *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 64 note 202, therefore requires reconsideration.

32. Cf. M. Nagatomi, *ALB* 31-32 (1967/68), pp. 52-72. - On this definition in Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, see now M.D. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's commentary on the distinction between the two truths* (Albany, 1987).

33. See also Y. Ejima, *op. cit.*.

Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?

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I.

This paper will limit itself to the frame provided by this question and will attempt to answer it. It will not deal with the character of Dharmakīrti's thought as such and its possible affiliation to one of the Buddhist philosophical traditions of his time.

A straight forward statement that Dharmakīrti must be considered as a Mādhyamika[1] has recently been made on the basis of Indian doxographical material.[2] For at least two Indian scholars from the late period, namely the doxographers Jitāri (ca. 940-1000)[3] and Mokṣākaragupta (between 1050 and 1292)[4] and some early Tibetan scholars[5] were of the opinion that Dharmakīrti in his final philosophical intent was a Mādhyamika. Before entering into an examination and discussion of this assessment some methodological reflections are appropriate.

The pertinent opinions of Tibetan scholars from the early period of interpretation of the Indian masters after the second spread of Buddhism, for instance rNog lotsāva Blo ldan śes rab or Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge, are still too entangled for us with the problems of interpreting the different aspects of the Madhyamaka and of other traditions to take them as good and authoritative witnesses for Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika nature. The groping quality of interpretation in this early period demands particular prudence in dealing with its historical notions.[6] It is only later, especially in the case of the 15th century gSer mdog Paṇ chen[7] that the understanding of the significance of an assessment as Mādhyamika with regard to Dharmakīrti makes very good sense in a critical historical perspective too. The early Tibetan opinions however cannot be abstracted from their contexts and hermeneutic situation, and will therefore not be taken into consideration here primarily.[8] Rather we shall be concerned with statements made by Indian authors as noteworthy documentation of such assessment.[9]

On principle it would be appropriate to develop the investigation as to whether Dharmakīrti was a Mādhyamika along two lines: the study of respective judgements on Dharmakīrti from the tradition, and the study of Dharmakīrti's works themselves as to whether they show any Mādhyamika features at all. The latter exercise however proves to be superfluous because we can take for granted that an Indian scholar who wants to

prove Dharmakīrti to be a Mādhyamika would have traced and mentioned every line of Dharmakīrti that would display, imply or hint at his Mādhyamika nature. I feel that this deliberation can support us when we confine our examination at first to the materials that have been referred to by the above mentioned Indian doxographers as apt proofs for the Mādhyamika nature of Dharmakīrti's final philosophical intentions, and it can also confirm us in our assumption that the adduced ones are all the statements of such kind that can be found,[10] or at least the most convincing ones.

Furthermore, there is also a natural circumstance pertaining to my personal hermeneutic situation that I see no better way to start this investigation than to deal first with those statements that directly assert Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika-hood, because I myself am still convinced that Dharmakīrti's critical thought tends to the tradition of the Yogācāric "idealism of selfconsciousness"[11] and that his concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) refers to dichotomously structured existence only. Or, in other words, I do not know of a single passage in Dharmakīrti's works that should be understood as a statements of unmistakably Mādhyamika character and content.

Finally, if we let ourselves be guided in a search for Mādhyamika traits in Dharmakīrti by the evidence for it presented by the old doxographers, we can also avoid the other well-known difficulty for anybody who wants to pin down the general philosophical position of the author of the *Pramāṇavārttika* within the whole range from a realistic epistemology in the first, second and fourth chapter to an idealistic position in the third chapter on perception.

The statements of Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta and their quotations from Dharmakīrti shall therefore be examined first as to whether they can really be made to serve the supposed purpose. And then we will have to look for a possible source of these assumptions.

II.

Shirasaki Kenjō has frequently drawn attention to the fact that Jitāri towards the end of the fourth chapter on Madhyamaka of his *Sugatamata-vibhaṅgabhāṣya* quotes five verses in order to demonstrate Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika standpoint, that he considers Dharmakīrti a "Mādhyamika master", and even says "that the Mādhyamika doctrine was established by Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti".[12] In his recent paper[13] he gives a survey of all quotations from Dharmakīrti in the text's four chapters on the four Buddhist schools - except for three from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* they are

from all four chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* - and adds short indications of their content or purpose. The last five quotations (PV III 4, 208, 209, 210, 359)[14] and one earlier (PV III 219) are characterised as "Mādhyamika doctrine". Subsequently the verses are translated and explained and Shirasaki concludes by stating that on the basis of the authority of Jitāri's Dharmakīrti-explanations one can make the claim that Dharmakīrti is a Mādhyamika.[15]

Jitāri is indeed explicit about his opinion of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, when he frames PV III 4 with the words: "This most excellent lord of logic in reality (*don dam par*) is certainly a Mādhyamika, because he said: PV III 4",[16] and goes on to introduce PV III 208ff. with the words: "Also because of the following (statement) he is a Mādhyamika".[17] Preceding this series of quotations Jitāri even explains that PV III 3ab cannot be taken to be a statement in Dharmakīrti that is contradictory to the Mādhyamika point of view, because Dharmakīrti there gives a definition of the really existent (**paramārthasat*) based on wordly practice (**vyavahārāśrita*) only.[18] And a little after these quotations he again refers to the "truth of the middle (tradition?)" (*dbu ma de kho na 'di*) as being classified by Nāgārjuna and accepted (*bźed pa*) by Dharmakīrti.[19]

Let us now examine whether Jitāri's assessment of these verses' Mādhyamika nature is well-founded in terms of Dharmakīrti's intention, as far as this can be ascertained from the verses' context in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. The five verses can be dealt with as three different textual units of statements, PV III 4, 208-210, and 359, or - with regard to our problem - even better as two kinds of text: one, namely PV III 4, that can be taken as direct consent to a Mādhyamika solution for a key-term in Dharmakīrti's concept of reality. And another kinds, namely PV III 208-210 and 359, where one of the main tools of argumentation in later Mādhyamika literature, the "neither one nor many"-argument, can be found and on account of this parallelism in the form of the argument a like parallelism in the aim of its application can be understood.

Considering the volume of Dharmakīrti's works and our certainly not totally unwarranted conclusion above, that Jitāri must have tried to find the most convincing statements in Dharmakīrti in order to reveal his Mādhyamika nature, the result of his effort is somewhat disappointing as we shall see. For with regard to both kinds of text we can find a majority of interpretations and statements in the tradition or the school that makes clear that there was certainly no general agreement as to the need for an exclusively Mādhyamika interpretation, and that in fact Jitāri's handling of these verses can be considered as a rather extreme case of partisanship in the light of his own leanings towards the Madhyamaka tradition in one of its later variants.[20]

astu yathā tathā

This phrase of admittance in the resignatory mode and with the purpose to avoid the elaboration of a new theme[21], must have been understood by Jitāri[22] as a statement affirmative to the Mādhyamika ways of defining the two realities (*satyadvaya*). But PV III 4 is also important, as we shall see below,[23] for its possible function of connecting a possible lost work of Dharmakīrti', the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*, with our investigation.

aśaktaṃ sarvam iti cet bījāder aṅkurādiṣu /
dṛṣṭā śaktir matā sā cet saṃvṛtyā 'stu yathā tathā //
(PV III 4)
"(Objection:) Everything is inefficient. (Answer:) The efficiency of the seed and other (causes) is seen in the sprout and other (effects). (Objection:) This (efficiency) is understood in terms of the conventional (truth). (Answer:) Be it as it may [we are not interested in discussing this here]".

It is generally admitted that the two statements of the opponent in this verse (*aśaktaṃ sarvam* and *matā sā cet saṁvṛtyā*) represent a Mādhyamika position.[24] The meaning of the final answer (*astu yathā tathā*) however is debatable and has been interpreted differently in the traditions of the school. According to Zwilling[25] the commentators who follow Prajñākaragupta, namely Ravigupta, *Jina and Yamāri read *yathā* as an expression of affirmation thereby claiming Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, while Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati understand this answer in such a way that Dharmakīrti holds on to the ultimate reality of causal efficiency as Sautrāntika leaving it to the Mādhyamika to deal with this reality by means of their different qualifications.[26]

It seems to me however that Prajñākaragupta's interpretation ends much in the same sentiment as Śākyamati's when he states: "Therefore ultimately there is nothing. Be as it may, thus, in terms of such conventional (truth) even the distinguishing determination of valid and invalid cognition! We do not mind. While (*iti*) we did understand of course your position, we cannot live beyond the reality of facts (*vastutattvam*)".[27] It is, in fact, only Ravigupta who ends his interpretation (PVV(R) III 14b7-15b6) with a formulation of consent to the Mādhyamika position which is very similar to the formulation of PVBh 185, 28f., where it is not however, Prajñākaragupta's last word.[28]

Thus, among the commentators Ravigupta is the only one Jitāri could have called as a witness for his evaluation of PV III 4 as a document of Mādhyamika learnings.

"neither one nor many"

a) *PV III 208-210* is a coherent group of verses which concludes the discussion of the "problem of colour-synthesis"[29] that was started with PV III 197.[30] The result of Dharmakīrti's investigation of colour perception under the Sautrāntika assumptions that "many atoms constitute one colour" and "many colours constitute the one object 'variegate'" is a formulation of the unsolved question with regard to how something manifold can be the object of one cognition. It is this problem which is formulated in our group of verses:

citrāvabhāseṣv artheṣu yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate /
saiva tāvat kathaṃ buddhir ekā citrāvabhāsinī //
(PV III 208)
idaṃ vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ /
yathā yathārthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā //
(PV III 209)
kiṃ syāt sā citrataikasyāṃ na syāt tasyāṃ matāv api /
yadīdaṃ svayam arthānāṃ rocate tatra ke vayam //
(PV III 210)
"(Objection:) If unity is not appropriate in things with a variegate appearance, how is it, then, that this unitary cognition shows something varigate?
(Answer:) It is attained on account of the power of facts, so that the inspired ones state: in whatever way the things are examined, they are always dissolved.
(Question:) What if this variegation lay in the unitary (cognition)? (Answer:) It would just not lie in this (unitary) cognition. (However) if this is to the liking of the things themselves, who are we in this matter?"[31]

The following verse[32] presents the conclusion of the whole previous investigation: the problem is caused by the assumption of cognition-external real atoms that constitute those objects that confront cognition. This assumption must be abandoned therefore in favour of the assumption of an undivided cognition whose reality (*tattva*) is a voidness of the duality of object and subject (*dvayaśūnyatā*).[33]

There can be no doubt that - within this context - our group of verses must be taken as the summary of a madhyamaka-like argument with the special purpose of overcoming the position that considers extra-cognitional realities as possible. They certainly do not dub Dharmakīrti and Mādhyamika if we consider the contextual facts in our interpretation

too. In other words: not the Mādhyamikas' *'sarvadharmaśūnyatā'* but the Yogācārin's *'bahyārthaśūnyatā'* is being established here.

It is in this sense that Devendrabuddhi stated that the insubstantiality of the phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*) is being taught in verse 209cd (cf. PVP 225b1); and that Śākyamati endorses a dissociation from the Mādhyamika meaning of this term by stating that it is nothing but selfconsciousness (*raṅ rig [: rigs] pa tsam, *svasaṃvedanamātra*) which is free from the imagined nature of the grasped and the grasping (**parikalpitagrāhyagrāhakasvabhāvavivikta-*) (PVT 248a4-5).[34] Śākyamati in addition explicitly states when explaining *arthāḥ* of verse 209c that the term is used in order to refuse all cognition-external things but not cognition itself (cf. PVT 248a1).

Prajñākaragupta however, apart from the fact that with regard to the following verses he clearly distinguishes between different kinds of voidness (*śūnyatā*),[35] seems to be in favour of a straight Mādhyamika interpretation with regard to verse 209cd.[36] And the commentators of his tradition, *Jina and Ravigupta corroborate this.[37]

If we follow Prajñākaragupta with regard to this group of three verses and particularly if we do not take Dharmakīrti's larger context into consideration, we apparently have here a distinct pronouncement on the insubstantiality of the phenomenal factors of existence (*dharmanairātmya*), on the basis of one of the more important Mādhyamika reasons, namely the argument that something in reality can be neither one nor many.[38]

But even when considering this argument as such we may be reluctant to take the passage in Dharmakīrti as an instance of Mādhyamika in the sense of a conscious effort within the methodical tradition of this school, because the "neither one nor many"-argument here has been developed naturally within the conceptual possibilities of the items the problem is connected with, one colour: many atoms, one cognition: many colours. One may be tempted to take our passage as Mādhyamika when the impossibility of a perception of external things is already revealed by the contradictory tension of the conclusion in PV III 207a: "Thus a single [sense-cognition] would have a plural object",[39] and when our passage following this conclusion simply corroborates the contradictory character of the statement. And this must be the way Jitāri would like to understand it as an indication for Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika thought. But as far as I can see such an interpretation cannot be substantially supported from Dharmakīrti's text itself, even if we should think of a kind of preformation of what later would become the "Yogācāra-Mādhyamika synthesis",[40] because our passage leaves open whether its author is intent on the philosophical goal of the Mādhyamika, total insubstantiality, or of the

Vijñānavādin, the existence of non-dual consciousness. The context here supports the latter.[41]

b) *PV III 219*[42] has been characterized by Shirasaki as "Mādhyamika doctrine" too,[43] although it is not to be found among the verses mentioned by Jitāri as being indicative of Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika nature.

Jitāri quotes this verse in order to adduce Dharmakīrti for the differentiation of *neyārtha* and *nītārtha* Sūtras.[44] It is only in the following quotation of *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 25 and 27 with the same purpose, that we find the two moments of overstepping first the realistic and then also the idealistic point of view. As shown in Vetter 1964:70f the verse is to be found at the important last position of the analysis of an object of perception. Its essential meaning is: although the realistic Sautrāntika doctrine is sufficiently appropriate for dealing with the problem present, particularly that of colour-synthesis, it cannot be considered as the ultimate truth. It only serves the mediation of thought within the world of practice, within which objective and subjective phenomena appear as different and are necessary. The truth (*tattva*) of PV III 219a is a non-duality of subject and object within cognition and the verse thus indicates the Yogācāra point of view that everything is non-dual cognition only (*vijñāptimātratā*).

c) *PV III 359*[45] is evaluated as a document of Mādhyamika thought not only by Jitāri[46] but also by Mokṣākaragupta.[47] Both authors[48] make it clear that it is not only the "neither one nor many"-argument indicated in the verse that renders it Mādhyamika but also the fact that it comes from a context where not cognition-external objects but cognition itself is dealt with.[49]

bhāvā yena nirūpyante tad rūpaṃ nāsti tattvataḥ /
yasmād ekam anekaṃ vā rūpaṃ teṣāṃ na vidyate //
(PV III 359)
"That form in which entities are [normally] perceived does not exist in reality, for these (things) have neither a unitary nor a multiple form."[50]

With regard to the context[51] we can assume that Dharmakīrti in this investigation of selfconsciousness refers back to his investigation of the possibility of something existing external to cognition where the "neither one nor many"-argument has already been applied,[52] because here he does not present the argument again in detail.

The term of the "entities" (*bhāvāḥ*) whose perceived form is not ultimately real may refer to either the mental entities alone[53] or more generally to both the cognition-external and the internal entities.[54] In both cases it is only their being differentiated that causes problems because their differentiated form does not exist in reality (*tattvataḥ*). And I see no possibility from the context how we can follow Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta in their taking this to mean that cognition itself does not exist in reality.[55] Rather that reality of cognition which is its voidness of the duality of object and subject (*dvayaśūnyatā*) and has been introduced as the aim of the "neither one nor many"-argument above[56] is being referred to here too.[57]

In conclusion it can be stated that on investigating Jitāri's quotations neither a clear admittance of a Mādhyamika interpretation of reality can be found in Dharmakīrti nor is it possible to interpret the "neither one nor many"-argument that is applied by Dharmakīrti to overcome a realistic point of view in explaining perception, as being applied to overcome the Yogācāra principal of non-dual cognition.

This interpretation of Jitāri's and Mokṣākaragupta's methods of tracing the material selected as extravagant and historically unfounded can be corroborated from the Madhyamaka tradition itself.[58] For it is in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* that we come across, in all probability, the ultimate source of Jitāri's selection of verses, and it is in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on this text that we find an explanation for the adduction of these verses that is more reasonable but was later evidently ignored in favour of the explanation that we find in Jitāri's doxography.

III.

In his commentary on v. 61 of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*[59] which is a reformulation of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* XIV 19[60] and which contains Śāntarakṣita's conclusion "there is neither a singular nor a plural intrinsic nature"[61] Śāntarakṣita quotes five passages from the *Pramāṇavārttika*[62] in order to add support to the authority of theoretical deliberation (*rigs pa, yukti*) exemplified by the quotation from the Catuḥśataka and of the four verses quoted from the authoritative revelatory tradition (*luṅ, āgama*).[63] The following verses and half-verses are quoted in this sequence: PV III 359, 208, 209cd, 215cd, 209ab.[64] They are all connected with the "neither one nor many"-argument as applied in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and, except for 215cd[65] they are also among the passages quoted by Jitāri.

With regard to the special relationship between the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* in the case of these verses which must be

the reason for quoting them here van der Kuijp is certainly right when he says that it "appears to be based on the similarities in the ways in which they have employed the argument of 'being free from the one and the many'."[66]

Śāntarakṣita does not state, as Jitāri will later, that Dharmakīrti must be considered to be a Mādhyamika on account of passages like these. He does however speak of "all entities" (*dṅos po ma lus pa*) in his last sentence on v. 61,[67] thus evidently also including the principle of cognition among that which "is thoroughly smashed to pieces"[68] in this investigation which ascertains the reason "being free from a singular and a plural nature" (**ekānekasvabhāvena viyogahetu*) as firmly established (**siddha*).

Taking into consideration the prominent systematical position where the quotations are being introduced and the clear information given in the last sentence, namely that these verses just quoted served to establish the Mādhyamika reason, it is quite natural that Jitāri refers to more or less the same group of verses in his proof of Dharmakīrti's Mādhyamika nature. When in addition we remember the relative closeness of Jitāri to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as a late representative of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school that was started by these teachers[69] there remains little doubt with regard to the natural assumption that it was here in the *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti* that Jitāri found his major source and reason for regarding Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika.

However, he evidently did not read what Kamalaśīla had to say in his commentary on these quotations[70] or he decided, for obvious reasons as we shall see, not to take Kamalaśīla's comments into serious consideration. For, when Śāntarakṣita introduces his series of verses quoted from Dharmakīrti with the words "the Blo gros dkar po [i.e. Dharmakīrti][71] therefore indicated[72] this meaning here and there",[73] Kamalaśīla makes the following comments: "'Therefore'; because it is established through argumentation (*rigs pa, *yukti*) and authoritative tradition (*luṅ, *āgama*). 'Blo gros dkar po (plural)': Dharmakīrti and others. 'Here and there': in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and other (texts).[74] 'Indicated' (*smos te*):[75] (it) is not really explained, because in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and other (texts of this school) is the appropriate place for explaining the (systematic) ways of the Yogācāra (*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul*). [Śāntarakṣita] has this in mind: the teacher [=Dharmakīrti] thus explains (this meaning) with regard to the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) [of things], but the perfectness (**pariniṣpannatva*)[76] [of things] is not established [in such explanation]; therefore these words of the teacher are everywhere (*thams cad du*) appropriate [only] because of (their) common correctness/applicability

(*yukti*). It is because of this (deliberation) that he says 'indicated' (*smos te*)".[77]

And that means nothing less than a clear statement of Kamalaśīla, speaking as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika thinker, on what he considers to be the reason for Śāntarakṣita's reference to a selection of passages from the *Pramāṇavārttika*: They do not establish an ultimate reality in terms of the Madhyamaka, but in dealing with a less real level of being, the imaginary nature of things, they proceed with the help of an acceptable method to similar results, if only with regard to another kind of reality. *rigs pa thun moṅ pa*, the reason given for the introduction of Dharmakīrti's statements, that may be understood as "correctness commonly accepted" or "argumentation commonly applicable", must refer to the "neither one nor many" argumentation which belongs to the context of all adduced passages. Beyond doubt however is that Kamalaśīla associates the *Pramāṇavārttika* with the Yogācāra system and takes some effort to explain why it was used as a source of quotations to corroborate a Mādhyamika point. Whether Kamalaśīla correctly interprets Śāntarakṣita here or presents his own impressions of the motives for Śāntarakṣita's choice of words and quotations, it is clear at least that Kamalaśīla had a distinct opinion with regard to the statements quoted from Dharmakīrti as being Yogācāra in intent and not an expression of Mādhyamika thought as the hidden pinnacle of Dharmakīrti's philosophical edifice.

IV.

The circumstances constitute a thin connection between the doxographic materials for an assessment of Dharmakīrti as Mādhyamika investigated above and a seemingly lost work of Dharmakīrti that has been identified recently[78] with the title *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*,[79] and some still extant verses as fragmentary remains of this text. Thin as it is, this lead must be followed up in order to ascertain whether Dharmakīrti's as yet undiscovered Mādhyamika nature can be revealed with the help of the faint light issuing from this corner of his philosophical life.

These circumstances are: firstly the fact that three padas almost identical or at least very similar to padas b-d of PV III 4 which was used by Jitāri as a witness for Dharmakīrti's Madhyamaka are quoted in MRP 346a4-5, and that only a few folios after a quotation of four verses from a work called *De kho na ñid gsal ba* (MRP 343a5-8), and secondly the fact that pada a of this verse is quoted in J 418,26f with the title of its source, *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*.[80]

I shall deal with the question of this text and with the fragments possibly derived from it on another occasion;[81] here it is sufficient in order to answer the question whether this text might have been the real reason for connecting Dharmakīrti with the Madhyamaka tradition to refer to relevant remarks made by Christian Lindtner in his presentations of these materials.[82] From these remains we know that the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* must have dealt with "the necessity of *bhāvanā* for realizing *tattvārtha*" and with *svasaṃvedana*.[83] The lines quoted from the *Tattvacintā* would add the *kṣaṇikatvānumāna* to the subjects of this text.

With regard to our question it seems that Lindtner first assumed that this lost *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* is representative of a "Mādhyamika background" in Dharmakīrti,[84] but then dropped this idea in the face of the verses discussing *svasaṃvedana*, where the ultimate reality (*tattva*) is clearly taken as selfconsciousness' emptiness in form of its non-duality.[85]

In other words, the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* as far as we know of it provides no possible reason for classifying Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika philosopher.

V.

In conclusion we may say that Jitāri considered the quotations from the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*, where they were introduced as a support for the Mādhyamika argumentation but not necessarily as another instance of Mādhyamika effort, as such instances of Mādhyamika thought and argument in Dharmakīrti. Jitāri's selection of statements that are related to the "neither one nor many"-argument differs slightly from Śāntarakṣita's, but it is only a difference of emphasis not an essential one. Both groups of quotations have the purpose of representing the occurrence of that major Mādhyamika argument in Dharmakīrti.

Jitāri goes beyond Śāntarakṣita[86] by understanding the occurrence of these quotations in the *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti* as being based on Śāntarakṣita's assessment of Dharmakīrti as an adherent of the Madhyamaka tradition, and, as we have seen above,[87] by attempting to identify Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika with the help of at least one other statement, PV III 4d, which implies active consent to an essentially Mādhyamika position.

Thus we can safely conclude our survey of extant attempts from the Indian tradition to assess Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika by stating that in relation to our present knowledge of his works these attempts have not produced sufficient evidence to prove their point. It is also evident that

Jitāri in his doxographic work is responsible for such notion, that Mokṣākaragupta draws on him, and that the beginning of this effort to incorporate Dharmakīrti into the Madhyamaka tradition was made willingly or unwillingly by Śāntarakṣita, when he quoted the "neither one nor many"-argument passages from Dharmakīrti in his *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*. The motives of some early Tibetan scholars for evaluating Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika and the final discussion of the later Tibetan doxographers of Jitāri's efforts[88] will have to remain subject of further investigation.

Notes

1. For the simple reason that the material reasonably to be investigated will not offer a sufficiently extensive basis for a discussion of the question at all we shall put aside the otherwise not unimportant question what the designation as Mādhyamika may mean exactly if applied to Dharmakīrti. There would be several possibilities: the svātantrika - prāsaṅgika type alternative, and the alternative between a pure Madhyamaka and a preformation of the later Yogācāra - Madhyamaka synthesis. In any case it is not the general "madhyamaka character" of Buddhism as such that needs to be investigated but the special one that can be related to that tradition of thought and argumentation which was begun by Nāgārjuna. For some interesting remarks on the question "what it means to say that a given philosoper belongs to a particular school" cf. Richard P. Hayes' review of *The heart of Buddhist Philosophy: Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti* by Amar Singh. New Delhi 1984, in *JIABS* 9/2, 166ff.

2. Shirasaki 1986.

3. On his life and works cf. Seyfort-Ruegg 1981:100; Shirasaki Kenjō, Jitāri - hito to shisō - [Jitāri - personality and thought]. In: *Kimura Takeo kyōjū koki kinen "Sōden no kenkyū"*, Kyōto 1981, 348-320; and, *The Bālāvatāratarka. Kōbe Kojo Daigaku Kiyō 15, (63-134)63-70.*

4. On Mokṣākaragupta cf. Kajiyama 1966: 7-11.

5. On various Tibetan lines of approaching the possibility of interpreting Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* as a work of Mādhyamika intent cf. the many interesting remarks in the first two chapters of van der Kuijp's book (Kuijp 1983: 29ff and 59ff) and chapter 7 in Jackson 1987.

6. Especially when such notions are only reported - as in our case - by a later writer with a possibly discernible motive for his way of presenting the views of the old masters (cf. Kuijp 1983: 35).

7. Cf. Kuijp 1983: notes 101, 188.

8. As regards the common opinion of later Tibetan scholarship on the issue of classifying the Indian philosophical tradition, it is evident from the exhaustive survey of the development of the classification of the Mādhyamika school in Mimaki 1982: 27-54, that there is no corner reserved for a Mādhyamika Dharmakīrti in Tibetan *Grub mtha'*-literature.

9. These statements will have to be seen of course within their context and in the light of their motivations, too. But they differ from the - not necessarily later - Tibetan contentions in that they are not burdened with the uncertainties of an additional hermeneutic gap (constituted by difference of language, imperfections of early translations etc.).
A survey of the available Indian Buddhist *siddhānta*-literature is given by Mimaki 1976: 67f with additions in Mimaki 1982: 2.

10. A "counter test" made by observing statements where the terms *śūnyatā, -nairātmya, advaya* occur in passages other than these shows that not Mādhyamika ideas are intended but only Yogācāra ones (cf. also Lindtner 1984: note 35).

11. Cf. Vetter 1964: 77ff.

12. Cf. e.g. Shirasaki 1978: 493, SMVBh I: 82; see also Seyfort-Ruegg 1981: 100.

13. Shirasaki 1986.

14. Counted as 360 *ibid.*

15. Shirasaki 1986: 114.

16. *rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug mchog de ni don dam par na dbu ma pa kho na ste / ... śes gsuṅs pa'i phyir ro //* (SMVBh IV 135, 28ff.)

17. *'di las kyaṅ dbu ma pa yin te /* (SMVBh IV 136, 3).

18. SMVBh IV 135, 16-28. This passage starts with an objection (SMVBh IV 135, 16-21) that raises the question in reference to PV III 3ab, in what way that which is said to be causally efficient (*arthakriyāsamartha*) and thus ultimately existent (*paramārthasat*) can also be void (*śūnya*). This objection is refuted by Jitāri who states (SMVBh IV 135, 26-28) that in this text (i.e. PV III 3) Dharmakīrti refers to causal efficiency as the defining characteristic of that which is ultimately existent (*paramārthasat*) as based on worldly practice (**vyavahārāśrita*) and that, therefore, no contradiction can be assumed to exist between Dharmakīrti's statement of PV III 3ab and the Mādhyamika position, that the causally efficient is devoid of an essential nature.
For a possible later attempt to give a Mādhyamika meaning to this line cf. Zwilling 1981. Zwilling shows that the attribute *don dam* in the extant Tibetan translation was the result of an interpretational inroad upon the text with the aim of rendering it a Madhyamaka statement. The author

of this addition was Sa skya Paṇḍita who was influenced by the previous translators rMa lotsāva and rNog lotsāva, the latter of whom is known to have considered Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika, and directly motivated by the emergence of the Prāsaṅgika school as resulting from Pa Tshab Ñi mag grags' acitivities (cf. 309f). For further clarifications cf. Jackson 1987: 186f, note 46, where Jackson points out that the *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi raṅ 'grel* was composed only after the work of revision of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and that there the quotation's source is not PV III but PVin II 56 where the context is quite different. We may ask in addition why Sa paṇ did not bother to change the translation of PV I 166ab either, which is another parallel passage. Thus the case of the attribute *don dam* in the "official" Tibetan translation of PV III 3 which was meritoriously discussed by Zwilling cannot be considered as solved yet. It is however evident that it is an exegetical gloss of the Tibetans (cf. now also Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, Studies in the Life and Thought of Mkhas-grub-rje I: Mkhas-grub-rje's Epistemological Oeuvre and his Philosophical Remarks on Dignāgas *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I. *Berliner Indologische Studien* 1, 1985 [75-105] note 28).

19. SMVBh IV 137, 20-138, 1.

20. Cf. Seyfort-Ruegg 1981: 100.

21. After his statement on the twofoldness of valid cognition as related to the twofoldness of the respective objects, and their short characterisation in the first three verses of the chapter, Dharmakīrti continues with an examination of that which is general (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) as an object of cognition. The objections of v. 4 are formulated with the intention of contrasting and associating the categories from the "two truths/realities"-thought of the Sautrāntikas as given in v. 3 (*paramārthasat, saṃvṛtisat*) with the parallel thought of the Mādhyamikas. Dharmakīrti indicates thus that there is this line of discussion as an open question to be dealt with, but he prefers not to develop it and therefore quickly drops it.

22. The verse is adduced for the same reason by Prajñākaramati in BCAP 223, 24f.

23. Cf. 81.

24. Cf. Tosaki 1979-1985: I, 61ff; Zwilling 1981: 308.

25. Cf. Zwilling 1981: 308f.

26. Cf. Devendrabuddhi's PVP 145a5-b3 and Śākyamati's PVT 189b6-191b2, particularly PVT 189b5-7 where he says: "If, even in terms of a conventional (reality), something is accepted as capable for causal function (**arthakriyāsamartha*), then something would be accepted as a reality (**vastutvena*). That is the meaning of the words "be it as it may". And this (something) which bears the name of conventional reality (**saṃvṛti*) and is excluded from what is without a designation by way of an efficiency for causal function must be accepted by the Mādhyamika too". (*ji lta de ltar 'gyur źes bya ba ni 'di ltar kun rdzob kyis kyaṅ don byed par nus par khas len na / dṅos po ñid du khas blaṅs par 'gyur pa yin no źes dgoṅs so // 'di ltar don byed par nus pa ñid kyis ñe bar brjod pa daṅ bral ba las ldog pa kun rdzob kyi miṅ can yaṅ dbu ma pas kyaṅ 'dod par bya ba yin te/*).

27. *tasmān na paramārthataḥ kiñcid astīty astu yathā tathā saṃvṛtyā etāvatāpi pramāṇāpramāṇavyavasthitiḥ, na kācin naḥ kṣatiḥ. abhipreta eva bhavatpakṣo 'smākam iti na vastutattvam atikramya vartayituṃ śakyam* (PVBh 186, 5-7). *Jina, PVAT(J) 19b3f, and Yamāri, PVAT(Y) 69a7-b1, corroborate these words of Prajñākaragupta.

28. The passages from *Jina and Yamāri adduced in Zwilling 1981: note 17 are not the appropriate ones, for *Jina comments in PVAT(J) 17b5-6 upon PVBh 184, 29f., and only PVAT(J) 19b3f. upon PVBh 186, 5-7, Prajñākaragupta's concluding words, without seeing here any consent to the Mādhyamika. And the same is true with Yamāri who in PVAT(Y) 66b8f. comments upon the earlier passage and only 69a7-b1 upon the concluding one.

29. Vetter 1964: 66.

30. For an analytic description and translation of this discussion cf. Vetter 1964: 66-70.

31. For the German translation cf. Vetter 1964: 69f.; the Japanese translation of Tosaki 1979-1985: I, 309ff. is also used in Shirasaki 1986: 112f.

32. *tasmān nārtheṣu na jñāne sthūlābhāsas tadātmanaḥ /*
ekatra pratiṣiddhatvād bahuṣv api na sambhavaḥ //
(PV III 211)
"Therefore there is no gross appearance neither in (external) things nor in cognition. Since what is of that (gross) nature has been refuted in case of something single, it is also impossible in case of plurality."

33. *tasmāt tad eva tasyāpi tattvaṃ yā dvayaśūnyatā //* (PV III 213cd).

34. For the background of such a Yogācāra conception of *dharmanairatmya* cf. e.g. VśV 6, 11-17 on Vś 10b-d (cf. E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1956, 372f).

35. Cf. PVBh 287, 36 where a question distinguishes between the position of the *Vijñānavāda* and a *sarvadharmaśūnyatā*, or PVBh 288, 29 where he speaks of the meaning of the term (*śūnyatārtha*) according to the Mādhyamika, Yogācāra and the Realist (*bāhyārthavādin*) system.

36. Cf. PVBh 286, 25f: *tasmād yathā yathā vastu cintyate tathā tathā viśīryate eveti kim atra kurmaḥ. tasmād āha: vijñānaṃ vijñānarūpatayā śūnyam iti sakaladharmaśūnyataiva nyāyyā.* (The second part shows small deviations in the Tibetan translation, PVBh 327a2: *de'i mam par śes pa ni mam par śes pas stoṅ ṅo źes gsuṅs pas na chos thams cad ni stoṅ pa ñid do źes bya ba rigs so //*). The quotation seems to be from a *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* but I cannot identify the source.

37. *Jina has no remarks on v. 209 but regards v. 210cd as teaching that "everything as non-existent is the true being (*tattva*)" (*thams cad med pa de kho na ñid yin par bstan pa ni /* PVAT(J) Ne, 92a3). Ravigupta in explaining v. 209 more or less literally copies PVBh 286, 16ff (cf. PVV(R) 107a2ff) and is even more explicit than Prajñākaragupta in his formulation of the conclusion: *ji ltar ji lta bur gcig pa ñid daṅ du ma ñid des phyi rol daṅ naṅ gi bdag ñid kyi don sems pa de lta de ltar med par 'gyur te /* (PVV(R) 107a7f) "In whatever way, in terms of (their) being one and many, the things of external or internal nature are examined, in all these ways they turn out to be non-existent."

38. This is the main argument of Śāntarakṣita in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāra (ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt,* MA 1cd/). Cf. the three papers by T. Tillemans, The "neither one nor many" Argument for *śūnyatā*, and its Tibetan Interpretations. In: *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy*, Wien 1983, 305-320; The "neither one nor many" Argument for *śūnyatā*, and its Tibetan Interpretations: Background Information and Source Materials. *Études de Lettres,* Université de Lausanne, 1982, 103-128; Texts on the "neither one nor many" argument for śūnyatā. *JIPh* 12, 1984, 357-388. For pre-Śāntarakṣita occurences of this argument, apart from Dharmakīrti cf. Ch. Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*. Copenhagen 1982, 273f; and Kuijp 1983: Anm. 188.

39. *nānārthaika bhavet tasmāt* (PV III 207a).

40. Seyfort-Ruegg 1981: 87ff.

41. Cf. above 76f; and for a similar assessment by Kamalaśīla cf. below 80f.

42. *tad upekṣitatattvārthaiḥ kṛtvā gajanimīlanam /*
kevalaṃ lokabuddhyaiva bāhyacintā pratanyate //
(PV III 219)
"Therefore the idea of something external is propagated [by the Buddhas] who disregard the true reality closing their eyes like elephants solely because of the conception of ordinary people." Cf. Vetter 1964: 70.

43. Shirasaki 1986: 111.

44. SMVBh IV 132, 36ff.

45. Counted as 360 in most editions and Shirasaki 1986.

46. SMVBh IV 137, 2-7.

47. TBh^1 38, 13ff; TBh^2 70, 6ff (Kajiyama 1966: 149); cf. Tosaki 1979-1985: II, 45, Anm. 27; Katsura 1969: 27.

48. On their relation cf. Shirasaki Kenjō, Jitāri to Mokṣākaragupta. *IBK* 25/1, 1976, 422-419.

49. SMVBh IV 137, 2ff: *mam par śes pa'i skabs ñid nas ... ... ces bya ba 'di las kyaṅ yin te /*; Mokṣākaragupta introduces this last paragraph with the clear words: *mādhyamikānāṃ tu darśane tad api vijñānaṃ na paramārthasat, vicārāsahatvat* (TBh^2 69, 19f).

50. Cf. Vetter 1964: 82.

51. Cf. Vetter 1964: 77-83.

52. Cf. PV III 208-210 dealt with above 76f.

53. Cf. *grāhyādayaḥ* PVV 227, 10 and *cittagatāḥ* PVV 227 note 3; cf. also the four explanations of applying the alternative *ekam anekañ ca* in PVBh 400, 19-24.

54. Cf. PVV(R) 158a1. The other commentaries have nothing to say.

55. Cf. above 76f.

56. Cf. above 76.

57. This verse is also quoted by Śāntarakṣita (cf. below 79f) and Kamalaśīla's remarks hold good for it too.

58. Considering the fact that certain commentators of Dharmakīrti seem to offer sufficient reason to classify him as a Mādhyamika because of their respective interpretations (cf. e.g. above Ravigupta on PV III 4 and Prajñākaragupta and his tradition on PV III 209cd) why should we look for an origin of this assessment in the Madhyamaka tradition at all? Firstly because the influence of the passage from Śāntarakṣita treated below can hardly be neglected. And secondly we have to admit that it may be better not to use too early certain interpretations in Prajñākaragupta's and his tradition's commentaries as an argument since we are as yet in no position to estimate the significance of such passages within the overall philosophical lay-out and line of intentions in Prajñākaragupta. But even in the case of Prajñākaragupta's own position gradually being revealed as that of a Mādhyamika and his interpretation of Dharmakīrti being in accordance with his own inclination, this would mean nothing more with regard to our question for the origin of Jitāri's assessment than that he could have felt supported by Prajñākaragupta's tendencies to grant more import to Śāntarakṣita's quotation of Dharmakīrti-verses than Kamalaśīla found acceptable (cf. below 80f).

59. *dṅos po gaṅ gaṅ mam dpyad pa // de daṅ de la gcig ñid med // gaṅ la gcig ñid yod min pa // de la du ma ñid kyaṅ med //* "When any entity is scrutinized, no unity is found in it. Where there is no unity, you cannot find plurality either" (Ichigō 1985: CXLI).

60. Quoted in first place MAV 174, 1ff.

61. Ichigō 1985: 172.

62. MAV 178, 1-16.

63. They are quoted from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in MAV 174, 6ff.

64. As already indicated partly in Shirasaki 1978: note 24 and particularly Kuijp 1983: note 188.

65. Kamalaśīla supplies the rest of the verse (MAP 179, 11-15) which also reasons for the nonsubstantiality of cognition-external things on account of their voidness in terms of a particular characteristic (*lakṣaṇaśūnyatā*) which again is rooted in an erroneous establishment of a difference between things (PV III 214); it can therefore be considered as homogeneous to our groups of passages. Cf. Vetter 1964: 70.

66. Kuijp 1983: note 101.

67. MAV 178, 16-18: *de ltar rigs pa daṅ luṅ daṅ ldan pa'i śes rab kyis brtags na / dṅos po ma lus pa brgya tshal du gźigs te gcig daṅ du ma'i raṅ bzin daṅ bral ba'i gtan tshigs grub pa //*

68. So in accordance with Ichigō who translates "*... sonzai wa, amasu tokoro naku konagona ni kudakare, ...*" (Ichigō 1985a: 156). It might be better however to read *tshul du* with Cone, to regard *gźigs* as perfect of *gźig* "to examine" and to translate "was investigated in a hundred ways (**nayaśatena* or something similar)".

69. Seyfort-Ruegg 1981: 100.

70. MAP 179, 2-10; cf. note 77.

71. The name Blo gros dkar po is not known to me as one of the usual designations for Dharmakīrti. The plural of the name here in the *Vṛtti* looks like a plural of majesty, because only Dharmakīrti's verses are quoted. Kamalaśīla paraphrases this name however with "Dharmakīrti and others" (MAP 179, 2f) thus understanding it as a designation not for Dharmakīrti but rather his tradition.

72. The exact meaning of *smos te* is not clear. Only the knowledge of the Sanskrit word that was translated would show us where the semantic emphasis is here within the wide spectrum of meanings and Sanskirt words the word *smos pa* can stand for. That it means something special here is clear from the fact that Kamalaśīla explains the word at all. And it is from his explanation: "... that is: [the meaning] is not really explained" (*dṅos su bśad pa ma yin pa ste*, MAP 179, 4f) that I take it to mean "indirectly or accidentally explained, indicated, referred to."
Then, of course, we face the second question regarding the "meaning" (*don, artha*) that he is said "to indicate". "This meaning" (*don 'di*) could either refer to the preceding quotations from the *Catuḥśataka*, where the irreality of things together with the "neither one nor many"-argument is stated, and from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, where only the irreality is emphasized, or to verse 61 of the root-text. The latter is more likely because all three groups of quotations are adduced to corrobarate v. 61.

73. MAV 178, 1: *de bas na blo gros dkar po rnams kyis don 'di de daṅ der smos te /.*

74. Since Kamalaśīla takes Blo gros dkar po rnams to mean Dharmakīrti and his followers, he means "other texts by other authors" here.

75. Cf. above note 72.

76. In the sense of "perfect nature" (*parinispannasvabhāva*), that is, their being in its most real, pure form.

77. Cf. MAP 179, 1-10: *de bas na źes bya ba ni gaṅ gi phyir rigs pa daṅ luṅ dag gis grub pa'o // blo gros dkar po mams kyis źes bya ba ni slob dpon chos kyi grags pa la sogs pas so // de daṅ der źes bya ba ni tshad ma mam 'grel la sogs par ro // smos te źes bya ba ni dṅos su bśad pa ma yin pa ste / tshad ma mam par 'grel pa la sogs par ni mal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul bśad pa'i gnas skabs yin pa'i phyir ro // slob dpon gyis kun tu brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid kyi dbaṅ du byas te de skad du bśad mod kyi / yoṅs su grub pa ñid ma grub pa'i phyir te / rigs pa thun moṅ pa'i phyir slob dpon gyi tshig 'di thams cad du ruṅ ba ñid do sñam du bsams pa'o // de ñid kyi phyir smos te źes bya ba smos so //.*

78. Lindtner 1980: 29-33.

79. For our problem the question of the authorship of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (cf. Lindtner 1982: 174 ff, 182ff; D. Seyfort Ruegg, Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School. In: *Indology and Buddhist Studies*, ed. L.A. Hercus a.o., Canberra 1982 [505-530] 530, and his contribution to the present volume) is irrelevant: what is important is the existence of these and other quotations from Dharmakīrti that cannot be traced in his extant works but can possibly be associated with a lost work.

80. Cf. Lindtner 1980: 30f.

81. In the Memorial volume for Professor Gopihamohan Bhattacharya.

82. In Lindtner 1980: 29-30 he introduces the two quotations from the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and one from Jñānaśrī. In Lindtner 1984: 160-162 he adds six verses from the *Nyāyāvatāravṛtti* to this collection and draws our attention to another citation of two verses in the *Anekāntajayapatākā* in his note 36. To this we can add, I think the one and a half verse quoted under the name *Tattvacintā* as their source in J 139, 16-20.

83. Lindtner 1984: 160f.

84. Lindtner 1980: note 32 ("Perhaps not only a Mādhyamika background but even a Tantric must be presupposed to gain the proper perspective"). But, in fact, the four verses from the MRP do not suggest such an assessment, for they convey nothing more than "common Mahāyāna lore" (*ibid.*: 30).

85. Lindtner 1984: note 35 and 36.

86. Śāntarakṣita within the frame given by MA 1 was evidently only interested in adducing texts connected with the "neither one nor many"-argument. He did not wish to argue an inclusion of the *Pramāṇavārttika* into the literature of the Mādhyamika school.

87. Cf. 75.

88. Some essential passages from the later doxographic literature have already been quoted by Shirasaki in the notes to his edition (cf. SMVBh IV 136, 138).

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On some non-formal aspects of the proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās

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I

In the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (MMK) of Nāgārjuna the majority of the chapters contain passages which seem to be dedicated to attempts to prove that various kinds of things cannot exist the existence of which is ordinarily assumed or taken for granted. In a great number of cases the proofs start with an argument the formal structure of which can be described as follows: It is first tried to demonstrate that there can be no entities of a certain kind F that are G and that there can be no entities of the same kind F that are not-G. Sometimes, but not always, follow remarks to the effect that there cannot be an F that is both G and not-G or that there cannot be an F which is neither G nor not-G. From this it is deduced that there cannot be any entity of the kind F.

This kind of argument seems with regard to its formal structure intuitively sound and it can also be shown that its analogue in the classical predicate calculus is valid. Nevertheless the results of these proofs are implausible and the impression of implausibility is strengthened by the circumstance that in many cases the deduced propositions that there are no entities of the kind F serve as the basis for deducing in an apparently stringent manner the non-existence of further entities the existence of which is not questioned by common sense.

Because of this the supposition seems justified that the proofs (or the apparent proofs) must be based on unwarranted assumptions and that the crux of the arguments lies in something other than their formal structure.

The task of finding out the crucial steps in the arguments is inhibited by the fact that in many places we do not encounter explicit reasons why the initial propositions of the form 'No F is G' and 'No F is not-G' should be regarded as true. Although explanations are very often given by the commentaries to Nāgārjuna's main work it is hardly satisfying to rely merely on interpretations that represent the reception of N.'s philosophy in the later tradition of the Madhyamaka-schools. Fortunately there are at least some passages in the MMK that furnish attempts of a justification and it seems advisable to begin the interpretational work by considering such cases.

II

It is remarkable that there are some passages where it is quite obvious that the argument can only apparently exhibit the above described logical structure. A striking example is given by the beginning verses of chapter XXI.[1] Here it is first stated (verse 1) that there is no destruction without or together with production and that there is also no production either without or together with destruction. This formulation suggests that the author of the text intends to affirm a pair of propositions of the form: 'There is no F which is G' and 'There is no F which is not-G', that he wants to say that there is no destruction that exists without production and that there is also no destruction of which it is not true that it exists without production and that in the case of production the situation is analogous.

This view appears to be confirmed by the statement of verse 6. Verse 6 contains the rhetorical question as to how there should be an establishment of two things that are neither established together nor without each other. As this statement is obviously meant to represent the outcome of the foregoing argumentation one should think that in this passage the non-existence of destruction and production is deduced on the ground that both types of entities do not exemplify any of two logically complementary predicates.

However, the intermediate verses 2-5 represent justifications which could only be valid, if the alternatives given by 'without production' - 'together with production' and 'without destruction' - 'together with destruction' were *not* taken as mutually exclusive. It is argued that on the one hand destruction without production as well as production without destruction are not possible, as there is no death without birth, no destruction without origination (verse 2) and as the impermanence in the things is never not existent (verse 4). On the other hand, destruction cannot be together with production and production not together with detruction because birth and death never occur at the same time (verses 3 and 5).

It is not difficult to see why the alternatives as they are taken in the justifications for the impossibility of any production without or together with destruction or of any destruction without or together with production are not exhaustive. The argument takes only into consideration that either production and destruction occur together at the same time - in connection, as one has to understand, with the same thing - or that there exist productions or destructions without the occurrence of a destruction or respectively a production - in connection with one and the same thing - at *any* time.

It seems therefore that the argument rests on an exploitation of two different senses that phrases of the form 'A is (together) with B' and 'A is without B' may have. They can be read either "temporally" or "atemporally" which means in this case that the sentences a) 'A is/exists (together) with B' and b) 'A is/exists without B' could on the one hand be used or understood as if they were equivalent with a1) 'A and B exist together at a certain time' - 'There is a time t such that A and B exist/occur together at t' - and with b1) 'A exists without B at a certain time' - 'There is a time t such that A exists at t, but B does not exist at t' - and on the other hand they allow interpretations according to which they become equivalent with a2) 'A exists (at some time) and B exists (at some time)' and with b2) 'A exists without there ever being B' - 'There is a time t such that A exists at t, but there is no time t such that B exists at t'. The author of the MMK reasons as if he presupposes the "temporal" reading for phrases of the form 'A is together with (a) B' (taking them in the sense of 'There is one time such that both A and B exist together at that time') whereas he assumes an "atemporal" reading for the phrases of the form 'A is without (a) B' (so that they are synonymous with 'A exists without there ever being (a) B').

The reasoning presents itself as disproving the existence of production and destruction and the proof would be valid if the expressions of the form 'to be together with B' and 'to be without B' represented contradictory predicates. But as the contradictoriness turns out to be only apparent and seems to rest on an exploitation of the "temporal-atemporal ambiguity" it appears that the author of the MMK uses a fallacious reasoning based on an equivocation of natural-language expressions.

It would be possible to identify further factors that could promote a fallacy of this sort besides the above mentioned ambiguity. If we consider the formulation of the second half of verse 4 *anityatā hi bhāveṣu na kadācin na vidyate* = "For impermanence does never not exist in the things" we discover again an ambiguity that is apt to blur the difference between the "temporal" and the "atemporal" reading of the phrase 'production is without destruction' contained in the first half of the same verse. The above cited expression can express a proposition that is at least in the Buddhist context relatively uncontroversial, for the temporal expression 'now' as well as the words 'sometimes' and 'always' may have the force of non-temporal quantifiers so that the sentence could express that no thing is not impermanent. It is the same kind of use of primarily temporal expressions that is exhibited by sentences like 'Elephants always have tusks' if they mean that all elephants have tusks. The

> linguistic meaning of the second half of verse 4 allows however also for the possibility to assume that the temporal quantifier is used in its primary and literal sense so that the sentence may be taken to say that everything possesses always the property of impermanence. Of course, the transgression from having always the property of impermanence to the actual destruction at every time of a thing's existence involves more than mere paraphrasing. But the latter reading may very well function as a starting point for deducing the impossibility of production without simultaneous destruction.

Despite the fact that the difference between the above mentioned readings tends to be obscured by equivocal and suggesting phrases like that of verse 4, the fallacious character of the argument, if based on the "temporal-atemporal ambiguity", is so obvious that it seems quite improbable that the author of the MMK should not have noticed it. Perhaps Nāgārjuna and his contemporaries might because of historical reasons not yet have been able to give a correct diagnosis of the mechanisms involved in such a fallacy. But from this it does not follow that one should also expect that the author of the text did not realise or at least feel that the reasoning is not compelling and that the relevant alternatives (as taken in the argumentation) were not exhaustive. Is it not quite evident that the truth here should lie in the middle between simultaneous existence of production and destruction on the one hand and of production without any destruction or of destruction without a production at any time on the other hand?

If we do not want to accept the consequence that the founder of the Madhyamaka-philosophy overlooked this relatively simple fact we must either assume that Nāgārjuna being well aware of the unconclusiveness of his reasoning intended for some reason to present such an argument here or assume that his argument was subject to tacit presuppositions which either strengthened the force of the reasoning or made the aim of the proof weaker than it appears to be.

I do not want to pursue the consequences of the first alternative here. Instead let us see whether it is possible to get further on the basis of the second assumption.

III

There are several other passages in the MMK where at first glance the "temporal-atemporal" ambiguity seems to be exploited for the argu-

mentation and besides the portion discussed above there are others where the fallacious character of such a reasoning is too obvious to hold it probable that the author of the text would not have realised this.

In chapter XIX Nāgārjuna reasons to the effect that time does not exist by arguing that present and future are not independent of the past but also not dependent because if present and future were depending (*apekṣya*) on the past they would exist in the past, a consequence that is obviously regarded as unacceptable. Similar consequences exist regarding the dependence of past and present on future and past and future on present.[2]

Here the reasoning seems prima facie absurd. If the premise of the dependence of the present and future on the past is presupposed and this premise is taken as having the weird consequence of the simultaneous existence of present, past and future then one should think that the author should have had every reason to give up this premise or to draw the conclusion that the assumption that the dependence of one thing on another *invariably* involves that both exist together at the same time (or at the same locus) is not justified. It seems hardly conceivable that Nāgārjuna should have clung both to the thesis of the dependence between the time epochs and to the assumption concerning the entailment between dependence and coexistence without special reasons.

Now, it is not clear on what grounds the thesis of the dependence between present, past and future is postulated by the author of the MMK. Also the commentaries are obscure on this point. But at least two hypotheses are possible: It could be the case that Nāgārjuna relies on special Buddhist doctrines as for example the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādin teacher Buddhadeva who most probably claimed that something is called present on the basis of the fact that the future is later and the past is earlier than it and analogously for the remaining epochs. One might however find it unsatisfactory that our author should base such far reaching claims as the non-existence of time on such singular scholastic views. At least this fact should give reason to look for alternative explanations that do not have this consequence. But there is also the possibility that the dependence-thesis rests on the view that everything present must also be past and future in the same way as every past thing must be present and future and every future thing also be past and present. In this case the dependence-thesis could be understood as based on an assumption that does not presuppose special philosophical views and harmonizes with the common-sensical outlook. It is natural to think that the temporal determination of being present involves those of being past and future and analogously that being past implies being present and future and being future entails being present and being past. The factual

basis for this assumption lies in the "temporal change" that consists in that the temporal determinations of being past, present and future are applicable to particulars at different times. - Every present entity was at earlier times future and will be past at later times, every thing that is (now) past was present at earlier and future at still earlier times, every thing which is (now) future will be present and past at later times.[3]

It is quite well imaginable that this fact of the mutual requirement between the determinations of being past, present and future which evolves from the "temporal change" could have found its expression in the theses of the dependence between past, present and future as formulated in the first four Kārikās of the XIX chapter of the MMK.[4] But if this is so, one should expect a chain of reasoning that leads from the proposition that represents the phenomenon of the "temporal change" to the simultaneous being of the three temporal determinations in a relatively natural way.

Now, it is true that a *partial* simultaneity of the three temporal determinations could be derived in a very simple way without premises that represent the fact of "temporal change" or logically follow from it. It is only necessary to assume the following propositions that appear at first glance quite plausible:

P1 Every particular exists at some time if and only if it is present at that time.

P2 For every particular holds that if it is something / is an F at any time, then it exists at that time.

From P1 and P2 obviously follows:

P3 Every particular is past at a time only if it is present at that time, and every particular is future at some time only if it is present at that time / For every particular holds that if it is past at any time_t then it is present at that time_t and if it is future at any time_t then it is present at that time_t.

It is also true that this derivation could claim the merit of providing a possible clue for solving the puzzle posed by the above mentioned passage of the verses 1 - 6 of chapter XXI. For one of the two assumptions of the above deduction, namely P2, is, although not identical, very similar to another proposition so that it is easily imaginable that someone who accepts P2 should also be ready to accept

P2' For every particular holds that if it is something / is an F then it is this (something) / is an F at a time where it exists.

The difference between P2 and P2' lies in the fact that the latter principle does not exclusively apply to predications with a "temporal specification"; it says that to be F is equivalent with to be F at a certain time and that this time is a time where the subject of the ascription of

the predicate exists. Chapter XXI showed that the author maintains principles which can be expressed by the sentences:
i) No production is without destruction.
and
ii) No destruction is without production.
These are equivalent with
ia) Every production (is such that it) is not without destruction.
iia) Every destruction (is such that it) is not without production.
Now, if one assumed that the principle of P2' applies to the predications of these sentences, if in other words one took 'is not without destruction' and 'is not without production' as possible instances of the schematic letter 'F' in P2' then the propositions expressed by the sentences
iii) Every production (is such that it) is not without = together with destruction at a time where it exists.
iv) Every destruction (is such that it) is not without = together with production at a time where it exists.
follow. But this means that there must be a time where both production and destruction occur (with regard to the same thing) so that the possible alternatives are reduced to the occurrence of production without any destruction at any time as well as the occurrence of destruction without any production at any time on the one hand and the (at least partial) simultaneousness of production and desctruction (of one and the same thing) on the other. Under these presuppositions the acceptance of production and destruction would indeed push us into the impasse of being forced both to deny and to accept the simultaneity of production and destruction. Therefore one might think that the above demonstrated derivation of a partial simultaneity of the temporal determinations 'present', 'past' and 'future' from the propositions P1 and P2 alone - and without any reference to the "temporal change"-phenomenon - should be credited with the merit of bridging the argumentations of chapter XIX and chapter XXI, in that P2 could very well be regarded as a possible foundation for the acceptance of P2' which in turn allows to understand how the reasoning of the verses 1-5 of chapter XXI could be viewed as leading into a dilemma (as the author of the text seems to have done).

It should however be noted that P2, although its aptitude to evoke an impression of plausibility is still higher than that of P2', must, as a matter of fact, be regarded as unacceptable. The predications of being past at a certain time and of being future at a time invalidate the generality of the principle that is formulated in P2. If one supposed that the argument of the beginning verses of chapter XIX is founded on this theorem one is forced to accept the consequence that the author of the text was ready to presuppose a principle in a context that contains clear

counterexamples to its validity and that he did not hesitate to apply a theorem explicitly to just those cases that could function as paradigms for disproving the generality of the theorem in question.[5] But there are other and still more serious difficulties.

The consequence that has been derived from P1 and P2, namely P3, makes it natural to say that past and future are in the present, but the text of the MMK mentions explicitly that the present and future would be in the past and from verse 4 one can conclude that also the existence of the past and future in the present as well as the existence of the past and present in the future should result as consequences. Obviously the author of the MMK holds that all the three time-epochs must entirely coincide.

On the supposition made above that statements like 'The present is in the past' etc. refer in this context to overlappings of the temporal determinations of being present, past or future, the set of consequences declared to be derivable in MMK 1 - 4a would be equivalent with or implied by the following proposition:

P4 Every particular is present at a time if and only if it is past at that time and if and only if it is future at that time.

The absurdity of P4 is so obvious that it seems hardly probable that the author of the MMK should have accepted it in any other form than as something derivable from assumptions or principles taken for granted. But if this is so, the question arises as to what these assumptions or principles are that lie at the root of the above theorem.

IV

P4 could be explained if one assumed that the author of the MMK presupposed another more general principle. Theorems like P4 would be the natural outcome of a view that rests on an equation of different types of conditions.

First one can differentiate between, so to speak, a) "logical conditions" for the truth of sentences/propositions or for the ascribability of predicates and, b) "real conditions", either for the existence of states of affairs, the occurrence of situations or events describable by sentences or for the possession of certain attributes or properties expressible by predicate-expressions. Within the class of "real conditions" one could further distinguish a subtype which would be describable by the term 'causal conditions' from a kind of conditioning where one is inclined to view certain facts as being a basis or as constituting a foundation for other facts. The former type is exemplified by situations, circumstances

or events insofar as they can be regarded as causal factors for the occurrence of other situations, states or events. But on the other hand there exists also a relation that is at least akin to a conditioning relation although it is problematic to speak of causal conditions in this context and where the term 'causal' would be definitely inappropriate if it were understood as involving a temporal precedence (in the strict sense which excludes simultaneousness). An example of this latter kind is given by the relation which holds between the brittleness of some material and some internal state of the material in question, as for example a certain molecular structure which could be taken as being responsible for the fact that a certain substance possesses the property of being brittle and that has been sometimes called by the term 'categorical basis'. It is not necessary to elaborate these distinctions further here. An intuitive understanding is sufficient for the present purpose. In this context two points are important: 1. On account of the above described differences between various kinds of conditioning or quasi-conditioning there are at least three possible senses in which one could speak of a condition for the applicability of a predicate to a subject or of a concept to a particular. For the idea of a condition for the applicability of predicates or concepts must not necessarily be taken as embracing those facts or propositions that constitute its "logically necessary requirements", those which are "logically implied" by every proposition representing instances of the application of the predicate or concept to particulars. It would be as well possible either to view the (types) of causal factors that are necessary for the state of affairs which holds if the predicate (concept) is truly applied to a particular as (necessary) applicability-conditions or else to understand the concept of a condition for the applicability of general terms in such a way that it refers to inherent constitutional features of particulars, insofar as they can be regarded as constituting the basis or foundation for the fact that the general terms can be truly applied. Accordingly one may use the terms 'logical condition', 'causal condition' and 'foundational condition' with resepct to those cases. 2. One must distinguish types of conditioning that possess temporal implications from those which do not. Whereas the kind of condition that was termed 'logical condition' is "atemporal" with respect to the conditioning relation, "real conditions" are conceived as involving certain requirements regarding the temporal order, insofar as causal factors are ordinarily conceived as being prior to the caused (the effect), and conditions which function as a basis in the way categorical states do in the above described example possess the characteristic that they (at least partially) coincide in time with the state of affairs that justifies the application of certain predicates or concepts.

The statement that the existence of some effect is a necessary condition of something's being a cause does not entail that everything classifiable as a cause must be temporally preceded by the existence of the effect, if it is used to express the fact that the concept of a cause entails that of an effect or that the truth of propositions of the form 'a is a cause' and 'There is an x such that a causes x' logically require the truth of 'There is an x such that x is the effect of a'. It does also not follow that the effect must at least exist at a time which is not later than that of the annihilation of the cause. If however someone disregarded the specific nature of this condition-type and equated it to "real conditions", it would not be surprising to find it treated in a way as if it involved such consequences. - Under such presuppositions one could further expect that the property of being asymmetrical is superimposed on cases of logical conditioning on the ground that 'A causes B' and 'E1 temporally precedes E2' express asymmetrical relations or because of the asymmetry of the relation between basis and based.

Now, is it not possible to understand the above theorem P4 as a result of viewing the conditioning-relation holding between the temporal determinations of being past, being present and being future on account of the "temporal change"-phenomenon in a "realistic manner"? Could the facts perhaps not be explained by the assumption that a conception which would be most appropriate in cases of "foundational conditioning" was imposed on the conditioning that can be seen in connection with the three temporal determinations of present, past and future? For under this presupposition what functions as a condition for the applicability of a predicate has to be regarded as an inherent quality, as something that conditions the inner constitution of just that thing to which the predicate in question is ascribed. The decisive point is that the conditioning character in this type of case relies on the circumstance that the condition can be assumed as existing or occurring during the time of the existence of the subject of predication and that the conditioning state is exemplified at those times and those places with respect to which the predicate can be applied. The deduction of a mutual overlapping of the three temporal determinations would therefore become understandable on the supposition that the conditioning-relation between present, past and future was conceived in a similar way. The applicability of 'x is present' would accordingly demand that the properties of being past and future are exemplified at the same time constituting something like inner qualities of the present thing and in the same way the other temporal terms would involve the simultaneous existence of the remaining determinations.

It would also be possible to state a factor that would be suited to play a key-role for the equation of the different distinguishable condition-types, namely the term *svabhāva* or 'own-being'. Not only is this word by force of its literal meaning apt to cause a merging between the notions of logically necessary requirements for predication and that of an inherent, "intrinsic" quality of a subject of predication, but there are also good reasons to believe that this expression has elsewhere and even outside Madhyamaka-philosophy played such a role, namely in Dharmakīrti's doctrine of momentariness (I shall try to show this elsewhere). But there should be hardly any need to demonstrate that the term *svabhāva* respresents one of the most important concepts in Nāgārjuna's thinking. If this is true, then the arguments of the MMK would represent cases where philosophical reasoning is intricately tied up with philosophical terminology.

Despite this there is reason enough to be still dissatisfied with the above described solution. For the explanation, as given so far, can only claim plausibility under the condition that we take into consideration exclusively the derivation of the theorem formulated by P4 and neglect the exact wording of the kārikās.

If the sentence that the present and the future are dependent on the past reflects the fact that the determinations of being present or being future presupposes the determination of being past and if we further assume that - in accordance with the above explanation - the argument rests on that "non-real" relationships of requirement are treated like "real" conditionings similar to the "foundational" type, then one should not expect the formulation which we actually find in kārikā 1 of chapter XIX. For the idea that a) present and future depend on the past in the sense that a (necessary) condition of something's being present or being future lies in its being past and that b) the conditional nature involved here can be viewed in the manner of the relation in which an inner constitution or state of a thing provides the real foundation for some attribute and the applicability of a predicate expressing it makes it at best natural to say that the past (= being past) as the foundation is or exists "in" the present and future. The formulation which is actually found, namely that present and future are in the past (time), does however not at all harmonize with this thought. For one might on the basis of what has been stated so far understand, why the author of the MMK could have said that the pastness is "in" the present or future because being past as conceived as the immanent condition for the ascription of being present or future can be viewed as being in the subject of predication or because the conditioning property must necessarily occur during the existence of the ascribed property. But why should

the writer affirm on the contrary that the being of present and future in the past follows as a consequence?

This objection does not however disprove the approach of understanding the argumentations of the MMK and especially the reasoning of the verses 1-3 of chapter XIX as an outcome of the equation of different condition-types. The analysis, as given so far, is only still too superficial. For it can in fact very well be explained on such a basis, why the founder of the Madhyamaka could have assumed that present and future should be in the past, if they depend on it. The required result can be achieved by the following supposition: The propounder of the argument discovered the existence of a conditioning-relation between the temporal determinations of being past, present and future that is given on account of the fact of "temporal change"; the derivation of the existence of present and future "in the past" on the basis that to be past is a (necessary) condition of being present or of being future would however be granted and was actually generated by the following theorem (the acceptance of which by the author of the MMK is testified also by other parts of the work):

P5 For all x and for all y: If x is the condition of y / If x is the condition of the existence of y, then y must be something that exists during the existence of x (or: that does not exist exclusively later than x).

On the supposition that being past is a condition of being present or future (so that present and future are in this sense dependent on the past) and that P5 is valid it follows that (something's) being present and future must be occurring during the time of (its) being past (at least at some time that is not later than the state of being past) and *this* thought could quite naturally be expressed by the formulation that presence / a thing's being present or (a thing's being) future must be in the past (time).

The affirmation that the argument of the beginning verses of chapter XIX rests on an equation of different condition-types continues to be valid because the principle expressed in P5 could hardly be maintained without such a presupposition. However, as soon as all "logical", "atemporal" relations of conditioning are assimilated to "real" ones, P5 is a natural result. For under this presupposition it is hardly avoidable that the "logical entailment" that exists between the concepts of a condition and a conditioned (or the concepts of cause and effect) and the idea that something's being the condition (cause) requires the existence of some conditioned (effect) is taken to imply that the existence of the conditioned (effect) must be something that temporally precedes the condition (cause) or occurs at the latest during its existence.

The formulation found in kārikā 1 can therefore be easily explained on the basis of the "condition-merger-hypothesis" as soon as we do not apply the theorem representing this merging exclusively to the conditioning that exists between being past and being present or future on account of the temporal change but on the conditioning relation between the existence of present and future insofar as they are conditioned and the fact that being past is a condition for being present or future.[6]

V

The last proposal can claim the merit of providing a basis for a unification of quite a lot of the argumentations found in different chapters of the MMK.

The theorem formulated in P5 probably plays a most prominent role in connection with the disproval of cause and effect. At least one can say that some obvious gaps in the argumentation could be bridged by this principle. The reasoning presented in MMK I,6[7] for example can be made much more understandable under the assumption that the author presupposed a theorem which is only a special case of P5 and is obtainable by merely replacing 'condition' by 'cause' or 'causal condition'. But this theorem would be the natural result of viewing the "logical entailment" existing between being a cause and possessing some effect in a "realistic manner" as a consequence of which the effect is taken as something that must either inhere in or precede or at least be partially simultaneous with its cause.[8]

The hypothesis of the merger of condition-types is suitable to explain several other argumentative passages where the reasoning seems at first sight to rest on a temporal-atemporal fallacy, e.g. besides MMK I,6 also in MMK VII,2[9] or in the principle mentioned in MMK X,11 and in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, kārikā 42 + commentary that neither an established (*siddha*) nor a not-established (*asiddha*) thing can be dependent.[10]

The relevance of the principle of the assimilation of different condition-types seems however not restricted to passages that are connected with the temporal-atemporal ambiguity. Its property of favouring the transformation of logical dependences into factual ones may serve to make argumentations as found in the second chapter of the MMK better understandable. Verses 22 and 23 probably represent a thought that plays a fundamental role for the argument of the whole chapter.[11] It seems that the mechanism involved here consists in a remodelling of the symmetrical relation of bilateral implication into a non-symmetrical dependence relation between particulars. If one rephrases the sentence

'There is someone who goes if and only if there is some action of going' as 'Every goer is dependent on an action of going and every action of going is dependent on a goer', if in other words logical requirements for the truth of propositions are interpreted as conditions for the constitution of particulars and if the conditioning-relation is reciprocal, one is inevitably led into a paradox. But it would need a thoroughgoing analysis of the whole chapter to substantiate the above statements which cannot be taken up here.[12]

In the present context it is however important to note that the possibility exists to give an explanation of the argumentation of MMK XXI, 1-6, which has been discussed before, on the basis of the hypothesis of the merging of condition-types. The existence of (a) production and the existence of (a) destruction can plausibly be viewed as conditions for the applicability of the concepts expressed by 'x is together with production' and 'x is together with destruction' in the same way as the existence of an effect has to be regarded as a condition of the applicability of the concept expressed by 'x is a cause'. It should be clear that anyone who derives from the fact that a) the existence of an effect is a condition of something's being a cause that b) the existence of the effect must be given during the existence of the cause could also have reason to derive in an analogous way from the fact that c) the existence of (a) production / destruction is a necessary condition for something's being together with production / destruction the consequence that d) the existence of (a) production / destruction must be given during the existence of the thing that is said to be together with production / destruction. Now, destruction and production are in the context of MMK XXI,3 and 5 the entities which are (hypothetically) assumed to be together with production and destruction respectively. So it follows that destruction and production must occur together at the same time and the rejoinder formulated in the second halves of the verses that birth = production and death = destruction are never found together seems entirely appropriate. Obviously the theorem P5 and the principle that lie at its root can be exploited to account for the way in which the author of the MMK argues in the above discussed passage.

VI

It is true that on the hypothesis that P5 and its underlying assumptions play a key-role in the mentioned passages it would hold that the author of the MMK applied principles to instances that contradict their general validity. The situation is however not entirely the same as the

one which would be given, if one supposed that the argumentation of the verses 1-3 of MMK XIX rested on assumptions like those formulated in P2 or P2'. For our claim was that P5 and the related views constitute a principle that lies at the root of a *great number* of (at least apparently) argumentative reasonings in the MMK. But the case in which a philosopher applies a very general principle in contexts that, as a matter of fact, do not harmonize with that principle must for the purpose of evaluating the probability of interpretational hypotheses be differentiated from the case where some author would, according to the proposed hypothesis, make ad-hoc assumptions in specific contexts which contradict their validity. The situation that would exist, if P5 and the underlying views lay at the root of the arguments, is closer to the first of the cases mentioned above and would be unlike the situation in which one assumed theorems like P2, P2' as presupposed without regarding them derived from other principles. The difference is, admittedly, only a matter of degree, but it should be sufficient to support the superiority of the interpretation which contains a reference to P5 and the merger of condition-types over any interpretation that exclusively relates to the propositions P1, P2, P2' in the context of an account of the argumentations of MMK XIX,1-4 and XXI,1-6.

Besides, it is noteworthy that the arguments of the MMK could be credited with a philosophical point, if they were based on a merging of different condition-types. For the impasses Nāgārjuna derives would not only allow to draw the moral that various kinds of conditioning must be differentiated, but one might also gather from it that the conditions which allow for the application of concepts to particulars cannot be generally viewed as constituting the inherent nature or constitution of the particulars in question. This fact probably *should* not be considered a good reason for a depreciation of the use of and thinking in concepts, but it is very well imaginable that, as a matter of fact, it *could* do so. As the Madhyamaka-tradition is notorious for its disregard of conceptual thinking, the hypothesis would allow to relate the argumentative passages of the MMK with this characteristic feature of the Madhyamaka-doctrine.[13]

Notes

1. XXI:
   1. *vinā vā saha vā nāsti vibhavaḥ saṃbhavena vai /*
      vinā vā saha vā nāsti saṃbhavo vibhavena vai //
      "There is no destruction either without or together with production;
      there is no production either without or together with destruction."
   2. *bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma vibhavaḥ saṃbhavaṃ vinā /*
      vinaiva janma maraṇaṃ vibhavo nodbhavaṃ vinā //
      "How should there be destruction without production?
      Death is (not) without birth, destruction is not without origination."
   3. *saṃbhavenaiva vibhavaḥ kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati /*
      na janma maraṇaṃ caiva[ṃ] tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate //
      "How should destruction be together with production?
      For birth and death are not found [like that] at one and the same time."
   4. *bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma saṃbhavo vibhavaṃ vinā /*
      anityatā hi bhāveṣu na kadācin na vidyate //
      "How should there be production without destruction?
      For impermanence is never not found in the things."
   5. *saṃbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati /*
      na janma maraṇaṃ caiva[ṃ] tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate //
      "How should production be together with destruction?
      For birth and death are not found [like that] at one and the same time."
   6. *sahānyonyena vā siddhir vinānyonyena vā yayoḥ /*
      na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate //
      "How should two things become established that are established neither together with each other nor without each other?"
2. XIX:
   1. *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca yady atītam apekṣya hi /*
      pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca kāle 'tīte bhaviṣyataḥ //
      "If present and future existed depending on the past, (then) present and future would be in the past time."
   2. *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi /*
      pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātāṃ katham apekṣya tam //
      "If present and future would however not be there [in the past], how would present and future be depending on that?"
   3. *anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nātītaṃ vidyate tayoḥ /*
      pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate //
      "But not depending on the past the two [present and future] are not established,
      therefore the present and future time do not exist."
   4. *etenāvaśiṣṭau dvau krameṇa parivartakau /*
      uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīṃś ca lakṣayet //
      "By this same (method) one should consider the remaining two changes in regard to (their) order, as well as the (attributes of being) the highest, the lowest and the middle (or: the latest, the earliest and the middle (?)) etc. and the oneness/sameness etc."

3. The principle of "temporal change" as formulated above presupposes that the determinations of being present, past and future do not apply to eternal entities. But this seems to correspond to the actual use of the predicates 'to be present', 'to be past', 'to be future'. In the present context it is irrelevant whether the fact, that these predicates are ordinarily only ascribed to entities that are not assumed to be everlasting, is as a matter of fact a result of the *meaning* of the terms 'present', 'past' and 'future' (so that e.g. 'x is present' semantically entails 'x will be past', 'x was future') or whether the non-applicability in cases where non-existence at (at least) some times is not assumed follows from conversational principles. Important is only that in both cases the author of the MMK may have acknowledged the principle in the form as given above.

4. It should be noted that this supposition is quite independent of the question whether the expressions *pratyutpanno* and *'nāgataś (ca)* are taken in the sense of 'present thing/dharma', 'future thing/dharma' or 'present time', 'future time'. Even if one assumed the former reading in

the verses 1 and 2 - which is however quite improbable in view of verse 3 - one is allowed to regard the "dependence-thesis" as based on the phenomenon of "temporal change". The possibility that the fact that the temporal determinations of being present, past and future presuppose each other is expressed by saying that present and future things (dharmas) depend on the past - and analogously present and past things on the future and future and past things on the present - cannot be excluded, although a formulation saying that present and future time depend on the past etc. would be more natural. It is however impossible to regard the word *atītam* as referring to a past thing or dharma if one wants to consider it as an expression of the principle of temporal change. The sentence that present and future (things) are dependent on a past thing (although linguistically compatible with the formulation of verse 1) can only be taken to represent a totally different theorem.

5. This is a feature which the above discussed hypothesis shares with some other assumptions, like the assumption that Nāgārjuna wanted to presuppose in this context that every dependence demands the simultaneous existence of the relata or that the author of the MMK conceived any relation and a forteriori any dependence-relation as something that occurs or comes into existence at a specific time and that any relation occurs only at such times where all the relata are existent - as it is for example suggested by phrases like 'Paul has become father an hour ago' etc.

6. It might be objected that the analysis, as given above, and especially the principle formulated in P5 does not yet make it explainable why the author of the MMK thinks that the same kind of reasoning that holds for the three times can also be applied to the local determinations of (being the) highest, middle and lowest etc. But even if it is granted - what must not necessarily be granted - that the expressions *uttama, adhama* and *madhya* in verse 4 are intended as referring to local positions, one is able to give an account of the data found in the text on the basis of the "condition-merging-hypothesis". One way to explain the extension of the method of reasoning adduced in connection with the "time-epochs" to other realms would lie in the supposition that Nāgārjuna was ready to extend the principle of P5 to the spatial dimension. This might have been done quite automatically because of the intuitive analogy between time and space. But it is also imaginable that the picture was responsible which obtrudes itself under the presupposition that the conditioning-relation constituting the topic of P5 is viewed in a way that would be appropriate to the above given examples of "foundational conditioning". If the (logical) conditioning that holds between any conditioned (entity) and its condition on account of the fact that being a condition presupposes ("is conditioned by") (the existence of) a conditioned is taken in such a "realistic" manner as involving the inherence of the conditioning factor (= the conditioned entity) in the conditioned (= the condition), the proposition that every conditioned entity must be located in its condition emerges naturally. But this presupposition represents just the spatial analogue of P5. There is however still an alternative way to account for the statement in kārikā 4 that in the same manner the (determinations of being) the highest etc. can be viewed. For the first half of the same kārikā betrays that Nāgārjuna held it possible to derive a mutal conditioning between the different time-epochs. Therefore it is not cogent that the author regarded the analogy in the reasoning as involving a similarity in all its steps; it is equally well possible that the analogical character is assumed on the basis of the reciprocal conditioning that is involved in the latter cases. Under the presupposition that all conditioning has to be taken in a realistic manner, however, and only under such a presupposition the idea of a mutual conditioning involves an absurdity. It should be noted that the explanations given above are apt to cover also the cases expressed by *ekatvādi* if this word is taken to refer to the dichotomy of identity and difference.

7. I,6: *naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate /*
asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim //

"Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent thing is a cause possible. Of what non-existent (thing) is there a cause, and of an existent (thing) what is the use of a cause?"

8. The circumstance that the theorem P5 and the principle leading to it plays a prominent role in the context of causation *may* explain, why chapter XIX begins as it begins, or more concretely, why it starts just with the dependence of present and future on the past and not with one of the other existing dependences between present, past and future. The sentence of the first half of kārikā 1 that formulates the dependence *could* linguistically also be taken to express a causal dependence of the present and future from the past things (*dharmas*). This fact bestows

on the formulation a suggestive character and the first verse could, taken in isolation, also be understood as if it alludes exclusively to the causal relationship between past and present as well as future dharmas without any reference to the "temporal change"-phenomenon. Under this supposition the argument of kārikā 1 would say that because of the causal dependence of any present or future dharma from a past one the present and future (dharmas) must exist during the existence of the past dharmas or must constitute their internal nature in accordance with principles that are brought into play in chapter 1 where the cause-effect relationship is tried to be disproved. But this would imply that any present or future dharma must already exist in the past time.

The reason why it is not probable that the dependence thesis formulated in the kārikās is meant *exclusively* as an expression of a causal dependence lies mainly in the circumstance that it does not harmonise with the possibility of changing the order between the temporal determinations explicitly stated in verse 4. This problem does not exist, if one sees the dependence thesis as based on the temporal-change-phenomenon.

- But perhaps one cannot regard the difficulties for the alternative analysis as unsurmountable. A possible way to reconcile the assumption that only causal dependence is alluded to in the beginning with what is said in the following verses would be to assume that the causal dependence of present and future on the past is viewed by the author as involving that also the other way round present and future must condition the past (be inherent constituents of the past). On this basis it would further be derivable that future and past depend on the present (where the dependence of future on present is motivated by the causal relationship between present and future and the dependence of past on present is obtained from the first step) and that past and present depend on the future (as is derivable from the foregoing steps and with the same principles as used before). - The fact that in the second half of kārikā 3 the author speaks of the non-existence of present and future time and not of present and future things may be explained by the assumption that this formulation is intended to represent a consequence that follows from the absurdity of the assumption of present and future dharmas (which constitutes the immediate result of the proof). - The circumstances that on this hypothesis the reasonings with inverted order of the constituents have to be taken as resting on the argumentation put forward in the kārikās 1-3 and that the extrapolation of the proof on the basis of its description in the first verses would not be simple whereas the author does neither indicate that the reasonings with inverted order are based on the foregoing steps nor give any clue regarding the way to continue but suggests instead that the reasonings with inverted order can be derived in a very simple way and could in principle also constitute the beginning of the argumentation are sufficient to make this latter interpretation less probable. But even if one followed this course to avoid the assumption that the dependence-thesis is based upon the phenomenon of temporal change, the main results of the analysis would not be affected. For the sketched alternative works with the same principles derived from a merging of condition-types as above. It is important to note this because it shows that the hypothesis of the assimilation of logical to "real" conditions is not essentially bound to a specific answer to the question as to what is the basis of the dependence thesis between past, present and future.

9. VII,2 *utpādādyās trayo vyastā nālaṃ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi /*
saṃskṛtasya samastāḥ syur ekatra katham ekadā //
"The three (characteristics) origination etc. are seperately not capable for the performance of the characterization of the conditioned (thing); (but) how could they be together at one place at one time?"

10. X,11 *yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham /*
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsya na yujyate //
"The thing that is established in dependence, how could it depend (when it is) unestablished?
Or it depends (when it is) established - (then) its dependence is not possible."

11. II,22 *gatyā yayājyate gantā gatiṃ tāṃ sa na gacchati /*
yasmān na gatipūrvo 'sti kaścit kiṃcid dhi gacchati //
"The going by which the goer is manifested, that he does not go, because he is not prior to going. For someone goes something."

II,23 *gatyā yayājyate gantā tato 'nyāṃ sa na gacchati /*
gatī dve nopapadyete yasmād eke tu gantari //*

* (Variant: *eke pragacchati*)

"Another going than that by which the goer is manifested, he does not go, because two goings cannot occur at one (single) goer."

12. As it is, admittedly, not immediately obvious, how the reasoning represented by MMK, 22-23 is connected with a transformation of a logical conditioning-relation into a dependence-relation between particulars, it may be remarked here that the place where such a mechanism comes into play, if the hypothesis is correct, would be kārikā 22. It is not necessary to admit any further principles apart from the above mentioned remodelling, if one regarded 1) the phrase *yasmān na gatipūrvo 'sti* as an expression of the thought that the circumstance that there is someone who goes cannot be given prior to the existence of an action of going (or more specifically: an action of going which manifests a goer as a goer, which is responsible for the fact that something can be called a goer - there exists also the reading *yayocyate* instead of *yayājyate*) and 2) the phrase *kaścid kiṃcid dhi gacchati* as a formulation of the fact that an action of going (specifically an action of going which someone goes) requires the existence of someone who goes (a goer).

13. If the thesis is correct that the crux of the arguments of the MMK does not lie in their formal character (that they are formally correct and intuitively plausible insofar as the correctness is tested on the level of abstraction of propositional or predicate calculus) and if they involve not explicitly stated principles which can only be inferred from the passages that contain proofs or apparent proofs, the supposition seems justified that all attempts trying to elicit relevant features of Nāgārjuna's thinking by analysing the argumentations in terms of modern propositional calculus are mistaken.

- Further justification for the assumption of the formal validity of the arguments as well as for the thesis that the argumentative passages of the MMK are intended as furnishing genuine proofs will be found in my papers "Die metaphysische Lehre Nāgārjunas" (forthcoming in Conceptus, nr. 56, 1988:47-64) and "Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Nāgārjunas" (forthcoming in StII15, 1989).

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